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FROM THE EDITORS
At a time when the Russia-generated crisis in and around Ukraine largely has mo
nopolized the attention of the international community, it is useful to be reminded
that the Middle East has not exactly gone away. It is more important than ever to
understand the Middle East not as an isolated geopolitical problem but rather as a
key arena of major-power rivalry. In “Israeli Maritime Power and Eurasian Com
petition,” Seth Cropsey underscores the historical and contemporary importance
of Israel’s naval capabilities as a strategic counter to these powers—principally
Turkey and Iran—rather than as a counter to the marginal naval threats posed by
its immediate neighbors. He notes that Israel understandably has hedged its bets
in relation to the extraregional great powers Russia and China, even as he registers
a warning about the risks of encouraging China’s appetite for Israeli advanced mil
itary technologies. The author emphasizes the significance of Israel’s submarine
force for the credibility of its nuclear deterrent but suggests that Israel may need to
embrace a new requirement for a naval (presumably, submarine) presence in the
Indian Ocean to counter Iran. Seth Cropsey is president of the Yorktown Institute.
The emergence in recent years of great-power competition as the defining
feature of the current strategic environment naturally has led to a revived atten
tion to nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear war. At the same time, the
strategic environment itself has evolved as new—and at best half-understood—
military capabilities have emerged on the scene. Cyber war is the most obvious
and consequential of these. In “Nuclear-Crisis Management and Cyber War:
A Dangerous Crossroads,” Stephen J. Cimbala attempts to come to grips at a
conceptual level with the possible interactions of cyber warfare, or information
operations more generally, with nuclear-crisis management. Drawing on a welldeveloped but by now virtually forgotten literature on crisis management gener
ated during the Cold War, the author reminds us that nuclear deterrence during
those years was more fragile than often believed, and that careful thought needs
to be given to the potential unintended consequences for command and control
and crisis communications with the adversary under various scenarios of cyber
attack. Stephen J. Cimbala is a professor of political science at Pennsylvania State
University–Brandywine.
Matthew Cancian’s “An Offensive Minelaying Campaign against China” focus
es on an aspect of a possible conventional conflict with the People’s Republic of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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China that is rarely discussed, if not actively neglected, by the U.S. Navy. Cancian
usefully reminds us of the underappreciated effectiveness of American minewarfare campaigns, especially the one against Japan over five months in 1945
that sank more ship tonnage than all the “unrestricted” USN submarine attacks
of World War II. He surveys existing American mine-warfare capabilities and
aerial-delivery options in the Taiwan Strait, offers a detailed analysis of Chinese
countermine capabilities, and highlights the overall operational advantage likely
to accrue to the United States and its allies from conducting such a campaign.
He also emphasizes the unique strategic advantage of mine warfare as a measure
short of direct kinetic combat. Matthew Cancian is a PhD candidate at the Mas
sachusetts Institute of Technology and a former Marine artillery officer.
At a time when Russia’s attention seems focused largely on Ukraine and its
future relationship with the West, it is important not to lose sight of Russian ac
tivities elsewhere in the world. This is particularly true of the African continent.
In “‘Great Regional Engagement’ Rather than ‘Great Sea Power’: Russia’s New
Supply Point on the Red Sea Coast,” Tobias Kollakowski assesses the significance
of Russia’s recent acquisition of a naval logistics base at Port Sudan on the Red
Sea in light of its overall interests in the region. He argues that, quite unlike the
example of the Soviet Union’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean toward the
end of the Cold War, Russia is concerned not with projecting blue-water naval
power but rather with positioning itself to exert political and military influence
in North Africa and the Sahel. It is surprising to learn that Russia is now the
source of 50 percent of all arms exports to African nations. Tobias Kollakowski,
an officer in the Federal German Naval Reserve, is a PhD candidate at King’s
College London.
It would not be difficult to make the case that the pace of technological change
today creates unprecedented challenges for those charged with the task of design
ing, building, and fielding the U.S. Navy of the future. David H. Lewis, in “In
novation, Interrupted: Next-Generation Surface-Combatant Design,” argues that
the Navy has not embraced sufficiently the imperative of the “open architecture”
approach to ship design it originally pioneered in the Yorktown-class aircraft car
riers of the late 1930s and has followed more recently with the Littoral Combat
Ship. David H. Lewis is the Acquisition Chair and Professor of the Practice at the
Naval Postgraduate School.
ERRATUM
On page 43 of the Autumn 2021 Review, USS Valley Forge (CV 45) was identified
incorrectly as a Midway-class carrier; it was actually a long-hull variant of the
Essex class.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (NWC) is a remarkably complex orga

nization and is unique within the Department of Defense. The
strength of our institution rests on the integration of many disparate entities into
one highly productive team that is laser focused on mission accomplishment.
The College’s recently published Strategic Plan documents how we seek to create
enduring strategic advantage by excelling in education, research and analysis, and
outreach initiatives.
In this President’s Forum, I want to highlight the impactful work being done
by one of our primary fleet-engagement and international-outreach entities, the
College of Maritime Operational Warfare (CMOW). CMOW provides educa
tion and assistance—in residence, on-site, and online—to improve the ability
of fleet commanders and their staffs to plan, prepare, and employ naval, joint,
and combined forces across the full range of military operations. The talented
and dedicated CMOW team, composed of sixty faculty and staff members and
contractors, executes this mission by providing a variety of courses, specialty
communities of interest, and direct advice and consulting. Specifically, CMOW
does the following:
• Facilitates the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander course for
U.S. flag and general officers who have the potential to command at the fleet
level, or the equivalent. This war-fighting course exposes these officers to
operational-level-of-war concepts and considerations, and includes practical
exercises as experiential learning events.
• Facilitates Combined Force Maritime Component Commander courses
around the world, bringing together flag and general officers from our
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partner nations and U.S. services to improve the ability of our maritime
forces to work together to maintain free and open seas.
• Offers the Executive Level Operational Level of War Course, the Maritime
Operational Planners Course, and the Maritime Staff Operators Course.
These courses are focused on preparing staffs to expertly support planning
within maritime operations centers (MOCs) at our fleet headquarters across
the globe. Our staff courses incorporate various planning evolutions and a
battle lab, leveraging experiential learning as a key component of andragogy
(the methodology of teaching adult learners). In response to the growing de
mand for international partners to plan and operate seamlessly with the U.S.
Navy, CMOW also provides the faculty for the International Maritime Staff
Operators Course, to which officers from around the world come to learn
how to plan and coordinate operations in the maritime domain.
• Maintains a Humanitarian Response Program, focused on the integration of
civilian and military efforts in the protection of civilians in conflict zones and
during disaster recovery. In partnership with a variety of civilian colleges and
universities that include Brown, MIT, and Stanford, this group supports all
our courses with instruction on working with the interagency, such as USAID
and humanitarian organizations. Its vignettes and tabletop exercises have
included scenarios involving pandemic operations in an urban environment,
as well as complex disaster recovery and the impacts of rising sea levels.
• Supports the U.S. Fleet Forces Command in training and certifying MOCs,
located at fleet headquarters. The assist-and-assess teams are composed of
civilian and military faculty members who participate in exercises and other
key training events in the MOCs. They represent a wide variety of skill sets,
including logistics, information warfare, operational law, and intelligence,
as well as line forces. Working side by side with the MOC staff, they instill
the skills and best practices defined by the Maritime Operations Center
Standardization Manual to ensure that our fleets are prepared to fight at the
operational level of war and engage in great-power competition.
• Responds to the rapidly evolving complexity of information warfare and as
sists with its integration into planning processes and the workings of MOCs.
These efforts included formation of the Rochefort Group, named after
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, who was famous for his analyses of intel
ligence information and message intercepts that contributed to victory in the
Battle of Midway and many other Pacific War engagements. The Rochefort
Group draws from information-warfare expertise across the College to im
prove our collective ability to understand and employ information warfare at
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the operational level of war. The effort includes such topics as cyberwarfare
integration; maneuver in the electromagnetic spectrum; counterinformation,
-surveillance, -reconnaissance, and -targeting (C-ISRT); and military decep
tion. The Rochefort Group holds workshops with fleet experts to explore
how best to integrate information warfare into the operations of MOCs and
supports a variety of exercises and events across all our fleet headquarters.
Additionally, the group teaches information warfare in NWC courses.
• Provides expert instruction and advice to various organizations and com
mands. Recently, the faculty supported the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
in a study of ways to operationalize the bureau’s staff to meet the demands of
the pandemic, and also assisted the Naval Meteorology and Oceanography
Command as it sought to improve staff responsiveness. Our faculty mem
bers instruct in planning courses with partner nations and the U.S. Marine
Corps, and facilitate tabletop exercises and scenario-based learning events
around the world. Closer to home, CMOW faculty members participate in
Naval War College–hosted war games as players, subject matter experts, and
ethnographers.
• Assists in the Navy’s periodic review of relevant publications and instruc
tions. For example, CMOW led the recent review and major rewrite of Navy
Planning, Naval Warfare Publication 5-01—the foundational reference for
Navy planning. The volume establishes doctrine and puts forward the fun
damental principles to guide Navy planning staffs within the framework of
service, joint, and multinational operations.
A look back at the many changes the College made over the past eighteen
months makes clear that CMOW adapted quickly to the COVID environment
and found success by expanding into virtual environments in some areas.
CMOW was able to deliver excellence in education by adapting its operationallevel-of-warfare courses to include virtual instruction for the first few weeks
of each course—during a “restriction of movement” period—before students
entered the classrooms and battle labs for experiential learning. Reconfigur
ing classrooms and connecting them electronically enabled the teaching of a
full-size class by assigning students to smaller cohorts to minimize contact and
risk. When travel overseas was prohibited, the staff adapted the Combined Force
Maritime Component Commander course into a virtual seminar, which attracted
more than fifty participants—twice the size of a normal class! CMOW designed
and delivered virtual instruction to many organizations and commands, and in
the process its personnel gained skills and competencies they will use to pilot ad
ditional virtual courses in the future to meet increased demand.
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The College of Maritime Operational Warfare is a critical component of our
outreach and fleet-assistance efforts, and contributes robustly to the College’s
lines of effort in research and education as well. In the months and years ahead,
our integrated and tightly focused CMOW team will continue to support the
nation’s maritime efforts to address the challenges of great-power competition.

SHOSHANA S. CHATFIELD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/1

18

Naval War College: Winter 2022 Full Issue

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,

19

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [], No. 1, Art. 1

Seth Cropsey is president of the Yorktown Institute.
He served as a naval officer and as Deputy Under
Secretary of the Navy. His books include Seablind
ness: How Political Neglect Is Choking American
Seapower and What to Do about It (2017). He is a
member of the Naval War College Press Advisory
Board.
Naval War College Review, Winter 2022, Vol. 75, No. 1

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/1

20

Naval War College: Winter 2022 Full Issue

ISR AELI MARITIME POWER AND EUR ASIAN
COMPETITION
Seth Cropsey

M

odern Israel stands at a strategic crossroads. Bilaterally, the Trump ad
ministration was more accommodating of Israeli interests than any U.S.
presidency had been since the first years of the century, if not the late 1960s. The
Abraham Accords constituted the most significant diplomatic shift in the mod
ern Middle East, creating the possibility of a legitimate Arab-Israeli coalition to
counter Iranian expansionism.1 Moreover, Israel’s diplomatic opening to Russia
provided Israel with greater freedom of action in Syria and Iraq against Iran,
potentially indicating a broader Eurasian political shift.
However, the situation has shifted over the past year. The United States now
seems eager to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
the Obama administration’s nuclear deal with Iran that likely would provide a
core aspect of a regional realignment.2 The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan
and the Taliban’s subsequent victory may indicate a broader American pivot
away from the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. The U.S. military force
structure—particularly at sea, but also more broadly—increasingly reflects this
pivot away from European and Middle Eastern security concerns and toward
East Asia. Russia remains a potential threat to Israeli interests, depending on its
political relationship with Iran. Turkey is now an active hostile power with clear
ambitions to control the Levantine Basin. Increasing daylight exists among the
Gulf monarchies over their policies toward Iran and Russia. China steadily has
expanded its regional economic influence, within and without Israel, and will
seek a more explicit political role if the United States departs from the Middle
East. Internally, although Israel has escaped the electoral deadlock that para
lyzed its domestic politics from early 2019 to June 2021, the new governing
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coalition has yet to resolve the tensions within Israeli society that generated
internal gridlock.
The strategic situation requires an understanding of Israel’s maritime interests
and strategy. Israel’s physical and human geography, economic realities, and geo
political location give it a distinct interest in maritime security. And as Middle
Eastern regional rivalries intersect increasingly with Eurasian great-power com
petition, the maritime element of Israeli grand strategy will grow in importance.
Assessing Israeli maritime strategy requires accomplishing four functions.
First, a review is needed of Israel’s broader human and physical geography, econ
omy, grand strategy, and military doctrine, locating naval power within Israel’s
operationally offensive philosophy. Second, Israel’s shifting strategic situation
should be examined, identifying both Eurasian and regional dynamics that in
fluence Israeli security. The third need is for an assessment of extant and future
Israeli force structures against these considerations. The fourth is an inventory
and description of the flash points most likely to catalyze a regional conflict.
THE EVOLUTION OF ISRAELI MARITIME STRATEGY
Traditionally, Israel is not considered a maritime nation. Historically, Phoenicia
was the Levant’s most notable maritime power, establishing colonies along the
North African coastline and as far west as modern Cádiz—most notably, Car
thage.3 In contrast, ancient Israel was landlocked, located in Judea and Samaria,
the so-called West Bank. Commercial contact did occur between Israelites and
the Phoenician city-states, but biblical and historical records do not indicate that
ancient Israel ever had a large-scale maritime presence.4 Jewish merchants hired
ships but generally were not sailors, with the notable exception of the sixteenthcentury Ottoman admiral Sinan Reis.5
Twentieth-century Zionists, particularly in Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s Revisionist move
ment, recognizing the importance of maritime power, established in Italy in 1934
the Betar Naval Academy, arguably the forerunner to Israel’s modern naval acade
my in Haifa.6 Preindependence Zionist groups relied on maritime support, initially
to transport Jewish immigrants to Mandatory Palestine, then after 1946 to secure
weapons for the Yishuv’s paramilitaries.7 Naval forces played a negligible role in
the 1947–48 war. While the fledgling Israeli navy fielded only three purpose-built
combat ships, the lack of Arab naval capacity precluded major engagements at sea,
although Israeli commandos successfully disrupted Egyptian amphibious-assault
attempts.8 However, U.S. sea control in the Levantine Basin ensured that the new
Israeli state received a steady supply of weapons and new immigrants throughout
the conflict, ultimately allowing the better-organized Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
to defeat the poorly coordinated Arab armies and their affiliated irregulars.9 Thus,
even from its founding, Israel has depended on the sea.
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Chronology of Israel’s Wars
1947–48 War: Israel’s War of Independence
1967 War: Six-Day War
1967–73 War: War of Attrition
1973 War: Yom Kippur War
1982 War: First Lebanon War
2006 War: Second Lebanon War
2014 War: Gaza War

Israel’s geography and economic profile explain this dependence. Half of Isra
el’s population lives along the Mediterranean coastline.10 At the country’s widest
point, the distance from inland border to coast is seventy-one miles—a distance a
T-72 tank could traverse in three hours. Even in 1948, a sixteen-inch naval gun’s
twenty-mile range would have covered nearly every major Israeli population cen
ter apart from Jerusalem, while the later development of cruise missiles brought
the entirety of Israeli territory under the threat of naval bombardment.
Economically, Israel is overwhelmingly reliant on maritime commercial trans
port, a situation that has persisted despite increased normalization of the coun
try’s relations, including trade, with Jordan and Egypt. Hence Israel’s treatment
of the 1967 blockade of the Strait of Tiran as an act of war; 90 percent of Israeli
oil passed through the strait, making the blockade an existential threat.11 Mod
ern Israel is far less reliant on oil, given its advances in solar and hydroelectric
technology. However, the discovery of the offshore Tamar and Leviathan gas
fields has renewed the Levantine Basin’s importance for Israel’s economic secu
rity; these deposits, if operationalized, could turn Israel into an energy exporter.12
Apart from Israel, no regional or great power—not Bourbon or Napoleonic
France; not imperial or Nazi Germany; not even Soviet Russia, despite the Com
munist Party’s protestations to the contrary—faced an extant encircling coalition
from the moment it came into existence as a state. Between 1948 and 1973, a
ready-made hostile coalition existed that centered on Egypt and Syria and in
cluded Jordan and Iraq. At its apex in 1973, this coalition also included every
state with a North African coastline plus Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Sudan. Cuba
joined in and received support from the Soviet Union, East Germany, North Ko
rea, and Pakistan.13
Moreover, until 1967 this coalition held overwhelming geographic advantages.
Jordan’s control of Judea and Samaria raised the prospect of an opening offen
sive that could cut Israel in two in mere hours. Syrian control of the Golan de
nied Israel the heights’ superb defensive geography and allowed Syrian armored
formations to begin a southward offensive from this geographic fortress. Until
1956, Egypt (and, to a lesser degree, Jordan and Syria) supported the Palestinian
fedayeen (irregular forces), which mounted cross-border raids targeting Israeli
civilians, to which the nascent Israeli special operations forces responded.14
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Simultaneously, the great powers became increasingly unwilling to serve as Is
rael’s benefactor. Initial Soviet goodwill vanished when it became apparent that,
despite Israel’s nominally socialist politics, the country would not transform
into a Stalinist proxy.15 The Eisenhower administration hoped to court the Arab
world—most notably, postrevolutionary Egypt—and therefore reduced the initial
American political support for Israel. France and the United Kingdom initially
took an active interest in Israel’s survival; however, the Eisenhower administra
tion’s response to Anglo-Franco-Israeli operations against Egypt catalyzed a shift
in diplomatic strategy.16 Increasing fear of Nasserist-style revolutions and a de
sire to maintain some political
control over their former Mid
[A]s Middle Eastern regional rivalries interdle Eastern clients resulted in
sect increasingly with Eurasian great-power
a distinctly Arabophilic postcompetition, the maritime element of Israeli
1956 Anglo-French policy or,
grand strategy will grow in importance.
in Britain’s case specifically,
17
thorough declinist apathy. And the Soviet Union, hoping to circumvent NATO’s
ability to deny it access to the Mediterranean, cultivated relationships with revolu
tionary regimes throughout the Arab world, even deploying air-defense forces and
fighter aircraft to Egypt during the 1967–73 War of Attrition.18
Israeli planners could not generate a tactical or technical solution to overcome
these disadvantages. Only after the 1967 war did the IDF field equipment that
was comparable to that of its Arab adversaries.19 Only after the 1973 war did
American defense exports provide Israel with a qualitative military edge, in re
sponse to the Soviet Union’s support for Egypt and Syria and continued British
assistance to Jordan. On the personnel side, in 1948 Israel could rely on its longterm strength vis-à-vis Arab militaries.20 Pre-1950s Arab armies consisted of a
core of Western-trained professional units of limited size supported by irregulars
such as the fedayeen. But as Arab revolutionary dictatorships institutionalized
themselves, they drew from their larger populations to create modern conscript
armies that outnumbered the IDF easily, given Israel’s much smaller population.
Israeli strategists identified an operational solution, the two components of
which still form the pillars of Israel’s modern doctrine. First, Israel’s lack of stra
tegic depth compelled the IDF to fight forward, taking the operational offensive
even in strategically defensive conflicts. This remains so today; if attacked, the
IDF should begin any defensive ground action beyond Israel’s borders. Second,
Israel could gain an advantage in command and control and officer quality, en
abling fluid operational actions that resembled the Wehrmacht’s most successful
armored offensives during the Second World War. This, combined with the IDF’s
superior morale—a function of Israel’s democratic political structures and the
existential stakes of any conflict—allowed the IDF to best numerically superior
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Arab forces in 1967. Contrary to the standard assessment, Israeli tactical airpow
er did not provide the IDF with a decisive advantage; rather, Israel used airpower
as an operational tool, in 1967 knocking out the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian
air forces in quick succession, and then using airpower to destroy Arab com
munications infrastructure, disrupt force coordination, and break the morale of
retreating Arab units.21
Israel’s strategic miscalculation in 1973 nearly led to its defeat; Israeli intelli
gence did not anticipate the Arab offensive until mere days before Egypt’s Opera
tion BADR, precluding a preemptive strike.22 However, once again superior Israeli
operational talent reversed the situation. The IDF’s counterattack in the Sinai
that split Egyptian forces in two, combined with its counteroffensive in the north
that drove almost to Damascus, demonstrates the role of operational skill; by
reversing Egyptian and Syrian gains so quickly, Israel spoiled the Arab coalition’s
political coordination.23
Maritime power played a central, if nonexplicated, role in this doctrine from
the outset. As stated, no participant in the 1948 war had enough naval forces to
make sea combat relevant. But in 1967, Israeli naval weakness arguably forced the
country’s hand. Unable to challenge Egypt’s blockade, Israel instead committed
to a ground invasion. Operationally, the Israeli navy provided intelligence and
reconnaissance to IDF air and ground units, particularly during the later stages
of the offensive toward the Suez Canal. However, no naval combat occurred. In
1968, Egypt sank an Israeli destroyer with antiship missiles.24
The 1973 war demonstrates most clearly the relevance of naval power to Isra
el’s broader doctrine. While Israeli ground and air forces encountered a dire op
erational situation, the Israeli navy took the offensive. Israel’s only naval reversal
came on 6 October, the war’s first day, when Egyptian missile boats bombarded
the Sinai coast. The following day, five Israeli missile boats sank a five-boat Syr
ian squadron, thereby winning the first missile-to-missile naval engagement in
history, while employing electronic countermeasures and taking no casualties.
Two days later, six Israeli missile boats sank three of four Egyptian missile boats.
From that point on, Israel had sea control of the Levantine Basin. This allowed
the Israeli navy to preempt Egyptian maritime pressure, destroying a fleet of fish
ing boats and fast-attack craft intended to land forces on the Israeli coast.25 Israeli
combat victories in the Levantine Basin also provided the IDF with sea control
in the Gulf of Suez, enabling the deployment of air defenses near the Suez Canal’s
southern outlet, thereby denying air support to the Egyptian Third Army and
preventing an offensive against the southern Sinai. Egypt blockaded the Bab el
Mandeb, which prevented Israel from receiving oil during the 1973 war, but Is
raeli control of the Gulf of Suez and Levantine Basin allowed the IDF to disrupt
Egyptian-bound trade, undermining Egypt’s economy.26 Israeli sea control also
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facilitated sabotage operations along the Egyptian coastline, and Israeli warships
shelled Egyptian land positions.27 This historical experience demonstrates two
benefits that maritime power offers to Israeli strategists.
• Rear-area security: Israeli sea control in the Levantine Basin prevents Israel’s
adversaries from pressuring its coastline. This has allowed Israeli land forces
to assume the operational offensive. Israeli air forces are relieved of responsi
bility for maritime defense, allowing a truly operational use of airpower that,
in 1967 and 1973, was instrumental in Israel’s victories.
• Operational flexibility: Israeli sea control facilitates intelligence gathering,
limits adversary options, and allows Israel to deny its adversaries access to
critical areas while providing freedom of action for its own forces. The Israeli
navy is not large enough to pose an amphibious threat, but it is effective
enough to keep enemy forces bottled up in port and to enable the forwarddeployment of air defenses, as occurred in 1973.
Israel’s strategic situation shifted after 1973. Cairo’s rapprochement with
Washington reduced the threat from Egypt. Even before the 1973 war, the Pal
estine Liberation Organization alienated Jordan—the organization attempted
to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy in 1970–71, leading to its expulsion
from the country and an increasing diplomatic break between Jordan and Syr
ia.28 Although an Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement was not formalized until
1994, by the early 1980s neither Jordan nor Egypt was a major Israeli adversary.
The 1975–90 Lebanese Civil War was a precursor to the Middle East’s contem
porary factional civil wars. Lebanon’s internal dissolution combined first with
Syrian action and then postrevolutionary Iranian involvement to transform an
internal war into a regional proxy war.29 Iran’s war with Iraq also shifted re
gional and great-power attention eastward. Naturally, the Lebanese Civil War
included few naval actions, given the limited naval capabilities of all combat
ants. But Israel’s overwhelming naval victories in the 1973 war and Syria’s con
sequent naval impotence again provided the IDF with freedom of action in
southern Lebanon.
There is an additional strategic role for Israeli naval power. Israel’s nuclear
capabilities technically remain unacknowledged, but it is likely that the coun
try first developed nuclear weapons months before the 1967 war and now has a
stockpile of from eighty to four hundred warheads. Israel is by far the smallest
country with nuclear capabilities; the next smallest, North Korea, is 450 percent
the size of Israel.30 Any nuclear power, to ensure a stable military balance, must
consider second-strike capabilities, usually by creating multiple delivery systems
and placing weapons across its territory. Initially, Israel procured and developed
air-launched, nuclear-capable cruise missiles and may have built hardened silos
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that could withstand a nuclear attack.31 But Israel’s paucity of territory still raises
the possibility that an overwhelming initial offensive would conquer the country
too quickly for it to employ its full nuclear arsenal, thereby decreasing its deter
rence value. Since the beginning of the century, the Israeli navy has operated an
attack-submarine fleet—initially three boats, soon to be six—capable of launch
ing nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.32 This has transformed the Levantine Basin
into a naval bastion, akin to the Soviet Union’s use of the Barents Sea and Sea of
Okhotsk during the Cold War.33 Israel’s naval capabilities afford it much greater
strategic depth and a secure second strike.
In sum, naval power provides Israel with rear-area security, greater operation
al flexibility, and invaluable strategic depth.
THE SHIFTING STRATEGIC SITUATION
The need for, and benefits of, Israeli maritime power have persisted despite the
Middle East’s political shifts. However, since the middle of the first decade of the
twenty-first century, the Middle East has become a focal point for Eurasian com
petition. A review of the intersection of great-power interests and the actions of
regional states and nonstate actors shows the scale of the strategic problem Israeli
planners face, and the role maritime issues play under changed circumstances.
China’s Middle East policy is a major component of its grand strategy. Its re
gional approach is inextricably linked to its grand-strategic goals. The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) has two main targets: Israel and Turkey. The latter pro
vides a land bridge to Europe, allowing China to link its Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) infrastructure to its investments in Greece, elsewhere in the Balkans, and in
Hungary.34 But the former is far more important. China operates the civilian por
tion of Haifa Port, collocated close to the Israeli navy’s headquarters and primary
base.35 Much as with Piraeus Port in Greece, China hopes to use its interests in
Haifa to monopolize Levantine Basin trade.36
More relevant is China’s investment in Israel’s high-technology sector. Not
withstanding its propaganda claims, the CCP understands that China’s political
economy is brittle. Yes, direct or indirect party control of major economic enti
ties allows the CCP to preempt any independent domestic faction; but the party
becomes tied to the country’s major economic actors and is obligated to rescue
them during crises—crises that China’s hybrid (central planning / market) eco
nomic system creates.
Innovation in China is extremely difficult, owing to the lack of legitimate
intellectual-property protections. The Israeli economy offers a solution. Its startup ecosystem is an innovative paradise, and Chinese firms are willing to provide
ample investment. Israeli military technology is also appealing. The CCP has iden
tified Israel as a potential military supplier since the Tiananmen Square incident
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in 1989; with China under a punitive embargo, Israel became one of the few
countries with a Western-style defense-industrial establishment able to do busi
ness with China.37 While the United States blocked high-profile arms transfers—
most notably, the attempted sale of an airborne-early-warning aircraft to China at
the beginning of this century—in the 1990s Israel and China developed a robust
defense-technology relationship, indicating the possibility of future cooperation.38
Chinese activity in the Middle East often intersects with Russian interests and
actions. Israeli strategists conceive of their country as a critical, if relatively small,
piece in the broader Eurasian competition. Still, Israel’s engagement with China
and Russia is risky. Neither of the two would be willing to provide Jerusalem with
the same freedom of action as does Washington, given Beijing’s desire to pre
serve Arab and Iranian oil imports and Moscow’s taste for cultivating links with
multiple parties in any conflict. Russia has acquiesced to Israeli action in Syria
and Iraq; however, before 2018 it simply may have been too focused on maintain
ing its tactical position to resist Israeli demands, and after 2018 too engaged in
Libya to consider Middle East policy proper. Moreover, during Hamas’s attacks
on Israel in May 2021 and the concurrent rioting in Israel’s Arab communities,
Chinese state media explicitly supported Palestinian unrest, criticizing Israel as
a supposed apartheid state.39 Given that Israel is a small power, it is reasonable
for Israeli policy makers to cultivate relationships with major actors beyond the
United States, but too great a reliance on Chinese and Russian cooperation leaves
Israel vulnerable to political isolation.
The difficulty is the ambiguous U.S. relationship to Israel and the Middle East
more broadly. The Biden administration has signaled its intention to return to
the Middle East policy that President Obama practiced from 2009 to 2017.40 It
rests on two uncertain paradigms. The first is that a U.S.-Iran rapprochement is
possible, either as the beginning of a wholesale regional realignment or simply
to reduce U.S. commitments outside the Indo-Pacific. The second is that most
Middle Eastern political disputes can be traced directly to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Thus, the JCPOA and the Roadmap for Peace process are two comple
mentary initiatives; the former disengages the United States from a region that is
declining in relevance because of the weight the Asia-Pacific exerts in the SinoAmerican antagonism, while the latter reduces regional tensions by addressing
the “root cause” of regional tension.
Neither of these concepts fits with strategic reality. The Palestine question
never has been relevant to the broad balance of power among the Middle East’s
major players, initially Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Syria, then the Gulf monarchies
and Iraq, and increasingly Iran. Iranian goals are bluntly hegemonic and fit far
more reasonably with Russian and Chinese interests than with American objec
tives. Moreover, the Middle East is not a peripheral region diverting resources
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from more-relevant conflicts in the Indo-Pacific but a central region in a broader
competition for Eurasian dominance. Nevertheless, despite the strategic irratio
nality of this paradigm, a small power such as Israel must hedge its bets; hence its
cooperation with Russia to gain a free hand in Syria and Iraq against Iran and its
increasing economic links with China.
It is evident that China and Russia have multiple intersecting regional in
terests, making them at most equally responsive to Israeli, Iranian, Saudi, and
perhaps Turkish and Emirati demands. Since the late 1960s, the United States
has recognized the strategic benefits an assertive Israel provides it. In return for
American diplomatic support and maritime security, Israel acts decisively against
states and nonstate actors that threaten American and Israeli interests in equal
measure. Indeed, Israel is one of the few U.S. allies that no American soldier has
died defending, unlike even the United Kingdom. America’s withdrawal from Af
ghanistan, potential pressuring of the Israeli government, and desire to reengage
with Iran all undermine Israeli and American security. But without a sufficiently
robust military—in particular, a naval force powerful enough to secure sea con
trol independently—Israel risks being boxed in during a future crisis.
Intraregional Rivalries: Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey
The Middle East may be a critical pivot point for Eurasian competition, owing
to the role it plays in Chinese and Russian strategy, but the region also has its
own dynamics and antagonisms that influence Israeli interests and impact Israeli
grand strategy and maritime policy. Much as Sino-American antagonism defines
Eurasian politics more broadly, Iranian-Arab and Iranian-Israeli enmities shape
the structure of Middle Eastern conflict. However, relationships among actors
are fluid, necessitating an explication of multiple major players’ interests as they
relate to maritime power.
Iran’s political ambitions and shifts in relative power make it the focal point of
regional rivalries. Even before the Islamic Republic was founded, Iran played an
odd role in regional politics. It served as an American ally, but an inactive one;
Iran was not expected to intervene in Middle Eastern conflicts but instead to pre
serve oil flows from the Persian Gulf. Imperial Iran’s military power and history,
however, increased Arab-Iranian enmity. Iran and Israel saw each other as useful
partners even before the United States became Israel’s great-power benefactor.
Iran benefited from Israeli technical skill and military expertise and in return be
came Israel’s primary energy supplier.41 This relationship never became a formal
alliance; nevertheless, Israeli policy makers viewed their relationship with Iran as
central to Middle Eastern stability. Arab nationalist revolutions simply intensified
existing enmity between Israel and its Arab neighbors; U.S.-aligned, Shia, Persian
Iran served as a useful counterweight to anti-Israeli Arab coordination, along
side Israel’s historical links with Turkey and support for the Kurds.42 Meanwhile,
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throughout the 1970s Iran’s shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi became more asser
tive, increasingly hinting at an Iranian desire for regional power.43 The 1979 revo
lution destroyed the shah’s regime, but had the shah survived, and had Pakistan
and India developed nuclear capabilities more rapidly, imperial Iran well might
have attempted a nuclear breakout.
The 1979 revolution in Iran was the culmination of a broader Middle East
ern political shift. The 1973 war and Egypt’s realignment with the United States
undermined a Syrian-Egyptian, Arab-nationalist coalition. Syrian aggression
in Lebanon also alienated the Gulf monarchies, who increasingly turned to the
United States for protection. Saddam’s consolidation of power in 1979 and Iraq’s
invasion of Iran in 1980 there
fore produced a catalytic mo
[T]he Middle East is not a peripheral region
diverting resources from more-relevant conflicts ment. The Gulf monarchies
viewed Saddam’s Iraq as a bul
in the Indo-Pacific but a central region in a
wark against Shia-Iranian im
broader competition for Eurasian dominance.
perialism, fearing the Islamic
Republic’s unique combination of revolutionary socialism, theological politics,
and de jure democratic representation.44 By contrast, Israel hoped to court the
new Iran, despite its explicitly revolutionary Islamist and anti-Zionist charac
ter, primarily because of the dangers Iraqi expansionism posed. Throughout the
1980s, Israel found itself covertly supporting Iran against Iraq with military tech
nology, even as it was fighting Iranian-backed groups in Lebanon.45
Iran’s regime is neither irrational nor apocalyptically inclined. Ruholla Kho
meini, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s founding leader, cannot be understood as a
Shia Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, fixated on unleashing sectarian violence to usher in
the eschaton. However, the Iranian regime’s religious character shapes its world
view and regional ambitions. The Islamic Republic is not simply a Shia entity;
it does not understand Shia Islam in purely sectarian terms. Rather, the regime
conceives of Shiism as a critical aspect of Islamic identity and sees its revolu
tionary role as encompassing the entire Islamic world. Iran is the descendant
of an ancient empire worthy of respect—respect that the Ottoman Turks and
European powers denied it. Persian states constituted the Middle East’s politi
cal center of gravity until the seventh-century Arab conquests. And apart from
the Umayyad dynasty, Persians and Persian culture dominated the Levantine
Islamic world, first during the so-called Iranian intermezzo, then with the de
velopment under the Seljuks of a Turko-Persian identity. It thus is unsurprising
that modern Iran would consider itself the rightful leader of the Islamic world in
general rather than the guardian of Shia sectarians alone. Ironically, despite Iraqi
military incompetence, Saddam grasped this fact better than any other region
al actors in 1979—hence his preemptive strike against the still-consolidating
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revolutionary Iranian regime.46 It was Iraqi power that constrained Iranian am
bition until America’s 2003 invasion.
Nevertheless, the outlines of Iranian strategy reach back to the mid-1980s,
as seen in Iran’s support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and its explicit religiousideological challenges to Saudi legitimacy. Iran’s general strategic framework has
two long-term goals. First, gaining ideological and religious leadership of the Is
lamic world requires controlling Islamic holy sites, specifically Mecca, Medina,
and Jerusalem. Therefore Iran hopes to undermine the Saudi and Israeli states,
either bringing Saudi Arabia into an Iranian-led alliance system or toppling the
house of Saud, and ultimately destroying Israel. Second, Iran seeks access to glob
al oil markets, given its economy’s reliance on oil production. Thus, maritime
power is a critical interest to Iran, both in its littorals and regionally.
Pursuing this strategy requires five steps. First, Iran must build a proxy net
work providing it control of a corridor running from its borders to the Levantine
Basin. It already has achieved this goal. Hezbollah has co-opted the Lebanese
state, as its conflicts with Israel have undermined the country’s physical infra
structure and civil capacity. Syria remains partly beholden to Russia, but Iran’s
support for Assad before 2015—and the manpower the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iranian proxies still provide to the regime—gives it
thorough influence over the country.47 Iran created a proxy network in Iraq to
combat the United States, then co-opted the government upon American with
drawal in 2011. Iran capitalized on the Islamic State’s (IS’s) offensive in 2014,
solidifying its control of Iraqi state institutions. What King Abdullah termed the
“Shia Crescent” now exists.48 One must note, however, that Iran’s allies are not
exclusively Shia; in Iraq in particular, Iranian-backed militia leaders have begun
to integrate non-Shia units into their command structure, while these militias
increasingly are integrated into the Iraqi state.49
Second, having created this proxy network, Iran must pressure Saudi Ara
bia and Israel. All Iran’s nonstate allies in the Middle East’s littorals now field
naval capabilities. Lebanon is Iran’s primary pressure point against Israel, ow
ing to Hezbollah’s history and Lebanon’s Mediterranean coastline. The 2006
Lebanon war is illustrative. Hezbollah assumed the tactical and operational de
fensive in southern Lebanon, drawing Israeli forces into close-quarters urban
combat. This shielded Hezbollah’s mobile missile launchers, which were used
to bombard Israeli population centers, undermining political will for the longterm operations necessary to destroy the group’s military capacity. Hezbollah’s
strategy will be identical in the next conflict.50 During that war, Hezbollah also
pressured Israel at sea, damaging INS Hanit during its blockade of the Leba
nese coastline.51 Hezbollah used a Chinese-produced C-802 missile and likely
received technical support from the IRGC. Israel’s ability to blockade Lebanon
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during a conflict provides it with a critical advantage; while its air force can
interdict supplies overland, its navy denies Iran or other countries that would
support Israel’s enemies the ability to resupply Hezbollah. Iran is now Hamas’s
primary benefactor, despite the supposed theological divide between the Shia
Islamic Republic and the Sunni Palestinian terrorist group. Israel’s blockade of
Gaza and Egyptian cooperation have prevented Iran from supplying Hamas
with sophisticated weapons, but Hamas has established naval commando units
for wartime sabotage. Farther south, in Yemen, Iran’s Houthi allies have used
antiship missiles against American and Saudi warships. Land-directed mea
sures remain prominent in Iranian strategy, as its 2019 Abqaiq-Khurais attack
on Saudi Arabia from Iraqi territory demonstrates; nevertheless, maritime
pressure is equally critical.52
Third, Iran must disrupt any regional coalition against it. The Islamic Repub
lic’s identity and interests make Saudi Arabia and Israel its major targets; how
ever, they are not the only significant regional actors. Until the 1990s, Saudi Ara
bia led a relatively coherent Gulf Arab coalition. But the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) and Qatar developed independent links with the United States, allow
ing them to expand their military capabilities. This enabled a broader regional
struggle during the Arab Spring, which led to Qatar’s public break with Saudi
Arabia and the UAE.53 In Syria, Qatar carved out its own proxy network of moreradical Islamists.54 In Libya, it opposed Saudi Arabia and the broader Arab co
alition.55 The UAE, another small state with tactical flexibility, generally aligned
with Saudi Arabia but acted independently in Libya during the second civil war.
More recently, Egypt has regained some foreign-policy independence after hav
ing served as a Saudi client since Abdel el-Sisi’s 2013 coup. Jordan, Egypt, and
Iraq have signed an agreement for a “New Middle East,” authorizing Jordan to
transport Iraqi oil to Egypt and offering citizens of all three countries visa-free
travel access.56 Iraq’s ties with Iran suggest that this may signal a shift in Iran’s
policy toward Jordan and Egypt. Moreover, Saudi Arabia views the UAE as an
economic competitor; Mohammed bin Salman plans to shift Saudi state media
companies from Dubai to Riyadh to improve the kingdom’s competitiveness.57
Recent events also are relevant. The UAE has been far more engaged in Afghani
stan than was Saudi Arabia, even hosting former Afghan president Ashraf Ghani
after the Taliban captured Kabul.58 Iran thus has significant political space to
maneuver among the Middle East’s major powers and will exploit it as necessary
to disrupt alliance formation.
Fourth, Iran must maintain good relations with great and middle powers oth
er than the United States to ensure it can export oil. As noted, the Iranian econ
omy is tied wholly to oil exports. The Iranian regime has attempted to diversify
the country’s economic profile, but this diversification occurs overwhelmingly
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through the bonyad system. Nominally charitable Islamic trusts, the bonyads
in fact serve as a link between the regime and the black market, facilitating Ira
nian arms and technology transfers and even selling narcotics and other illicit
substances. The IRGC controls major bonyads, while former and active IRGC
officers run both Iran’s Petroleum Ministry and its nuclear program, preventing
a pivot away from petrochemical dependence.59 Hence it is critical for Iran to de
velop links with oil-dependent great and middle powers. Since the 2015 JCPOA,
Iran has increased its exports to China, to which it now exports 51 percent of
its crude oil; signed a comprehensive development framework with India; and,
as of mid-2021, planned to expand exports to Europe as well. A greater interna
tional petrochemical presence will allow Iran to hamper any U.S.-led sanctions
efforts, especially if it can establish a foothold in European markets. Moreover,
10 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports travel to the UAE, so a more robust IranUAE partnership is possible because of divisions between Saudi and Emirati
objectives.60
Fifth, Iran hopes to use the above four policy measures to isolate the Unit
ed States and ultimately to eject it from the Middle East. The United States is
the only great power that has been willing to confront Iran’s expansion and is a
necessary participant in any formal anti-Iranian Arab-Israeli alliance system. If
Iran can pressure the United States and its allies militarily through its proxies,
maintain links with other great-power benefactors, and increase its economic ties
with China, India, and America’s European allies, it can undermine the American
political and diplomatic role in the Middle East. Ideally (in Iran’s view), it would
use the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as a lever to increase pressure on the
United States in Iraq while increasingly cooperating with its Arab rivals as the
U.S. presence declines.
Iran is the most significant regional actor for general strategic purposes, but
Turkey is equally relevant in a maritime context. Contemporary Turkey should
not be confused with its twentieth-century predecessor. Until the 1990s, Turkish
leaders subordinated any regional ambitions to bolstering the country’s engage
ment with Europe and the U.S.-led alliance system. Turkey hemmed in Russian
action in the eastern Mediterranean and was the cornerstone of NATO’s southern
maritime defenses.61 Turkey was aggressive at times, particularly against Greece,
but American senior military officers and diplomats managed Turko-Greek ten
sions well enough to prevent an intra-NATO conflict.62
This state of affairs has shifted since the first years of the twenty-first cen
tury. Turkish fixation on the Kurdish question resulted in its opposition to the
U.S. invasion of Iraq—Ankara denied Washington the ability to use its military
bases to attack Iraq from the northwest.63 The U.S. presence in Iraq until 2011
did mitigate tensions, but the Syrian civil war and IS’s emergence brought the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,

33

28

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [], No. 1, Art. 1

Kurdish question to the fore again, resulting in Turkey’s military incursions
into Syria and tensions with Russia.
Of equal importance is Turkey’s internal political realignment. Initially, Recep
T. Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party retained its Europhilic tilt despite
the party’s nominal religious identification. But since the early 2010s—most no
tably, after the 2016 alleged coup—Erdoğan has solidified his personal control
over Turkish politics and increasingly has escalated Turkish international adven
turism.64 Turkey was the most
active foreign participant in
As the United States pivots away from the
the 2014–20 Libyan civil war,
Middle East and Europe, . . . Israel must be
intervening on the Tripoli
prepared to use its navy independently to secure the Levantine Basin for its own purposes. government’s behalf—thereby
opposing Russia, NATO ally
France, and U.S. partners Egypt and the UAE.65 Turkey also supported Azerbai
jan in its 2020 war with Armenia, again bringing it into confrontation with Rus
sia.66 Turkey’s relationship with Russia, however, is complex; despite their policy
disagreements, Turkey has purchased air defenses from Russia, resulting in its
ejection from America’s F-35 program.67
Turkey’s actions indicate its self-perception. Erdoğan believes he directs a po
tential great power and has attempted to accumulate strategic influence in the
Levant, North Africa, and Caucasus that will give Turkey political leverage over
Russia, the European powers, and Iran. Turkey’s actions in Afghanistan reinforce
this view. It is the only NATO member to maintain an embassy in the coun
try and is in discussion with the Taliban and Qatar to take responsibility for the
Kabul airport, in return for economic and political access in Afghanistan.68 As
noted, Turkey also supports China’s BRI and has been bribed into silence on the
CCP’s Xinjiang genocide.
Turkish naval expansion also is a major factor. Turkey’s first big-deck am
phibious assault ship, Anadolu, can be converted into a light carrier, while the
Turkish navy plans to refit its extant fleet with new navigation, propulsion, and
weapons technology, overwhelmingly produced by Turkish firms.69 The Turk
ish navy has deployed to Libya’s coastline, causing friction during the 2014–20
civil war.70 If Turkey’s current procurement efforts are successful, the Turkish
navy will become a significant regional force. Moreover, even with procurement
roadblocks, Turkey still fields a dozen German-built submarines and sixteen
small surface combatants—a fleet larger than Israel’s, albeit less technologically
sophisticated.
Turkey’s naval expansion, presence in Syria, and foothold in Libya indicate a
long-term strategy to monopolize the Levantine Basin, “box out” Israel, and emerge
as the primary developer of the eastern Mediterranean natural gas deposits.
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Clearly, Israel faces a volatile interstate regional situation. Israeli policy makers
must consider Iran’s attempts to disrupt a potential Arab-Israeli coalition against
it, account for Turkish adventurism in the eastern Mediterranean, and consider
the costs of Turko-Israeli confrontation.
Nonstate Actors
The Middle East is not the only region saturated with nonstate armed groups;
however, unlike in Africa, where nonstate actors drive regional politics no less
than states do, in the Middle East nonstate actors should be conceived of as en
abling forces. Three are most important for Israel to consider.
Iranian Proxies. Proxies are Iran’s primary tools to pressure Israel and the Unit
ed States. Iran’s most-developed proxies are in Iraq and Lebanon: in the former,
the groups considered “Popular Mobilization Forces”; in the latter, Hezbollah.
Iran also supports other groups, for instance serving as the Yemeni Houthis’ and
Hamas’s primary international benefactor.
However, no substate partner can be considered fully subordinate to Iranian
control. Indeed, the January 2020 assassination of Qassem Soleimani under
mined Iran’s power over local proxies, most notably in Iraq, where these groups
mounted independent attacks on the United States.71 Over time, this may trigger
spiraling escalation, as Iran may feel compelled to intervene in a growing conflict
between the United States or Israel and an Iranian affiliate acting independently.
Hezbollah and the Yemeni Houthis field the greatest naval capabilities at pres
ent. However, one can expect Iran to supply relevant Iraqi militias with antiship
missiles if Persian Gulf escalation seems likely.72
Palestinian Terror Groups. Currently, Hamas is the only relevant Palestinian
group, given Fatah’s contemporary political impotence and Palestinian Islamic Ji
had’s small size. Palestinian Authority corruption has increased Hamas’s standing
in Judea and Samaria, although the latter organization’s primary focus is Gaza.
As with Hezbollah’s, the core of Hamas’s strategy relies on attacks against Israeli
civilians, either by using large numbers of unsophisticated rockets and mortars
or by mounting terrorist attacks.73 Ambition to achieve such attacks underlies
Hamas’s attempts to tunnel under Israeli defensive barriers and deploy operatives
in Israel.
Hamas has limited naval capabilities, given Israel’s long-term blockade of Gaza
and Egypt’s equal hostility toward the organization. But Hamas’s naval comman
do units have mounted suicide attacks against the IDF in the past and can be
expected to do so in the future whenever tensions with Israel escalate.74
Salafi-Jihadist Organizations. Typically, Israel is not non-Palestinian jihadist
organizations’ primary target. However, there are indications that al-Qaeda has
attempted to expand in Gaza and the West Bank and has planned operations in
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Israel in the past.75 Moreover, jihadist power provides Iran, Russia, and Turkey
with greater freedom of action by creating a political pretext for regional action.
None of these groups has a major naval presence. Nevertheless, Israeli strate
gists must keep in mind the impact they can have on the regional balance of power.
THE ROLE OF ISRAELI MARITIME POWER
Given this strategic situation, Israeli naval power must achieve two tasks: secur
ing the Levantine Basin, and increasing its own ability to operate in Indian Ocean
littorals.
By securing the Levantine Basin, the Israeli navy fulfills the following five stra
tegic priorities:
• Great-power independence. As the United States pivots away from the
Middle East and Europe, American sea control in the eastern Mediterra
nean will diminish. Indeed, insufficient American presence in the Levan
tine Basin allowed Russia to act with impunity in Syria, supporting its
ground forces with surface combatants and carrier-based aviation. There
is no guarantee that Russia—or China, if it establishes a major military
presence in the Middle East—will provide Israel with the same sea-control
benefits as the United States has heretofore. Thus, Israel must be pre
pared to use its navy independently to secure the Levantine Basin for its
own purposes, possibly in concert with regional partners such as Egypt
and Greece. This entails not necessarily defeating Russian forces but at a
minimum establishing robust enough capabilities to jeopardize Russian sea
control in the Levantine Basin.
• Economic security. A maritime footprint allows Israel to secure its claims to
the Leviathan gas fields. This will increase in importance as Leviathan’s de
posits are developed; for the entire Levantine Basin, the U.S. Geological Sur
vey puts the amount of recoverable oil at 1.7 billion barrels and recoverable
natural gas at over 100 trillion cubic feet.76 Nevertheless, other regional actors,
particularly Turkey, have taken an interest in the Leviathan gas fields. The Is
raeli navy must be able to assert Israel’s claims against Turkey’s, and thus must
be able to control the eastern Mediterranean out to and beyond Cyprus.
• Regional deterrence. Israeli sea control in the eastern Mediterranean denies
Israel’s adversaries the ability to pressure its coastline. In a future conflict
between Israel and Iran, Hezbollah is likely to harass Israeli warships, as it did
in 2006; but beyond that, an amphibious movement, even if intended only to
spread terror, would be disastrous.77 Conventionally, Turkey also poses a threat,
owing to the size of its naval forces and its increasing hostility toward Israel.
The Israeli navy must be able to deter and, if needed, defeat Turkish operations.
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• Second-strike maintenance. Israel’s second-strike capability rests on access
to the Levantine Basin. In lieu of American sea control, the Israeli navy’s sur
face forces must be able to ensure that Israeli submarines can operate in the
eastern Mediterranean without detection. It is here that great-power dynam
ics gain clear importance. An Iran confident in Russia’s ability to limit Israeli
naval action, even absent Russian engagement as a cobelligerent, would be
much more adventurous, since it would know that ground- and air-launched
missiles posed the only second-strike threat.
• Restraint of terrorist organizations. Israel’s blockade of Gaza and functional
blockade of the Lebanese coastline prevent terrorist organizations from re
ceiving supplies by sea. Absent this advantage, Hezbollah and Hamas would
become much greater threats.
These five tasks are central to Israeli strategy. But they are defensive, provid
ing the IDF with rear-area security robust enough to allow the assumption of the
operational offensive on land; they do not put pressure on Israel’s state-based ad
versaries. Thus, a second set of missions can be identified that involve operating
in the Indian Ocean’s littorals.
• Anti-Iranian war-fighting capability. While the Levantine Basin is Israel’s
maritime center of gravity, Israeli sea control in the eastern Mediterranean
does not impact Iranian war-fighting capabilities directly. Israel finds it dif
ficult to operate in the Indian Ocean because of the natural choke points that
hem in any Elat-based naval forces. If Israel developed and deployed surface
warships or submarines (most likely the latter) that were capable of remain
ing on station for months, it could maintain a permanent presence in the
Indian Ocean, thereby increasing its ability to pressure Iran directly. More
over, if Israel can solidify its potential partnership with Saudi Arabia and
the UAE, it can use its naval forces as a diplomatic bargaining chip. No Arab
navy can project power beyond the Arabian Peninsula’s littorals, nor do any
of the Gulf Arab nations operate submarines. Israel could turn to the Gulf
Arabs for logistical support, likely covertly, to enable long-term operations in
the western Indian Ocean.
• Sea denial in the Bab el Mandeb. The 1967 and 1973 wars demonstrate the
importance the Bab el Mandeb holds for Israel and the dangers of pressure
against it. Elat is a poor home port for submarines, but—barring large-scale
Chinese force deployments to Djibouti—Israel could deploy a naval pres
ence to Elat large enough to counter an Iranian blockade. This might involve
both striking targets in Yemen and countering Iranian warships that threaten
Israeli-bound merchant traffic.
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THE FUTURE OF ISRAELI NAVAL FORCES
This review of great-power activity in the Middle East and regional Middle
Eastern dynamics indicates the scope of the problem that Israeli policy mak
ers face. Extraregional and regional actors all hope to seek leverage over the
Middle East’s maritime littorals. Thus, maritime power is central to Israel’s
interests.
Israel’s current force structure is sufficient for immediate political conditions.
However, as analysis of broader strategic shifts has demonstrated, an Israel less
certain of U.S. naval support must consider expanding its naval presence and
shifting its strategy accordingly. Additionally, Israel must take into account sever
al potential maritime flash points that could spark a broader conflict. Insufficient
naval power will invite pressure on these flash points.
Force Structure and Acquisitions
Today’s Israeli navy’s force structure matches the IDF’s historical operational
requirements. Israel has no ship or submarine displacing over 2,200 tons and
no surface combatant larger than 1,900 tons. Three classes of ships comprise the
current fleet.78
The backbone of the IDF’s combat capabilities is provided by its five (soon
to be six, with the delivery of INS Drakon) German-built Dolphin-class subma
rines.79 The Dolphin boats are relatively similar in size and capability, despite
their division into two classes. The Dolphin 2 hulls are about three hundred tons
heavier, but their armament appears identical to that of the Dolphin 1s. The great
est difference is propulsion. All the Dolphin 2 boats, and presumably the future
Dakar-class hulls, are equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP), mak
ing them much quieter than the Dolphin 1s.80 The AIP requirement likely came
from the IDF’s nuclear needs. In lieu of constructing much larger, more expensive
nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, the
IDF has opted to field smaller, quieter, conventional submarines in numbers great
enough to conduct deterrence patrols.
Israel combines these Dolphin boats with a handful of extremely capable small
surface combatants, designated corvettes. All Israeli corvettes are under two
thousand tons and have a standard ship’s complement of sixty to seventy offi
cers and sailors. But the Sa’ar 5– and Sa’ar 6–class ships have two thirty-two-cell
vertical-launching-system units, dedicated antiship missile launchers, and a he
licopter deck. The larger Sa’ar 6s are equipped with the same air-defense system
that Israel’s Iron Dome uses, giving it potent antiair capabilities—a necessity that
grows out of the IDF’s attention to offensive counterair and nonmaritime battle
field air-interdiction missions.81
Missile boats and fast-attack craft comprise the remainder of the Israeli fleet.
It fields eight larger (all under five hundred tons) missile boats equipped with a
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mix of antiship and antiair missiles. Like their larger Sa’ar 5 and 6 cousins, the
Sa’ar 4.5 missile boats are designed for independent operation despite the threat
of air attack. Additionally, Israel has about three to four dozen fast-attack craft
designed for littoral operations, supplemented with an increasingly capable fleet
of unmanned surface vehicles.
Notwithstanding Israel’s small size and the funding imbalance among the Is
raeli navy, ground forces, and air forces, the Israeli navy’s ships are well built
and extremely capable. It is remarkable, for example, that surface combatants and
missile boats as small as 440 tons have relatively robust air defenses.
Nevertheless, three factors hamper the Israeli navy’s force structure. First, a
lack of submarine capacity limits the IDF’s ability to maintain a presence in the
western Indian Ocean. As
noted, the Israeli navy pos
Extraregional and regional actors all hope to
seek leverage over the Middle East’s maritime sesses five boats, with a sixth
likely to be delivered in 2022.
littorals. Thus, maritime power is central to
If the IDF reserves its three
Israel’s interests.
Dolphin 2s for deterrence pa
trols of the Levantine Basin, only three Dolphin 1s are left for non-Mediterranean
deployments. There are no plans to expand the Israeli submarine fleet; when the
navy receives the first Dakar in 2027, it will begin phasing out the Dolphin 1s hull
for hull. Thus, as effective as the Dolphin class may be in a conventional context,
Israel lacks the capacity to use its fleet of diesel-electric attack submarines offen
sively outside the eastern Mediterranean.
Second, while Israel has a proportionally large defense-industrial base, the
country is dependent on foreign suppliers for its larger hulls. The largest do
mestic ships Israel has constructed are its Sa’ar 4.5–class missile boats, all un
der five hundred tons. Israel’s future Sa’ar 72–class “corvette”—in fact a mis
sile boat, with an eight-hundred-ton displacement—will be produced in Israeli
yards. But Israel relies on foreign yards for its higher-end naval combatants.82
The United States constructed Israel’s Sa’ar 5 class; Germany, the Sa’ar 6 class
and Israel’s Dolphin-class submarines. This leaves Israel vulnerable to foreign
production shortages, or to international pressure during a crisis if the United
States no longer maintains a presence in the Middle East or a core political in
terest in European politics.
Third, as capable as Israel’s small surface combatants and missile boats may be,
geographic realities make it difficult for the Israeli navy to deploy surface com
batants to the western Indian Ocean. Elat’s naval facilities are slightly too small to
host submarines regularly, while the Strait of Tiran and the Bab el Mandeb hem
in any ships deployed from Israel’s Red Sea coastline.83 Since the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty, Egypt has allowed Israel to move warships through the Suez Canal.
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But the Chinese presence in the Horn of Africa and Iranian leverage through the
Yemeni Houthis could limit Israel’s access to the Indian Ocean even if Egypt and
Israel remain on good terms.
Future acquisitions will bolster the Israeli navy’s combat capacity. Even if
the IDF retires the first three Dolphins once it receives the Dakar-class replace
ments, the new boats will be more advanced than nearly any other regional
submarine, despite Turkish and Greek contracts with German suppliers. Ad
ditionally, Israel could export domestically produced warships, as it has done
with small coastal craft in the past, to improve relationships with regional
powers. Nevertheless, Israel will face challenges to its maritime security and
must consider whether its current fleet architecture is sufficient to meet new
threats.
Six Potential Contingencies
These force-structure questions are compounded when the potential maritime
flash points that could spark a regional conflict are reviewed. Six are most rel
evant for Israel’s context.
Conflict over the Leviathan Gas Fields. Since the discovery of the Leviathan
gas fields, multiple eastern Mediterranean actors have attempted to assert their
claims. Currently, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece have agreed to coordinate resource
extraction in the Levantine Basin, with Egyptian and Italian support.84
Turkey, however, has used Northern Cyprus as a pretext for claims to the Le
viathan deposits. Initially, Lebanon also claimed that the gas fields were within its
exclusive economic zone. Lebanon, Syria, and perhaps even Hamas are likely to
make similar claims, particularly if Turkey can coordinate more effectively with
Iran.85 A Greek-Turkish confrontation over Levantine Basin resource extraction
would necessitate Israeli involvement, in light of the economic and strategic im
plications of a Turkish-dominated Mediterranean.
A Third Lebanon War. It is remarkable that since 2006 Israel has been able to
avoid another offensive against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. This indicates
the degree of Hezbollah’s and Iran’s involvement in the Syrian civil war; neither
proxy nor patron could pressure Israel directly, given the resources and band
width needed to prop up the Assad regime.86 However, now that Assad has con
solidated control of the country, and as the United States seems to consider a
broader withdrawal from the Middle East and rapprochement with Iran, a new
Lebanon war has become increasingly likely.87
Hezbollah’s strategy will rely on ground-attack missiles. Although Iron Dome
will provide some protection, it is unclear whether it will perform as well against
advanced Iranian-supplied weapons as it did against Hezbollah’s and Hamas’s
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improvised rockets. This will demand an Israeli ground invasion and the longterm urban combat that entails.
Hezbollah can inflict additional punishment on Israel by attacking ships that
Iranian intelligence identifies as Israel bound and by harassing Israeli warships
deployed to enforce a blockade of Lebanon. Moreover, while Turkey and Iran
were at odds in Syria, a political thaw is conceivable, considering their mutual op
position to Israel and Turkey’s thorough tactical flexibility vis-à-vis Russia. Thus,
a naval contingency that grows out of a Hezbollah-Israel conflict could broaden a
local war into a regional crisis—absent sufficient Israeli sea control.
Iranian Escalation in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s view of the Strait of Hormuz
is badly misunderstood. An Iranian blockade of the strait would undermine the
country’s economy. But, as with British strategy during the First World War, Ira
nian policy makers could calculate that the damage caused to American allies
would accumulate far more quickly than Iranian internal pressures—the regime’s
public-security forces are brutally efficient.88
More important, however, are Iran’s attempts to integrate into China’s BRI. A
natural-gas pipeline running from northeastern Iran to Xinjiang via Central Asia
is under construction; Iran has the world’s second-largest proven natural-gas re
serves after Russia, making this a significant buffer to Iranian economic difficul
ties. Iran also has invested in three alternative transportation routes that bypass
the Strait of Hormuz. First, it has constructed a pipeline for Iranian oil to the port
of Jask on the Gulf of Oman, beyond the Strait of Hormuz.89 Iran hopes to link
this pipeline to a broader network running through Central Asia and to Russia,
increasing its leverage over Moscow during a Hormuz-related contingency. Sec
ond, a natural-gas pipeline between Iran and Pakistan is under construction, in
concert with both India and China, providing another export outlet. U.S. sanc
tions delayed the pipeline, but a Pakistani realignment or Biden-driven sanctions
shift might enable its completion.90 Third, China has proposed two pipelines,
one to transport Iranian oil through Central Asia alongside existing natural-gas
routes, the other to move oil to Pakistan, then onward to Chinese transportation
infrastructure linked to Xinjiang.
As these overland transportation networks develop in the next decade—and as
China becomes a major Iranian oil-export partner, rather than India or, histori
cally, Japan—it becomes more reasonable for Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz
to constrict Saudi exports and punish U.S. allies. The potential this would raise
for increased Iranian aggression is of obvious importance to Israel. Absent sig
nificant American support, the UAE and Saudi Arabia would find it difficult to
reopen the Strait of Hormuz, thereby hamstringing Saudi oil exports and pre
venting any Emirati sales. Support from Israel would be critical if it and its Gulf
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Arab cobelligerents wish to avoid greater escalation—a central concern if Iran
fields nuclear weapons.
Iranian Harassment in the Indian Ocean. In late July 2021, off Oman’s coast, Iran
used a drone to attack a tanker operated by an Israeli-led company, killing two.91
This attack followed four others since February 2021, each of which targeted
ships owned or previously owned by Israeli companies.92 None of Iran’s attacks
has done significant damage; the worst attack, in February, required the targeted
tanker to dock in Dubai for repairs.93 Iran’s attacks also seem to be retaliatory,
in keeping with the sort of low-level harassment it uses to keep Israel on edge in
between serious crises.
Nevertheless, Iran’s attacks on Israeli-connected ships in the Indian Ocean
and Gulf of Oman raise the prospect of more-frequent maritime pressure. Israel
can defend shipping in the Levantine Basin and expect a reasonably secure envi
ronment once tankers pass the Bab el Mandeb, but farther east no Arab partner
of Israel can guarantee the security of Israeli ships. Without leverage in the In
dian Ocean, pressure against Israeli-owned or Israeli-bound shipping, whether
brought by Iran directly or through a proxy, would force Israel to escalate during
its response. And a major cyber attack may not be sufficient to block Iranian
pressure, depending on Tehran’s calculations. Thus, Israel could find itself plan
ning major first strikes to preclude a broader crisis rather than preventing Iran
from attacking Israel-bound merchant traffic.
Regional Eastern Mediterranean Conflict. A Turkish-Israeli conflict is possible,
particularly if Turkey increases its support for Hamas or escalates a dispute over
the Levantine Basin’s energy deposits. Equally relevant is the likelihood of a
broader Mediterranean contingency that pits Turkey against some combination
of Greece, Egypt, Russia, and perhaps even France. A conflict in which Turkey
and France were openly hostile to each other would shatter NATO. And regard
less of the precise configuration of forces, a regional realignment likely would
follow any of these scenarios. Russia and Turkey would be presented with an
opportunity to establish sea control over the eastern Mediterranean. Both cases
would impinge directly on Israeli interests.
The danger for Israel is that an entirely unrelated conflict will spill over into
the Levantine Basin. Libya is a likely catalyst. French, Russian, Turkish, and Egyp
tian hostility, along with the again-delayed Libyan presidential elections, makes a
renewed political crisis likely.94 Less likely but still relevant would be a Caucasus
conflict, akin to the October 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. In that event, fighting
was restricted to the specific contested regions, reducing the likelihood of open
Turkish or Russian belligerence; however, a war with more expansive Azerbaijani
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or Armenian political aims could trigger mutual intervention, which likely would
spill over into the Levantine Basin.95
If Israel does not have the naval capabilities to secure its coastline, it could find
itself squeezed between great or regional powers or forced to escalate to contain a
broader conflict.
A Broader Eurasian Confrontation. Middle Eastern politics set against a broader
Eurasian backdrop demonstrates the region’s centrality to China’s long-term am
bitions. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is constructing a fleet capable of
projecting power beyond the first island chain.96 The base access China has cre
ated in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Djibouti raises the possibility that the PLA will
deploy a full strike group to the Indian Ocean once it has completed its Type 003
carrier.97 This would expand the physical theater of Sino-American confronta
tion beyond the East and South China Seas, forcing the United States to redeploy
naval forces to protect shipping and allies outside the western Pacific. China’s
partnership with Pakistan also could develop into a more formal alliance, par
ticularly if the American withdrawal from Afghanistan prompts a broader crisis
in U.S.-Pakistani relations.
Thus, it is entirely conceivable that, in the next half decade, the Middle East may
become a region of military confrontation directly relevant to a Sino-American
conflict.
Even if the Indian Ocean is more relevant to this conflict, Israel must be aware
that regional actors such as Iran and Turkey will be tempted to capitalize on Amer
ican weakness. The dangers of a long war for the CCP demand that Beijing wel
come any allies or cobelligerents it can identify. This creates a clear incentive for
regional escalation. Moreover, maritime escalation would be most beneficial to the
CCP, as it would redirect valuable U.S. naval forces away from defending the first
island chain. Hence Israel may become an unwilling participant in a much broader
Eurasian confrontation—a situation it faced seriously only during the 1973 war.
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NUCLEAR- CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND
C YBER WAR
A Dangerous Crossroads
Stephen J. Cimbala

T

he full implications of combining the worst weapons of mass destruction with
advanced weapons for cyber war are still obscure. The nuclear revolution that
dominated the Cold War took place in an environment of relative information
scarcity and primitive information technology (IT), compared with those of
the present and the foreseeable future, given current trends. One aspect of the
nuclear-cyber conjunction lies in its potential impact on nuclear-crisis manage
ment. For the United States and Russia, the nuclear-cyber relationship has special
significance: the two powers hold more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear
weapons; both have advanced offensive and defensive cyberwar capabilities;
and both Washington and Moscow have experienced the stress of nuclear-crisis
management under Cold War and later conditions.1
The implications of the nuclear-cyber nexus are explored below in four
steps.2 The first considers important conceptual issues emerging from the
overlap of nuclear and cyber. The second discusses definitions, parameters, and
requirements for crisis management. The third examines potential disrupters
of or threats to successful crisis management. The fourth discusses scenarios
and risks. The conclusion summarizes the findings and offers policy recom
mendations.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of
Political Science at Penn State Brandywine. Dr.
Cimbala coedited and coauthored Defending the
Arsenal: Why America’s Nuclear Modernization
Still Matters (2017).
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CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
What are the implications of the potential overlap
between the concepts and practices applicable to
cyber war and those for nuclear deterrence?3 Cy
ber war and nuclear weapons seem worlds apart.
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Cyber weapons should appeal to those who prefer a nonnuclear, or even a post
nuclear, military-technical arc of development. War in the digital domain offers,
at least in theory, a possible means of crippling or disabling enemy assets without
the need for kinetic attack, or at least while minimizing physical destruction.4
Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are the very epitome of “mass” destruction,
such that their use for deterrence—the avoidance of war by the manipulation of
risk—is preferred to the actual firing of same. Unfortunately, neither nuclear
deterrence nor cyber war will be able to live in a distinct policy universe for the
near or distant future.
Nuclear weapons, whether held back for deterrence or fired in anger, are incor
porated into systems for command, control, communications, computers, intel
ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). The weapons and their C4ISR
systems must be protected from attacks both kinetic and digital in nature. In addi
tion, the decision makers who must manage nuclear forces during a crisis ideally
should have the best possible information about the status of their own nuclear
and cyber forces and command systems, about the forces and C4ISR of possible
attackers, and about the probable intentions and risk acceptance of possible op
ponents. In short, the task of managing a nuclear crisis demands good information
and clear thinking. But the employment of cyber weapons in the early stages of a
crisis could impede clear assessments by creating confusion in networks and the
action channels that depend on those networks.5 The temptation to take preemp
tive cyber action—for example, intrusive cyber reconnaissance of commandand-control (C2) systems—might “succeed” to the point at which nuclear-crisis
management becomes weaker instead of stronger. Related to this, one challenge of
the second nuclear age is that conventional war is more likely to take place within
a nuclear context. Paul Bracken has noted the following:
Cyber’s effect on conventional operations has barely been considered in the current
nuclear debate. Cyber could cripple U.S. command and control. Space war is also
overlooked. Disruptions, from cyber, ASAT [antisatellite], and hacks to our recon
naissance system[,] make good sense from the enemy point of view, to blind our
reconnaissance targeting. This would turn our precision strike force into blunt carpet
bombing, and likely [result in] a vast increase in collateral damage. Obviously this has
political implications. It could lead to a U.S. reluctance to act. This may well be the
real intent of such a move on the part of the enemy, to create a kind of nuclear digital
brinkmanship that forces the United States to back off in a crisis.6

IT systems provide invaluable intelligence during a crisis, using databases, big
data, visualization, geographic-information-systems mapping, artificial intel
ligence (AI), image recognition, and other means. If the confidentiality, integrity,
or availability of these systems is doubtful, leaders will feel that they have lost
control and are left groping for options.
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Ironically, the downsizing of U.S. and post-Soviet Russian strategic nuclear
arsenals since the end of the Cold War, while a positive development from the
perspectives of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, makes the confluence
of cyber- and nuclear-attack capabilities more alarming. The overkill deploy
ments of missiles and bombers and expansive numbers of weapons that the Cold
War Americans and Soviets deployed had at least one virtue; those arsenals pro
vided so much redundancy against first-strike vulnerability that relatively linear
systems for nuclear-attack warning, C2, and responsive launch, under or after
attack, sufficed. At the same time, Cold War tools for military cyber action were
primitive compared with those available now. In addition, countries and their
armed forces were less dependent on the fidelity of their information systems
for national security. Thus,
the reduction of U.S., Russian,
[N]either nuclear deterrence nor cyber war
will be able to live in a distinct policy universe and possibly other forces to
the size of “minimum deter
for the near or distant future.
rents” might compromise
nuclear flexibility and resilience in the face of kinetic attacks preceded or accom
panied by cyber war.7 In addition, although the mathematics of minimum deter
rence would shrink the size of attackers’ as well as defenders’ arsenals, defenders
with smaller-size forces might have greater fears of absolute, compared with
relative, losses, and therefore might be more prone to preemption-dependent
strategies than defenders with larger forces would be. One of the reasons for Cold
War force redundancy was that superpowers lacked confidence in the reliability
or availability of some of their nuclear systems.
Offensive and defensive information warfare (infowar), as well as other cyberrelated activities, is obviously very much on the minds of U.S. military leaders and
others in the American and allied national-security establishments.8 Russia also
has been explicit about its cyber-related concerns. In early July 2013, President
Vladimir V. Putin urged the Russian Security Council to improve state security
against cyber attacks.9 Russian security expert Vladimir I. Batyuk, commenting
favorably on a June 2013 U.S.-Russian agreement for the protection, control, and
accounting of nuclear materials (a successor to the then recently expired NunnLugar agreement on nuclear risk reduction), warned that pledges by Presidents
Putin and Barack H. Obama of cooperation on cybersecurity were even more
important: “Nuclear weapons are a legacy of the 20th century. The challenge of
the 21st century is cybersecurity.”10
On the other hand, arms control for cyber is apt to run into daunting security
and technical issues, even assuming a successful navigation of political trust
for matters as sensitive as these. Of special significance is whether cyber armscontrol negotiators can certify that hackers operating within their own states
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are sufficiently under control for cyber verification and transparency. There is
extensive evidence that Russia, China, and other states use civilian hackers to
support national goals. For example, some sources attributed Russia’s hacking
into the e-mail account of the Democratic National Committee in 2016 to “Guc
cifer 2.0”—an homage to the original Romanian hacker using that name. Some
forensic evidence supports the hypothesis that Guccifer 2.0 was run by the Rus
sian FSB (the country’s principal security agency), with some involvement by
Russian military intelligence.11 Another uncertainty is the potential role of hack
tivists who routinely join in conflicts even without state sanction. If a country is
in a state-versus-state crisis, then finds itself on the receiving end of an effective,
widespread cyber attack that affects “the man on the street,” pressure on the
government for a kinetic (i.e., military) response may become overwhelming.
Technically minded, determined individuals or small groups of hacktivists now
have the potential to shake the world through cyber warfare.
The cyber domain cuts across the other geostrategic domains for warfare as
well: land, sea, air, and space. On the other hand, the cyber domain, compared
with the others, suffers from a lack of historical perspective; it “has been created
in a short time and has not had the same level of scrutiny as other battle domains,”
as one author has argued.12 What this might mean for the cyber-nuclear intersec
tion is far from obvious.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Definitions and Parameters
Crisis management, including nuclear-crisis management, is both a competitive
and a cooperative endeavor between military adversaries. A crisis is, by defini
tion, a time of great tension and uncertainty.13 Threats are in the air, and time
pressure on policy makers seems intense. Each side has objectives that it wants
to attain and values that it deems important to protect. During a crisis, state be
haviors are especially interactive and interdependent with those of another state.
It would not be too farfetched to refer to this interdependent stream of interstate
crisis behaviors as a system, provided the term system is not understood as refer
ring to something completely separate from the state or individual behaviors that
make it up. The system aspect implies reciprocal causation of the crisis behaviors
of A by B and vice versa.
One aspect of crisis management is this deceptively simple question: What
defines a crisis as such? When does the latent capacity of the international order
for violence or hostile threat assessment cross over into the terrain of actual crisis
behavior? A breakdown of general deterrence in the system raises threat percep
tions among various actors, but it does not guarantee that any particular relation
ship will deteriorate into specific deterrent or compellent threats. In defining
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the onset of a crisis, Patrick M. Morgan offers the useful concept of immediate
deterrence failure: specific sources of hostile intent have been identified by one
state with reference to another, threats have been exchanged, and responses now
must be decided on.14 The passage into a crisis is equivalent to the shift from a
Hobbesian world of omnipresent potential violence to the actual movement of
troops and exchanges of diplomatic démarches.
All crises are characterized to some extent by a high degree of threat; a short
time for decision; and a “fog of crisis”—reminiscent of Clausewitz’s “fog of
war”—that confuses crisis participants about what is happening. Before modern
scholars ever invented the discipline of crisis management, historians had cap
tured the rush-to-judgment character of much crisis decision-making among
great powers.15 The influence of nuclear weapons on crisis decision-making is
not easy to measure or document, because the avoidance of war can be ascribed
to many causes. The presence of nuclear forces obviously influences the degree
of destruction that can be inflicted should crisis management fail. Short of that
catastrophe, the greater interest of scholars is in how the presence of nuclear
weapons might affect the decision-making process itself in a crisis. The problem
is conceptually elusive; there are so many potentially important causal factors
relevant to a decision on war versus peace. History is full of dependent variables
in search of competing explanations.
Crisis Management: The Requirements
The first requirement of successful crisis management is communications trans
parency. Transparency includes clear signaling and undistorted communications.
Signaling refers to the requirement that each side must send its estimate of the
situation to the other. It is not necessary for the two sides to have identical or even
initially complementary interests, but a sufficient number of correctly sent and
received signals is a prerequisite for the effective communication of goals and
objectives from one side to the other. If signals are sent poorly or misunderstood,
steps taken by the sender or receiver may lead to unintended consequences, in
cluding miscalculated escalation.
Communications transparency also includes high-fidelity communication be
tween adversaries and within the respective decision-making structures of each
side. High-fidelity communication in a crisis can be distorted by everything that
might interfere physically, mechanically, or behaviorally with accurate transmis
sion. Electromagnetic pulses that disrupt communication circuitry and physical
destruction of communication networks are obvious examples of impediments
to high-fidelity communication. Cultural differences that prevent accurate un
derstanding of shared meanings between states can confound deterrence as prac
ticed according to one side’s theory. As Keith B. Payne notes with regard to the
potential for deterrence failure in the post–Cold War period, “Unfortunately, our
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expectations of opponents’ behavior frequently are unmet, not because our op
ponents necessarily are irrational but because we do not understand them—their
individual values, goals, determination, and commitments—in the context of the
engagement, and therefore we are surprised when their ‘unreasonable’ behavior
differs from our expectations.”16
A second requirement of successful crisis management is the reduction of time
pressure on policy makers and commanders so that no unintended, provocative
steps are taken toward escalation mainly or solely as a result of a misperception
that “time is up.” Policy makers and military planners are capable of inventing fic
tive worlds of perception and evaluation in which H-hour becomes more than a
useful benchmark for decision
closure. In decision patholo
A . . . potentially disruptive effect of infowar
gies that emerge under crisis
on nuclear-crisis management is that it may
reduce the search for available alternatives to conditions, deadlines may be
confused with policy objec
the few and desperate.
tives themselves; ends become
17
means, and means, ends. For example, the war plans of the great powers in July
1914 contributed to a shared, self-fulfilling prophecy among leaders in Berlin,
Saint Petersburg, and Vienna: that only by prompt mobilization and attack could
they avoid decisive losses in war. Plans predicated on the unchangeable structure
of mobilization timetables proved insufficiently flexible for policy makers who
wanted to slow down the momentum of late July and early August toward an ir
revocable decision in favor of war.18
One result of the compression of decision time in a crisis, compared with
typical peacetime patterns, is that the likelihood of type I (undetected attack) and
type II (falsely detected attack) errors increases. Tactical-warning and intelligence
networks grow accustomed to the routine behavior of other-state forces and may
misinterpret nonroutine behavior. Unexpected surges in alert levels or uncharac
teristic deployment patterns may trigger tactical operators to misread indicators.
Bruce G. Blair has argued that “[i]n fact, one distinguishing feature of a crisis is its
murkiness. By definition, the Type I and Type II error rates of the intelligence and
warning systems rapidly degrade. A crisis not only ushers in the proverbial fog of
crisis, symptomatic of error-prone strategic warning, but also ushers in a fog of
battle arising from an analogous deterioration of tactical warning.”19
A third attribute of successful crisis management is that each side should be
able to offer the other a safety valve or face-saving exit from a predicament that
has escalated beyond original expectations. The search for options should back
neither crisis participant into a corner from which there is no graceful retreat.
For example, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, President John F. Kennedy
was able to offer Soviet premier Nikita S. Khrushchev a face-saving exit from
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his overextended missile deployments. Kennedy publicly committed the United
States to refrain from future military aggression against Cuba and privately
agreed to remove and dismantle Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles previ
ously deployed on the soil of America’s NATO allies. Kennedy and his inner circle
recognized—after some days of deliberation and a clearer focus on the Soviet
view of events—that the United States would lose, not gain, by a public humili
ation of Khrushchev that, in turn, might diminish Khrushchev’s interest in any
mutually agreed-upon solution to the crisis.20
A fourth attribute of successful crisis management is that each side maintains
an accurate perception of the other side’s intentions and military capabilities.
This becomes difficult during a crisis because, in the heat of a partly competitive
relationship and a threat-intensive environment, intentions and capabilities can
change. Robert Jervis warned in 1989 that Cold War beliefs in the inevitability of
war might have created a self-fulfilling prophecy. “The superpowers’ beliefs about
whether or not war between them is inevitable create reality as much as they reflect
it. Because preemption could be the only rational reason to launch an all-out war,
beliefs about what the other side is about to do are of major importance and depend
in large part on an estimate of the other’s beliefs about what the first side will do.”21
Intentions can change during a crisis if policy makers become more optimistic
about gains or more pessimistic about potential losses. Capabilities can change
owing to the management of military alerts and the deployment or other move
ment of military forces. Heightened states of military readiness on each side are
intended to send a two-sided signal: of readiness for the worst if the other side
attacks, and of a nonthreatening steadiness of purpose in the face of enemy pas
sivity. This mixed message is hard to send under the best of crisis-management
conditions, since each state’s behaviors and communications, as observed by its
opponent, may not seem consistent.
In addition, under the stress of time pressures and of military threats, different
parts of complex security organizations may be making decisions from the per
spective of their narrowly defined, bureaucratic interests. These bureaucratically
chosen decisions and actions may not coincide with the policy makers’ intent or
with the decisions and actions of other parts of the government. Alexander L.
George explains as follows:
It is important to recognize that the ability of top-level political authorities to main
tain control over the moves and actions of military forces is made difficult because of
the exceedingly large number of often complex standing orders that come into effect
at the onset of a crisis and as it intensifies. It is not easy for top-level political authori
ties to have full and timely knowledge of the multitude of existing standing orders. As
a result, they may fail to coordinate some critically important standing orders with
their overall crisis management strategy.22
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As policy makers may be challenged to control numerous and diverse standard
operating procedures (SOPs), political leaders also may be insufficiently sensi
tive to the costs of sudden changes in standing orders or unaware of the rationale
underlying those orders. For example, heads of state or government may not be
aware that more-permissive rules of engagement for military forces operating
in harm’s way come into play once higher levels of alert have been authorized.23
POTENTIAL DISRUPTERS
Information or cyber warfare has the potential to attack or to disrupt successful
crisis management with regard to each of the preceding attributes.24 First, infowar
can muddy the signals being sent from one side to the other in a crisis. This can be
done deliberately or inadvertently. Suppose one side plants a virus or worm in the
other’s communications networks.25 The virus or worm becomes activated during
the crisis and destroys or alters information. The missing or altered information
may make it more difficult for the cyber victim to arrange a military attack; how
ever, destroyed or altered information also may mislead either side into thinking
that its signal has been interpreted correctly when it has not. Thus, side A may
intend to signal “resolve” instead of “yield” to its opponent on a particular issue;
side B, misperceiving what it has received as a “yield” message, may decide to con
tinue its aggression, but then meets unexpected resistance, causing a much more
dangerous situation to develop. There is also the possibility of cyber-enabled pre
emption to disable enemy nuclear missiles before they reach the launchpad or dur
ing the launch itself. Apparently, the United States has used such “left-of-launch”
techniques against North Korea.26 During a nuclear crisis, would such a move be
accepted by the attacked party as one of intimidation and deterrence or, to the
contrary, would offensive cyber war against missile launches prompt a nuclear
first use or first strike by the defender for fear of losing its retaliatory capability?
Infowar also can destroy or disrupt communication channels necessary for
successful crisis management. One way it can do this is by disrupting communi
cation links between policy makers and military commanders during a period of
high threat and severe time pressure. Unanticipated problems, from the stand
point of civil-military relations, may arise under these conditions. For example,
political leaders may have predelegated limited authority for nuclear release or
launch under restrictive conditions; only when these few conditions obtain, ac
cording to the protocols of predelegation, would military commanders be autho
rized to employ nuclear weapons distributed within their commands.27 Clogged,
destroyed, or disrupted communications could prevent top leaders from knowing
that military commanders perceive a situation to be far more desperate, and thus
permissive of nuclear initiative, than it really is. For example, during the Cold
War, disrupted communications between the U.S. national command authority
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and ballistic-missile submarines, once the latter came under attack, could have
resulted in a joint decision by submarine officers and crew, in the absence of
contrary instructions, to launch.
Second, infowar during a crisis almost certainly will increase the time pressure
under which political leaders operate. It may do this literally, or it may affect the
perceived timelines within which the policy-making process yields its decisions.
Once either side sees parts of its command, control, and communications (C3)
system being subverted by phony information or extraneous cyber noise, its sense
of panic at the possible loss of military options will be enormous. In the case of
American Cold War nuclear war plans, for example, disruption of even portions
of the strategic C3 system could have prevented competent execution of parts
of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), the nation’s strategic nuclear
war plan. The Cold War SIOP depended on finely orchestrated time-on-target
estimates and precise damage expectancies against various classes of targets.28
Partly misinformed or disinformed networks and communications centers
would have led to redundant attacks against the same target sets and, quite pos
sibly, unplanned attacks on friendly military or civilian installations. Even in
the post–Cold War world of flexible nuclear-response plans, the potential slide
toward preemption, on the basis of mistaken or exaggerated fears of C2 vulner
ability, casts a shadow over deterrence stability. As Blair has warned, “There are
no widely accepted methods for calculating command and control performance
under wartime conditions, and empirical validation of such an assessment cannot
be done. Compared with the tight and tidy standard calculations of force vulner
ability, any objective assessment of command and control systems would raise
more questions than it answered.”29
A third potentially disruptive effect of infowar on nuclear-crisis management
is that it may reduce the search for available alternatives to the few and desperate.
Policy makers seeking escapes from crisis denouements need flexible options
and creative problem-solving. Victims of infowar may have a diminished ability
to solve problems routinely, let alone creatively, once information networks are
filled with flotsam and jetsam. Questions to operators will be posed poorly, and
responses (if available at all) will be driven toward the least common denomina
tor of previously programmed SOPs. Retaliatory systems that depend on launchon-warning dynamics instead of survival after riding out an attack are especially
vulnerable to reduced time cycles and restricted alternatives. “A well-designed
warning system cannot save commanders from misjudging the situation under
the constraints of time and information imposed by a posture of launch on warn
ing. Such a posture truncates the decision process too early for iterative estimates
to converge on reality. Rapid reaction is inherently unstable because it cuts short
the learning time needed to match perception with reality.”30
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The propensity to search for the first available alternative that meets mini
mum satisfactory conditions of goal attainment is strong enough under normal
conditions in nonmilitary bureaucratic organizations. 31 In civil-military C2
systems under the stress of nuclear-crisis decision-making, the first available
alternative quite literally may be the last—or so policy makers and their military
advisers may persuade them
The rule book for nuclear-crisis management selves. Accordingly, the bias
toward prompt and adequate
in the age of cyber deterrence and cyber war
solutions is strong. During
remains to be written.
the Cuban missile crisis, for
example, a number of members of the presidential advisory group continued
to propound an air strike and invasion of Cuba during the entire thirteen days
of crisis deliberation. Had less time been available for debate and had President
Kennedy not deliberately structured the discussion in a way that forced alterna
tives to the surface, the air strike and invasion might well have been the chosen
course of action.32 Paul K. Davis and coauthors have noted the following:
Usual discussions of crisis stability assume that leaders are in control of their nuclear
capabilities. Again, history is sobering. President Kennedy became worried in 1961
about possible unilateral actions by military leaders to prepare a preemptive strike
against the Soviet Union. He instigated efforts to tighten the President’s personal
control. Soviet leadership worried about survivability of its forces and developed
capability for launch on warning and automatic response. Such systems could be the
source of accidental war.33

Fourth and finally on the issue of crisis management, infowar can cause flawed
images of each side’s intentions and capabilities to be conveyed to the other, with
potentially disastrous results. Another example from the Cuban missile crisis
demonstrates the possible side effects on U.S. crisis management of simple mis
understanding and noncommunication. At the most tense period of the crisis, a
U-2 reconnaissance aircraft got off course and strayed into Soviet airspace. U.S.
and Soviet fighters scrambled, and a possible Arctic confrontation of air forces
loomed. Khrushchev later told Kennedy that Soviet air defenses might have inter
preted the U-2 flight as a prestrike reconnaissance mission or as a bomber, calling
for a compensatory response by Moscow.34 Fortunately, Moscow chose to give
Washington the benefit of the doubt in this instance and to permit U.S. fighters to
escort the wayward U-2 back to Alaska. Why this scheduled U-2 mission was not
aborted once the crisis began never has been revealed fully; the answer may be
as simple as bureaucratic inertia compounded by noncommunication down the
chain of command by policy makers who failed to appreciate the risk of “normal”
reconnaissance under these extraordinary conditions.
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The significance of the preceding discussion and examples is underscored by
the assessment of expert analyst Martin C. Libicki about the relationship between
cyber war and crisis management.
To generalize, a situation in which there is little pressure to respond quickly, in which
a temporary disadvantage or loss is tolerable, and in which there are grounds for
giving the other side some benefit of the doubt is one in which there is time for crisis
management to work. Conversely, if the failure to respond quickly causes a state’s
position to erode, a temporary disadvantage or degree of loss is intolerable, and there
are no grounds for disputing what happened, who did it, and why—then states may
conclude that they must bring matters to a head quickly.35

SCENARIOS AND RISKS
The outcome of a nuclear-crisis-management scenario influenced by informa
tion operations may not be a favorable one. Despite the best efforts of crisis
participants, the dispute may degenerate into a nuclear first use or first strike by
one side and retaliation by the other. In that situation, information operations
by either side or both might make it more difficult to limit the war and bring it
to a conclusion before catastrophic destruction and loss of life has taken place.
Although there are no such things as “small” nuclear wars compared with con
ventional wars, there can be different kinds of “nuclear” wars, in terms of their
proximate causes and consequences.36 Possibilities include a nuclear attack from
an unknown source; an ambiguous case of possible, but not proved, nuclear first
use; a nuclear “test” detonation intended to intimidate, but with no immediate
destruction; or a conventional strike mistaken, at least initially, for a nuclear one.
With regard to the last-mentioned case, George H. Quester has noted that
the “United States and other powers have developed some very large and power
ful conventional warheads, intended for destroying the hardened underground
bunkers that may house an enemy command post or a hard-sheltered weapons
system. Such ‘bunker-buster’ bombs radiate a sound signal when they are used
and an underground seismic signal that could be mistaken from a distance for the
signature of a small nuclear warhead.”37 In such an instance, the adversary may
question why its command posts or strategic assets are being targeted and assume
the actions are the prelude to an all-out strategic strike.
The dominant scenario of a general nuclear war between the United States
and the Soviet Union preoccupied Cold War policy makers, so concerns about
escalation control and war termination were swamped by apocalyptic visions of
the end of days. The second nuclear age, coinciding roughly with the end of the
Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, offers a more complicated menu
of nuclear possibilities and responses.38 Interest in the threat or use of nuclear
weapons by rogue states, aspiring regional hegemons, or terrorists, abetted by
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the possible spread of nuclear weapons among currently non-nuclear-weapons
states, stretches the ingenuity of military planners and fiction writers.
In addition to the possibility of the world’s worst characters engaging in
nuclear threat or first use, there also may be backsliding in political conditions,
such as between the United States and Russia, or Russia and China, or China
and India (among current nuclear-weapons states). Arguments assuming the
continuation of stable deterrence among major powers depend on the continu
ation of favorable political auguries in regional or global politics. Conflicts that
are politically unthinkable in one decade have a way of evolving into wars that
are politically unavoidable in another; World War I is instructive in this regard.
The war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 was a reminder that local
conflicts on regional fault lines between blocs or major powers have the poten
tial to expand into worse. So, too, were the Balkan wars of Yugoslav succession
in the 1990s. In these cases, Russia’s one-sided military advantage relative to
Georgia in 2008 and NATO’s military power relative to that of Bosnians of all
stripes in 1995 and Serbia in 1999 contributed to war termination without fur
ther international escalation.
Escalation of a conventional war into nuclear first use remains possible where
operational or tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed with national or co
alition armed forces. In allied NATO territory, the United States deploys several
hundred substrategic, air-delivered nuclear weapons among bases in Belgium,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.39 Russia probably retains several
thousand operational or tactical nuclear weapons, including significant numbers
deployed in western Russia.40 The New Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (New
START) agreement establishes a notional parity between the United States and
Russia in nuclear systems of intercontinental range.41 But U.S. and allied NATO
superiority in advanced-technology, information-based conventional military
power leaves Russia heavily reliant on tactical nukes as compensation for com
parative weakness in nonnuclear forces. NATO’s members breathed a sigh of relief
when Russia’s officially approved Military Doctrine of 2010 did not seem to lower
the bar for nuclear first use compared with previous editions.42
However, Russia’s military doctrine does indicate a willingness to engage in
nuclear first use in situations of extreme urgency for Russia, as defined by its
political leadership.43 And, despite NATO’s evident superiority in conventional
forces relative to those of Russia, neither the United States nor the rest of NATO
is necessarily eager to get rid of its remaining substrategic nukes deployed among
America’s NATO allies. An expert panel that NATO convened to set the stage
for its 2010 review of the alliance’s military doctrine was carefully ambivalent on
the issue of the alliance’s forward-deployed nuclear weapons. The possibility of
negotiating away these weapons in return for parallel concessions from Russia
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was left open for further discussion. On the other hand, the NATO expert report
underscored the present majority sentiment of governments that these weapons
provided a necessary link in the chain of alliance deterrence options.44
Imagine now the unfolding of a nuclear crisis or the making of a decision for
nuclear first use, under the conditions of both NATO and Russian campaigns
employing strategic disinformation and information operations intended to dis
rupt enemy C3 and warning systems. Disruptive information operations against
enemy systems on the threshold of nuclear first use, or shortly thereafter, could
increase the already substantial difficulty of bringing fighting to a halt before a
Europe-wide theater conflict or a strategic nuclear war ensues. All the previously
cited difficulties in crisis management under the shadow of nuclear deterrence
pending a decision for first use would be compounded by additional uncertainty
and friction after the nuclear threshold had been crossed.
In addition, three new kinds of frictions would be posed for NATO. First, the
cohesion of allied governments would be tested under conditions of unprec
edented stress and danger, doubtless aided by a confused situation on the field of
battle. Second, reliable intelligence about Russian intentions following Russian or
NATO first use would be essential but challenging to nail down. Third, the first
use of a nuclear weapon in anger since Nagasaki would establish a new psycho
logical, political, and moral universe within which negotiators for de-escalation
and war termination would have to maintain somehow their sangfroid, obtain
agreed stand-downs from their militaries, and return nuclear-capable launchers
and weapons to secured but transparent locations. All this would be taking place
within the panic-spreading capabilities of 24/7 news networks and the Internet.
Theoretically, one might finesse the issue by eliminating cyber operations that
potentially conflict with de-escalation. But the political desire to do so conflicts
with the military need for timely information gathering, assessment, and pen
etration of enemy networks to accomplish two necessary, but somewhat opposed,
missions. First, each side would want to anticipate correctly the timing and
character of the other’s decision for nuclear first use—and, if possible, to throw
logic bombs, Trojan horses, electronic warfare, and other impediments in the
way. (Or, if methods of finesse are not available, bombing the relevant installa
tions is always an option, although obviously a provocative one.) The second, and
somewhat opposed, mission is to communicate reliably to the other side one’s
preference for de-escalation, one’s willingness to de-escalate if reciprocity can be
obtained, and one’s awareness of the possibility that the situation shortly will get
out of hand. Consider the Russian General Staff and the president’s office filtering
this hydra-headed group of messages while their forces are grappling in Georgia
or Ukraine, with the smaller country having been taken into NATO membership,
say, a year earlier, over Russia’s objections.
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The problem of nuanced messages and the management of de-escalation, even
short of war, is illustrated by the 1983 iteration of NATO’s command-post exercise
ABLE ARCHER, held 7–11 November that year. An annual exercise, ABLE ARCHER
was intended to practice nuclear-release procedures. Soviet intelligence routinely
monitored these exercises. However, the 1983 version took place against a back
ground of rising U.S.-Soviet political tensions and heightened suspicions within
the Soviet political leadership and military high command that the United States
and NATO might be preparing for a nuclear first strike. One reason that Russian
sensitivities to the possibility of U.S. or NATO nuclear first use or first strike were
high at this time was NATO’s decision to begin deploying Pershing II ballistic
missiles and ground-launched
States’ actual experience in managing nuclear cruise missiles of intermediate
range in Europe, beginning
crises or peacetime deterrence situations occurred almost entirely prior to the information in the fall of 1983. Soviet and
Warsaw Pact reactions to
age as we know it today.
ABLE ARCHER 83 included an
unprecedented surge of Warsaw Pact technical collection, a significant increase
in reconnaissance by Soviet strategic and naval aviation, and other unusual Soviet
moves that indicated increased concern about NATO and U.S. intentions.45 The
case illustrates how mistaken interpretations of “normal” events can overvalue pes
simistic assessment at just the wrong time.46 As the President’s Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board concluded in 1990, “We believe that the Soviets perceived that the
correlation of forces had turned against the USSR, that the US was seeking military
superiority, and that the chances of the US launching a nuclear first strike—perhaps
under cover of a routine training exercise—were growing. We also believe that the
US intelligence community did not at the time, and for several years afterwards,
attach sufficient weight to the possibility that the war scare was real.”47
The possibility of nuclear war by inadvertent escalation did not disappear
with the end of the Cold War. The Russian General Staff remained alert to the
possibility of a U.S. nuclear attack even as political relations between the two
early post–Cold War states were officially nonhostile. In one instance, a U.S.Norwegian Black Brant research rocket was launched from an island off the
coast of Norway on 25 January 1995 to study the northern lights. This triggered
a reaction from Russia’s missile-early-warning system, which alerted senior
Russian defense officials, including then-President Boris Yeltsin, who for the
first time activated his nuclear briefcase until confirmation was received that no
attack was in progress.48
Avoiding mistaken nuclear preemption in a complex information environ
ment is one kind of challenge; the problems in coordinating the management
of de-escalation and conflict termination with the conduct of information
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operations offer another. Two examples follow. The first, already alluded to, is
the use of a bunker-busting or other advanced-technology conventional weapon
that the other side, during the fog of crisis or war, confuses with a nuclear first
use or first strike. Russia expressed this concern specifically during New START
negotiations in 2010, with regard to American plans to deploy some convention
ally armed ballistic missiles on nuclear-capable intercontinental or transoceanic
launchers.49 New START counting rules regard conventionally armed ballistic
missiles as being nuclear-capable launchers, and therefore subject to overall
restrictions on the numbers of deployed launchers and weapons. U.S. plans for
Prompt Global Strike systems to include missiles or future space planes were
approved first during the George W. Bush administration and carried forward
under the Obama administration.
A second illustration of the problem of managing escalation control and con
flict termination alongside information operations, one separate from the issue
of escalation in Europe, is provided by the proposal for a joint NATO-Russian
theater-missile-defense (possibly including air defenses) system. The idea had
expert and highly visible political proponents on both sides of the Atlantic, and
official Russian commentators have not closed the door to the possibility of some
cooperation on ballistic-missile defenses (BMDs). Here, NATO and Russia are
facing in two political directions: toward each other, displaying wariness but also
openness; but regarding Iranian or other Middle Eastern leaders who may get
their hands on nuclear weapons in the future, and who may be beyond deterrence
based on the credible threat of nuclear (or other) retaliation, displaying concern.
However, the problems of achieving missile-defense cooperation between
NATO and Russia are not only political. Even with the best of intentions among
U.S., NATO, and Russian negotiators, the military-technical difficulties involved
in coordinating BMD C3 systems are considerable. Indeed, they are not strictly
“military-technical” but also heavily embedded with issues of political sover
eignty; classified intelligence; and trust, among both governments and militar
ies. Even among NATO members, militaries differ in their national traditions,
military-service identities, experiences in nuclear arms control, and willingness
to share online information in real time with temporary partners who may be
future enemies. For example, if a European theater-wide system of intelligence
and missile-attack warning is established, how many capitals will host relevant
servers and receive timely output? Who will decide that a missile warning is now
a threat requiring activation of the European BMD system—can a single nation
do so if a missile is headed its way, or must NATO (including the United States)
and Russia agree before any action is taken in response?
If a political crisis between NATO and Russia erupts, and both sides already
have deployed missile defenses, will Russian or American cyber warriors attempt
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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to spoof or otherwise negate the other’s missile-defense component? Would it
be better to reassure Russia regarding the surety of its own missile defenses, as
against the possibility of a conventional or nuclear preemption? Neither Russia
nor the United States will want to relinquish sovereign control over its part of any
cooperative missile defenses. However, would it be more prudent to announce a
withdrawal from the cooperative aspect of the regional BMD system during a cri
sis or to maintain the fiction of cooperation while attacking the other side’s cyber
systems with Trojan horses, logic bombs, and trapdoors—just in case? Perhaps, in
future nuclear or other crises, the U.S. and Russian cyber commands should have
their own direct “hotline,” or in this case an encrypted digital link.
The rule book for nuclear-crisis management in the age of cyber deterrence and
cyber war remains to be written. States’ actual experience in managing nuclear
crises or peacetime deterrence situations occurred almost entirely prior to the
information age as we know it today.
Military cyber war already has been used to attack nuclear-production facili
ties, to hijack computers and servers for hostile purposes, to infiltrate networks
with lurking malware awaiting timely activation, and to divert or prevent rocket
launches by hostile powers.50 Advanced cyberwar capabilities also might interfere
with future crisis management, either intentionally or otherwise, resulting in
misperceptions, faulty communications, caricatures of the other side’s intentions
and capabilities, and hasty judgments based on stereotypical thinking pushed
forward under duress.51 Added to this list, in the case of nuclear crisis, is the pos
sibility of imminent attack with historically unprecedented consequences, creat
ing a bias for preemptive action—“striking first in the last resort.” Finally, it is
important to emphasize that deterrence, whether it is based on the credible threat
of denial or retaliation, must be communicated successfully to, and believed by,
the other side. The “deterree” has the decisive vote.52
Technology alone will not resolve the dilemmas of nuclear-cyber overlap; to
the contrary, it may worsen the risks of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war.
For example, the outsourcing to AI or other expert systems of nuclear warning,
attack assessment, and response functions—on the assumption that they can
work faster and more accurately than can fallible humans—creates temptations to
resolve the human-machine interface by defaulting to technology. This is part of
the wider debate about keeping the human in the loop and is important in many
areas of AI, not only the military.53
One policy recommendation following from this analysis is that political
and military leaders need to wargame continually these types of scenarios, in
which cyber weapons might exert significant influence on crisis-management
outcomes. These war games do not need to be excessively complicated, but they
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should capture the environment of crisis decision-making under constrained
conditions of limited information, insufficient time for full consideration of all
options, and perception of the enemy “through a glass darkly.” On the other hand,
there are caveats in following this prescription; timing is everything. As soon as
the wargame scenarios start to explore what happens if the adversary is under
the same level of attack, the other states might speculate about the motives for
such war games; they might suspect that such games are a prelude to someone
developing a capability to attack their systems as preparation for war.
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AN OFFENSIVE MINEL AYING C AMPAIGN
AGAINST CHINA
Matthew Cancian

T

his article explores the feasibility of a limited minelaying action against China
to provide a crisis-response option more forceful than diplomacy but less
risky than kinetic operations.1 Using existing assets, it is feasible to lay minefields
in the Taiwan Strait, which would both disrupt intra-Chinese trade and delay any
Chinese military movement against Taiwan. Such a plan must be developed in
peacetime to be available as an option to U.S. leaders in a crisis. Although offen
sive minelaying often is overlooked, the United States has a history of successful
minelaying operations.
While mines can be weapons of the weak, they also can be tools of the strong.
During World War I, Great Britain and the United States, despite possessing the
strongest fleets in the world, laid seventy thousand mines to hinder German sub
marines.2 During World War II, the United States, after achieving naval dominance
over Japan, launched an offensive minelaying campaign that sank or damaged two
million tons of shipping in the last five months of the war.3 Most germane to this
article, the 1972–73 U.S. mining of Haiphong and other harbors over the course
of a few days during the Vietnam War shut down those harbors for almost a year.4
Although this article focuses solely on the military feasibility and not on the
political advisability of such a mission, minelaying has several advantages over
other responses to crises with China. In the event of a China-Taiwan conflict,
minelaying could be portrayed as “separating the
Matthew Cancian is a PhD candidate in political
science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. combatants,” like a UN peacekeeping force arrayed
He previously served as an artillery officer in the U.S.
between two rival armies. Thus, other states might
Marine Corps.
be more willing to accept such an action as an aid
to diplomacy. The pause in Chinese operations
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that a minefield likely would cause might provide enough time to defuse a crisis.
The economic pain caused by reduced or inconvenienced shipping also might
influence Chinese decision-making positively.
Minelaying’s greatest advantage is that it does not cause immediate harm but
threatens harm if the other side does not yield. It transfers the burden of decision
and action onto the other side; as Thomas C. Schelling points out, offering the
other side the “last clear chance” to avoid disaster can be a great advantage.5 As
the U.S. Navy did with its “quarantine” during the Cuban missile crisis, passing
the onus for action onto decision makers on the other side forces them to choose
between highly risky escalation and backing down.6 To avoid this painful choice,
the Chinese would try to clear any minefield.
The key question, then, is how quickly could China remove a minefield and
return the situation to the status quo ante? On the basis of minesweeping history,
it would take China about two to three months to clear completely even a small
minefield. The duration of this minesweeping operation would depend on the
number of mines laid and the effectiveness of Chinese minesweepers. Analysis of
the American bomber arsenal shows that it could lay between 840 and 3,880 mines
at one time. Historical cases show that each of China’s twenty available minesweep
ers could clear an average of between 0.8 and 2 mines per day. Therefore, even the
smallest minefield would take between twenty-one and fifty-three days to clear.
This estimate draws on analogies from historical minesweeping operations, the ge
ography of the strait, U.S. capabilities, and Chinese capabilities. While it is reliant on
open-source data, the data are extensive and sufficient to provide a rough estimate.
China could clear a limited route for military use within one to two weeks;
however, the United States could reseed the minefield faster than the Chinese
could clear it. The American capability to conduct constant reseeding of the field
is increasing as the United States acquires more extended-range, aerial-dropped
mines. Thus, assuming that the United States has sufficient stockpiles, mines
could provide an enduring obstacle to Chinese cross-strait movement.
This article proceeds in five parts, examining the following subjects: past of
fensive minelaying operations, the minelaying mission within the hydrography
of the Taiwan Strait, U.S. capabilities to plant a minefield, Chinese minesweeping
capabilities, and U.S. responses to Chinese minesweeping efforts.
U.S. MINE WARFARE
While naval mining has ancient roots, the mine only came of age as a weapon
of modern war during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. In the Far East,
the Russians laid more than four thousand mines, which sank thirteen Japanese
ships.7 On the opposite side, the Russians lost two predreadnoughts and the en
ergetic vice admiral Stepan O. Makarov to Japanese mines. While mines helped
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to tie up the Imperial Japanese Navy, they also proved a double-edged sword, by
restricting Russian movement, according to Sir Julian S. Corbett.8 Their use in
this conflict demonstrated that naval mines could have dramatic operational and
strategic effects, but their risks and benefits had to be evaluated carefully.
Why Offensive Minelaying Is Neglected
The risks involved might be one reason why naval mines have been neglected
in contemporary American thought. Failures in mine countermeasures and the
dictates of naval doctrine also have caused U.S. planners to forget their own past
successes with naval mines. Thus, any offensive mine campaign would need to
overcome internal, cultural barriers.
Defensive versus Offensive Minefields. Because the U.S. Navy generally has oper
ated forward and offensively since the Civil War, it operates in the waters of ad
versaries and must contend with their defensive minefields. This has not always
gone well. At Wonsan, the United States tried to make an amphibious landing on
the North Korean east coast, intending to cut off retreating North Korean forces,
as in the Inchon landings several months earlier. However, North Korean mines
frustrated the attempt, and coalition forces moving by land arrived at the port
first. As the senior naval officer put it, “We have lost control of the seas to a nation
without a Navy, using pre–World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized
at the time of the birth of Christ.”9 In the Persian Gulf during Operation DESERT
STORM, Iraqi minefields—mostly using obsolete contact mines—severely dam
aged two ships and limited coalition naval maneuvers during the war.10
These failures have spawned endless (and justified) hand-wringing over the
U.S. Navy’s unpreparedness for operations in mined waters. Thus, the literature on
mine warfare focuses on shortfalls in mine countermeasures and what the Navy
might do to remedy those shortfalls, rather than on offensive mine warfare.11
Naval Doctrine. Doctrine also has contributed to the neglect of offensive mine
warfare—it traditionally has focused on the clash of fleets. Alfred Thayer Mahan,
a U.S. naval theorist writing at the end of the nineteenth century, argued that con
trol of the sea meant control of commerce, which drove the outcome of conflicts.
He believed that this “overbearing power can only be exercised by great navies.”
Thus, the focus of naval operations should be on the adversary’s fleet, and this
required capital ships.12
Fleet action still dominates U.S. naval thinking. In contemporary terms, fleet
action involves missile exchanges rather than battleship broadsides, but the anal
ysis is the same. What counts is ordnance delivered. Such ordnance inflicts dam
age on an adversary’s fleet according to physical laws established by Frederick
W. Lanchester at the beginning of the twentieth century. Mass is critical, giving
priority to the construction of fleet combatants.13
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Since World War II, naval doctrine also has focused on power projection: the
ability of naval forces to influence operations ashore. This influence is exerted
mainly via aircraft and amphibious forces. Mine countermeasures have a role
here because fleets often need to approach close to an adversary’s shore; however,
offensive mine warfare has played only a small role.
Naval officers also might hesitate to use minelaying because of legal complica
tions. According to The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,
naval mining during armed conflict requires international notification and the
recording of mine location for future removal, and mines cannot be placed solely
to intercept commercial shipping.14 Any prospective naval mining by the United
States could be subjected to complex legal debates. Of course, “in times of war,
the law falls silent”; whether naval mining was legal or not in the particular con
text, the exigencies of conflict might compel the United States to practice it again,
as it has in the past.15
Use against Japan in World War II
The most extensive and successful minelaying campaign the United States has
conducted was against Japan in World War II. Although overshadowed by the
strategic bombing offensive, the submarine campaign, and amphibious assaults
on Japanese-held islands, the 1945 offensive minelaying campaign succeeded in
paralyzing Japanese shipping and crippling the Japanese economy.
Called Operation STARVATION, the campaign ran for only five months, from
late March to early August 1945. But it entailed emplacing twelve thousand mines
(mainly by B-29 bombers), and the resultant minefields sank or damaged two
million tons of shipping. The most dramatic effect was that shipping in Japanese
home waters effectively ceased. As the summary report noted, “[S]hip losses are
but incidental to the primary objects of mining which are to delay and disrupt the
enemy’s shipping, disorganize his maritime supply system, and thereby deprive
him of essential military and economic materials.”16
Because the Japanese swept mines aggressively, the minefields did require pe
riodic reseeding. Reseeding with a few mines frequently was better than doing
so with large numbers infrequently; the former approach forced the adversary
to clear continuously. The minelaying campaign also required good intelligence
(to understand the hydrography and shipping patterns), effective preparation (to
have mines and aircraft in place), and experienced planners (to use assets opti
mally). The summary report emphasized the importance of the surprise intro
duction and large-scale use of mines to overwhelm defenses before the adversary
could develop effective countermeasures. The report also noted that operations
followed capabilities—that is, as better mines became available, the results im
proved, and the use of mines increased.17
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The campaign was highly cost-effective. Of the aircraft participating, only
fifteen were lost, amounting to less than 1 percent—a far lower loss rate than
from the strategic bombing of cities. Further, the minelaying effort inflicted these
high losses on Japan while constituting only 5.7 percent of the bomber sorties
conducted over the country. One ship was damaged or sunk for every eighteen
mines.18 One calculation estimated that the mining of Japanese home waters was
nine times more cost-effective than the submarine campaign.19
Use against North Vietnam
A smaller minelaying campaign against North Vietnam is relevant to this discus
sion because it both contributed directly to the political goal—bringing the North
Vietnamese to negotiations—and involved more-modern mines. The minelaying
occurred in reaction to the North Vietnamese Easter offensive against northern
South Vietnam. Eighty-five percent of North Vietnam’s imports came through
the port of Haiphong, so the country was quite vulnerable to naval mining.20
The campaign began in May 1972. Ultimately eight thousand mines were
placed, all by air.21 The operation used modern influence mines, both magnetic
and acoustic. Thirty-one ships, mostly foreign, were trapped in the harbor, and
none tried to depart after the mines activated, indicating that the North Vietnam
ese had confidence in the effectiveness of U.S. mines. The ships were stuck in port
for three hundred days, until the United States cleared the mines in 1973.22
The United States removed the mines as part of the overall peace agreement.
Performing the sweeping after the political settlement was concluded—that is, not
during active hostilities—should have been easy, because the location, types, and
settings of the mines were known. In addition, the minesweeping force had been
training for seven months in preparation for the operation. A large task force was
employed, with thirty-three heavy helicopters, ten mine-countermeasures vessels,
an LPH (landing platform, helicopter), and an LPD (landing platform, dock). Yet
even given these ideal conditions, the process took forty-eight days to be sure that
all the mines had been either removed or inactivated, as the treaty required. As a
final proofing of the sweep, an old ship specially configured to withstand mine
explosions sailed up the channel. As the officer in charge concluded, “[S]weeping
of any sort is difficult, tedious, [and] lengthy.”23
The Modern Situation
Offensive mine warfare today may be even more effective than history in
dicates. Contemporary mines are smart (able to distinguish a ship from a
simulator), have multiple sensors (acoustic, pressure, magnetic), and typically
sit on the bottom. Often, they cannot be swept by ships passing above them
simulating signatures but must be hunted individually. That involves finding
metal objects on the bottom, investigating them, identifying them as mines,
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and neutralizing them. Since the world’s oceans are full of trash, this can be
time-consuming.24
Further, it has been seventy years since great powers engaged in minecountermine competition. Both sides have made technological advances whose
effectiveness cannot be known fully until they are deployed in a wartime envi
ronment. However, because only a few mines must work for a minefield to be
successful in deterring shipping, the advantage likely rests with the minelayers,
not the mine clearers. While contemporary adversaries might not be as helpless
as the North Vietnamese, these historical cases suggest that the offensive use of
mines deserves deeper analysis.
CRISES THAT MIGHT DEMAND A U.S. RESPONSE
While this article focuses on the military feasibility rather than the political wis
dom of minelaying, it is necessary to establish that minelaying might be a useful
tool in certain scenarios. China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea and its
recent crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy show a willingness to take risks to
enhance regional hegemony. China’s claims on Taiwan and its extensive claims
in the South China Sea could lead to a future crisis. The following paragraphs
explore some of these scenarios.
If China decided to use military force against Taiwan and its outlying islands,
it would not be the first time. When the Chinese Nationalist forces were driven
off the mainland in 1949, they settled in Taiwan, but they also were able to hang
on to a few islands just off the coast; Quemoy and Mazu are the closest to the
mainland. In the 1950s, China periodically shelled the islands and appeared
ready to assault them. The crises abated when the United States demonstrated
support for the Nationalists.25 Suppose the Chinese resumed shelling today, now
with precision munitions, and appeared ready to jump the narrow straits and
assault the islands?
Taiwan could make a Chinese attack more likely by declaring formal indepen
dence. The Taiwan government occupies an ambiguous position in international
diplomacy. It never has announced its independence formally, instead maintain
ing for many decades the fiction that it is the rightful government of all China, but
fewer and fewer nations continue to adhere to that formula. The Chinese Com
munist government has stated emphatically that Taiwan is a province of China and
that it would react forcefully to any declaration of independence. Suppose a future
Taiwan government declared formal independence and the mainland Chinese
government took actions that looked like preparations for a cross-strait invasion?
China could use force to pursue its claims in the South China Sea. China has
claimed that its manmade “islands” in the South China Sea establish territorial
rights; other states dispute this. Currently China claims twelve-nautical-mile
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/1

76

Naval War College: Winter 2022 Full Issue

C A N C IA N

71

exclusion zones around the island formations and seeks to require that ships and
aircraft request permission to transit the area. Although states mostly ignore this,
in the future China could try to enforce such a claim, either within the twelvenautical-mile band or farther out. China established an air-defense identification
zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea in 2013; recently, Taiwan’s defense minister
expressed his belief that China would set up a similar zone in the larger and more
contested South China Sea.26 Suppose China started shooting at aircraft and ships
that did not comply?
Minelaying might be an appropriate response in any of these scenarios. Other
current options might not satisfy U.S. politicians. Diplomatic action certainly
would be called for, but that might not be strong enough. Kinetic strikes have a
high likelihood of leading to a high-intensity conflict. Even shows of force in the
contested areas might set off a shooting war without achieving the political goal.
A minelaying campaign, on the other hand, would constitute a forceful response
without causing any immediate casualties. Depending on the nature of the crisis,
the minefields could be configured to impede hostile naval action by the Chinese
or to bottle up commerce so the Chinese would pay an economic price for their
actions.
THE MISSION: MINE THE TAIWAN STRAIT
If American politicians chose to respond to a crisis with minelaying, the nature of
the minefield necessarily would depend on the particular crisis. Chinese aggres
sion in the South China Sea might entail minefields that block ports, whereas a
threat against Taiwan’s islands might entail minefields that block the intervening
bodies of water. Nevertheless, the different operations share many characteristics.
This article analyzes a limited minelaying mission to block Chinese access to
the Taiwan Strait, assuming the following:
• There is no ongoing exchange of fire.
• The mission is to lay enough mines to deter civilian and military use of the
strait.
• The mines are laid in one mission, after which the United States announces
the presence of the minefield and its desire to resolve the crisis peacefully.
The purpose here is not to explore what reaction this minelaying would provoke
or how such a crisis might play out, but rather to analyze its feasibility as an option.
The Taiwan Strait is shallow and narrow, making the area an effective one to
mine. It is about three hundred kilometers (km) long; the width averages 180 km,
but measures only 130 km at the narrowest. The average depth is sixty meters
(m); even at its deepest (100 m), the depth does not exceed the maximum usable
depth of America’s most numerous mine, the Quickstrike.27 However, maritime
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traffic in the strait is centered on an 8 km wide band of water of 20 m depth, mak
ing civilian traffic particularly vulnerable.28 The 1945 offensive minelaying cam
paign against Japan provides a historical analogy. Granted that the Shimonoseki
Strait between Honshu and Kyushu is shorter, narrower, and shallower than the
Taiwan Strait, that campaign did block the passage effectively.29
Besides any military effects, a mining campaign would cause significant eco
nomic disruption to China. Sixty percent of Chinese trade travels by sea, and
maritime imports into China account for a quarter of global maritime trade; a
campaign aimed at ports would disrupt this trade severely.30 However, minelay
ing in the Taiwan Strait mostly would disrupt Chinese internal trade, although
the ports of Xiamen, Quanzhou, and Fuzhou also would be affected. Internally,
China moved 5.5 million ton-kilometers of freight by ship in 2018 (compared
with 2.7 million ton-kilometers by rail).31 Approximately 39,000 vessel trips were
made through the Taiwan Strait during a twelve-month period in 2011–12.32 This
means that the pain inflicted by the blockage of the strait would be focused on the
Chinese themselves—an added benefit in the political calculus.
Given the mission and geography of an offensive minelaying campaign in the
Taiwan Strait, the question then becomes: Does the United States have the capa
bility to do it?
U.S. Ability to Mine the Taiwan Strait
The United States could not block the Taiwan Strait using mines laid by surface
ships or submarines; the Navy currently has no surface minelaying capability,
and submarine minelaying capabilities are limited. The only currently available
submarine mine is the Mk 67 mobile mine. While it does offer clandestine deliv
ery, it relies on technology from the 1960s, has a small inventory, and cannot be
launched by Virginia-class submarines.33 (A replacement is being developed, but
it is not yet in service.)34
Given the geography and current capabilities, aerial-delivered mines would
be used. The Quickstrike family of mines is built around five-hundred-, onethousand-, and two-thousand-pound bombs of the Mk 80 series.35 As noted
above, these mines can function in all depths of the strait, using variable-influence
sensors to detect submarines and surface ships.
Using the smallest-charge version of the Quickstrike, the Mk 62, makes sense,
for three reasons. First, Iran demonstrated in the 1980s that even 250-poundcharge mines can cause significant damage.36 Second, actually sinking ships and
inflicting casualties might be counterproductive to the political goal of coercion;
the loss of life created by large-charge mines striking Chinese ships that “damn
the torpedoes” could create among the Chinese a perceived need to retaliate that
would make a beneficial political settlement less likely.37 Third, smaller mines
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can be laid in greater quantities, which is helpful to the mission of blocking the
strait.
Before the first mines are dropped, China will be uncertain what the aircraft
in question are doing in the strait. After the first mines are laid and China
knows what is afoot, it might target follow-on missions and escalate the situ
ation in a context in which its actions would appear to be more justified. The
first flight of aircraft could fly along the strait without going over Chinese land.
While this would violate the ADIZ the Chinese have declared over the East
China Sea, the United States has flown bombers through the ADIZ previously
without their being shot at.38 China would have to decide whether to shoot at
American aircraft whose intentions it would not know; if it chose to shoot at
such aircraft, the United States could abort the minelaying mission and seize
on the Chinese action as a casus belli to gain international support. However,
the more likely scenario would have China not shooting at U.S. aircraft on the
first mission. Therefore, the number of mines laid would be determined by the
inventory of aircraft available for a single mission and the resultant payload
capacity.
B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers all can deliver the Mk 62 Quickstrike mine.39
Open-source information indicates that these bombers can fit the same amount
of mines as their base munition—that is to say, the extra detection devices on the
Quickstrikes do not reduce bomber payload.40 With payloads of seventy thou
sand pounds for both B-52s and B-1s, each of those airframes could carry 140
mines. The forty-thousand-pound payload for the B-2 bomber means that each
of those planes could carry eighty mines. As the mission does not require im
mediate action, the United States could spend some time marshaling aircraft to
participate in the strike. The strait is comfortably within range of air bases in
Japan and Guam for all bombers, even without refueling; with the high air-base
capacity in the area and with B-2s taking off from the continental United States,
air-base space would not be a constraint.
For a major operation, the United States could launch a strike force of six B-1B,
three B-2, and twenty B-52H bombers, laying 3,880 mines. For comparison,
eleven B-1s, four B-2s, and twenty-eight B-52s deployed for the 2003 invasion
of Iraq.41 However, open-source data suggest that readiness may have decreased
since then; in 2019, only six B-1B bombers were ready to deploy.42 It has been
estimated that only three of the twenty active B-2s are ready for a mission at any
time.43 Fifty-eight B-52s are active and eighteen are in reserve, and the readiness
of the simpler airframe is likely higher; thus, the conservative estimate of twenty
available B-52s is reasonable.44
The planes’ available payloads yield the maximum figure of 3,880 mines. How
ever, use of an air armada of this scope likely would be unnecessary, its capacity
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might exceed American mine stockpiles, and using it might increase the risk of a
catastrophic Chinese reaction.
In a more conservative scenario, six B-1B bombers could lay 840 mines. Be
cause B-52 and B-2 bombers are nuclear capable, their use might cause the Chi
nese to conclude that a nuclear strike was incoming, which could precipitate
hostile countermeasures. Using only B-1B bombers flying on a north–south axis
along the Chinese coast would reduce the likelihood of a Chinese reaction. As
noted above, U.S. bombers have flown through the Chinese ADIZ in the Taiwan
Strait previously without provoking hostile counteraction. The Chinese likely
would assume that the bombers again were performing a show of force—until
the bomb bays had opened, the payload had been delivered, and the bombers
already had turned away.
The degree of risk to the bombers would vary only slightly with the orienta
tion and location of the minefield. Because Quemoy Island is only two kilo
meters from the Chinese mainland, a minefield to protect the island would
require bombers to get closer to Chinese air-defense assets. An east–westoriented minefield to interdict trade through the Taiwan Strait would be less
risky, although some aircraft still would have to get within a few miles of the
Chinese coast. The stealth technology of the B-2 bomber would make those
aircraft more survivable and thus preferred for seeding the areas closest to the
Chinese coast, but their nuclear capabilities and lower payloads make them less
attractive.
Much of the risk to the bombers would be eliminated by using extendedrange variants of the Quickstrikes that currently are in development. These
variants use Joint Direct Attack Munition kits to increase their range and pre
cision. Although sufficient stockpiles likely do not exist for a mission of this
magnitude at this time, they could be developed and amassed in coming years.
The new, extended-range Quickstrikes have a range of about 64 km, so they
could be launched from outside the Chinese-claimed 22 km ADIZ. While this
is not outside the envelope of modern antiair systems, it would decrease the
threat the Chinese would perceive from the bombers, and increase their surviv
ability even if the Chinese chose to engage. In an east–west minefield to block
the strait, extended-range Quickstrikes could seed the 64 km closest to the
Chinese shoreline while basic Quickstrikes seeded the other half of the strait.
The extended-range variants have completed operational testing and offer the
added benefit of being GPS guided, which would aid in their eventual removal
following a political settlement.45
But could the Chinese simply sweep the mines themselves, without making
concessions and receiving American help?
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Chinese Ability to Sweep Mines
If the United States took no further measures, how long would it take China to
clear the minefield? In addition to the number of mines laid, the answer depends
on the number and effectiveness of Chinese minesweepers.
China could field around twenty minesweepers. It has fourteen active Type
81 minesweepers and sixteen smaller Type 82 minesweepers.46 While China pos
sesses a variety of other coastal and harbor minesweepers, they can counter only
moored contact mines, which are less sophisticated than the Quickstrikes.47 As
suming that a third of ships are unavailable owing to maintenance, as is typically
the case with U.S. military vessels, then around twenty Chinese minesweepers
would be available.48
Past campaigns indicate that minesweepers can clear an average of between
0.8 mines and 2 mines per minesweeper per day. U.S. minesweepers in Wonsan
cleared 225 mines over fifteen days using eighteen minesweepers, for a rate of

LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED FOR THE CHINESE TO CLEAR THE MINEFIELD

Mines Swept per Ship per Day

2.0

Days

242.5

1.6

90.8

1.2

52.5
21.0

0.8
840

1800

2760

Number of Mines Laid

3880

Note the range from 21 days (assuming the smallest U.S. field and the most efficient sweepers) to 242.5 days at the other extreme.
Source: Based on multiple runs of author simulation.
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0.83 mines swept per day.49 To counter Iraqi mines during the 2003 invasion of
Iraq, ten minesweepers were active.50 Talmadge calculated that together they
cleared 19.5 mines per day, making 1.95 mines per minesweeper per day.51
Talmadge also calculated that coalition minesweepers in 1991 swept 1.18 mines
per day.52 Therefore, in historic cases of similar minefield sizes and number of
minesweeping vessels, each minesweeper has removed between 0.8 and 2 mines
per day.
In this simplified scenario, it likely would take the Chinese between fifty and
ninety days to remove an American minefield. The figure shows the duration of
the minefield, depending on the per-ship minesweeping efficiency of the Chinese
and the number of mines the United States laid. All scenarios assume that the
Chinese can muster their twenty minesweeping ships on the day the minefield is
laid. The duration ranges from twenty-one days, assuming the smallest minefield
and the most optimistic per-ship sweeping efficiency for the Chinese, to a longest
duration of 242.5 days. The average estimated duration of the Chinese efforts is
90.8 days. Perhaps the most likely scenario is 52.5 days, which uses the smallest
minefield and the least efficient Chinese sweeping efforts. The smallest minefield
is likely because the risk in laying mines will push planners to keep the number
of aircraft exposed to danger low. The least efficient minesweeping efforts are
likely because the United States would use influence mines more technologically
sophisticated than the mines the North Koreans and Iraqis used, which mostly
were contact mines.
An additional variable is whether any minesweepers themselves are lost to
or damaged by the mines. At Wonsan, the United States lost two out of eighteen
minesweepers over the course of fifteen days while clearing 225 mines. In 1991,
two American ships were struck by mines; although they themselves were not
minesweepers, they were escorting a flotilla of ten minesweepers in an operation
that removed 250 mines over forty-two days.53 However, no ships were lost in the
2003 clearing of mines from the Umm Qasr waterway.
Therefore, this article relies on a simulation of the results of a Chinese mine
sweeping operation in which the minesweepers suffer attrition. The simulation
assumes that every day the surviving Chinese minesweepers clear a certain num
ber of mines; this reduces the number of active mines. The most likely scenario
has 840 mines being cleared at a rate of 0.8 mines per minesweeper per day. Every
day, the Chinese have a two-in-fifteen chance of losing a minesweeper (as the
United States lost two minesweepers over the course of fifteen days at Wonsan).
Even though Wonsan is the case with the highest historical attrition rate, it prob
ably is the most realistic, given the technological balance between America and
China. If the Chinese were reduced to five minesweepers, the projection is that
they would abort the mission. Minesweeper attrition thus not only extends the
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duration of the Chinese operation but also makes it possible for the Chinese to
fail entirely. The simulation continues until either all the mines are cleared or the
Chinese have five minesweepers remaining.
Introducing minesweeper attrition to the calculation increases the duration
of Chinese minesweeping to sixty-nine days in the most likely scenario, with a 6
percent chance that the Chinese are unable to sweep the field at all. Simulating
the clearance operation a thousand times, the durations ranged from forty-eight
to 106 days, with an average duration of sixty-nine days; nine minesweepers
were lost on average. In 6 percent of trials, the Chinese minesweepers were re
duced to five, and they aborted the mission. A fair summary of the results is that
it likely would take the Chinese between two and three months to clear all the
mines.
But do they need to clear all the mines, or just a portion thereof? Clearing a
passage for military traffic might take only one or two weeks. In minefield par
lance, a Q-route is an initial passage in which the chance of hitting a mine is be
lieved to be 10 percent or less. How many mines this requires sweeping depends
on the density of the minefield and other characteristics. In the case of Won
san, the clearing of 225 mines out of three thousand laid by the North Koreans
was sufficient for military operations. This means that clearing about 10 percent
of mines would suffice for military traffic, which would reduce the duration of
minesweeping proportionately. Minesweeper attrition would be lower because of
the reduced number of mines to be cleared. In this scenario, the Chinese prob
ably would require only one or two weeks to clear a Q-route through the mine
field (two to nine days of actual sweeping, preceded by a few days to marshal the
minesweepers to the area).
While a cleared route would defeat a U.S. mission of area denial, it would not
be sufficient to allow civilian traffic to resume. A Q-route probably would not
instill enough confidence to restore merchant traffic, meaning that China would
continue to suffer economic pain. If the mission were defined as complete denial
of the strait to the Chinese military, then an undefended minefield would afford
the United States only enough time to rush assets into the theater; the minefield
itself would not prevent Chinese military traffic for longer than two weeks. How
ever, this calculus changes if the United States or Taiwan targets Chinese mine
sweeping assets.
RESPONSES TO CHINESE MINESWEEPING
Depending on the political situation, the United States or Taiwan or both could
disrupt minesweeping efforts or could reseed the minefield. Attacking Chinese
minesweeping assets would subtract one of the positive aspects of the minelay
ing option—namely, that laying mines can be portrayed as a relatively passive
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,

83

78

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [], No. 1, Art. 1

response. However, if China were attacking Taiwan or some portion thereof
(such as Quemoy), then destruction of Chinese minesweepers might be justifi
able. Taiwan’s expanding antiship-missile capability could allow it to disrupt
minesweeping operations without involving the United States.54 While it is be
yond the scope of this article to analyze such an expanded engagement, the loss
of or damage to only a few minesweepers would delay significantly or even halt
Chinese minesweeping.
Reseeding the minefield is a less escalatory option that could extend the time
required for Chinese minesweeping. Reseeding a minefield not only increases the
number of mines; it also potentially makes previously swept zones unsafe, which
usually requires minesweeping operations to start over. However, once the initial
minefield has been laid, the Chinese would be justified in engaging the bombers
doing the reseeding. Therefore, reseeding efforts would need to be more limited
and rely on stealthier options than the initial minelaying.
The simulation used above can be expanded to see how reseeding affects the
Chinese minesweeping. The B-2 bomber’s forty-thousand-pound payload means
it can carry eighty Mk 62 mines. The B-2 bomber’s stealth makes it more surviv
able than other platforms, particularly when coupled with the 64 km standoff
range that the extended-range Quickstrike variants provide. In the simulation,
every x days eighty mines are added to the field, representing the payload of one
B-2. At the end, the simulation reports the percentage of times the Chinese mine
sweeping failed for each value of x. This tells us the likely outcomes of American
reseeding at various frequencies.
Reseeding the minefield with one B-2 bomber per week likely would be enough
to prevent the Chinese from ever clearing all the mines without American aid.
Reseeding the minefield as infrequently as once every thirteen days with one B-2’s
payload results in a 92 percent chance that the Chinese will lose fifteen mine
sweepers, and thus abort their mission, before they sweep every American mine.
Assuming the less costly attrition rate of 1991 (two ships lost in forty-two days),
reseeding the field once a week results in a 98 percent chance of Chinese failure.
Reseeding the minefield with one B-2 bomber every five days likely would be
enough to prevent the Chinese from clearing a route for military use. Again, this
assumes that 10 percent of the mines need to be cleared to create such a lane. Un
der the assumptions of the most realistic scenario, the Chinese need only a little
over five days to clear 10 percent of the 840 mines ((10 percent of 840 mines) ÷ (20
minesweepers × 0.8 mines per minesweeper per day)). However, reseeding the
minefield once every five days with one B-2’s payload is likely enough to thwart
the Chinese continuously. The issue of minesweeper attrition does not enter
these calculations—so long as America has sufficient stockpiles and the Chinese
minesweepers operate at expected efficiency, there never will be a cleared route.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/1
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Furthermore, it is unlikely the Chinese minesweepers would be particularly ef
ficient in this scenario, as the B-2 could lay mines in areas the Chinese had des
ignated previously as swept. But what if, despite this, the Chinese operate at the
same efficiency as the coalition in 1991 (two mines per minesweeper per day)?
In this case, one B-2 every other day would be required. Thus, with sufficient
stockpiles of the extended-range Quickstrike mines, the prospects are good of
preventing the clearance of a lane even under conservative assumptions.
For Navy programmers, the analysis presented here shows the importance of
acquiring sufficient stockpiles of naval mines and conducting training in their
employment. In the most conservative scenario depicted, six B-1B bombers lay
840 mines. Even this conservative scenario assumes that enough mines exist,
they are available for a mission within days, and the bomber pilots are trained
in their employment; procurement and training programs might have to be es
tablished to ensure that these factors are not stumbling blocks in the future. The
new, extended-range version of the Quickstrike also should be procured in large
quantities, as use of these mines would reduce dramatically the risk to bomber
crews. Assuming the unit cost for Quickstrike mines is similar to that for guided
bombs (around thirty thousand dollars per unit), the mines also represent a
much cheaper option than other tools (for example, the AGM-158C long-range
antiship missile costs $3.96 million per unit).55 Finally, using other mines in
conjunction with Quickstrikes would make the minefield much more difficult
to sweep. The Mk 68 Clandestine Delivered Mine and the Hammerhead are two
such systems under development.56
For strategists, this article shows how the exploration of unorthodox lines of
action can expand the Navy’s tool kit. Mines represent a historically effective
weapon about which the United States thinks too little. Developing plans and
capabilities now not only would make the Navy more potentially useful; it also
would set up China for a measure of surprise, likely creating an advantage for the
United States and the Navy during a time of great danger. Although the exact cir
cumstances of a real crisis will be different from those of the stylized one depicted
here, the effort put into thinking about options ahead of time will produce better
information and plans during an actual event. As General Dwight D. Eisenhower
put it maximally, “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.”57
Finally, for decision makers, having a minelaying option would provide a valu
able additional rung on the escalation ladder between diplomatic initiatives and
kinetic strikes. When faced with a crisis to which the United States must respond,
American decision makers will start with diplomatic efforts, but these may prove
insufficient. Escalating directly to kinetic strikes poses great risks and might not be
supported by U.S. allies, even those most vulnerable to Chinese aggression. Thus,
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having an intermediate option might strike the right balance between doing too little
and doing too much. On the other hand, the initial seeding of the minefield could
spark a larger conflict, or the Chinese could respond by laying their own minefield
against U.S. bases or allies. While the operational feasibility of this operation is clear,
the political and legal ramifications bear further scrutiny from other scholars.
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“GREAT REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT”
R ATHER THAN “GREAT SEA POWER”
Russia’s New Supply Point on the Red Sea Coast
Tobias Kollakowski

F

ollowing a Russo-Sudanese agreement on military cooperation that came into
effect in May 2019, a series of legal documents were ratified in November–
December 2020 that give the Russian military access to the Sudanese harbor
of Port Sudan.1 The basing agreement permits the establishment of a punkt
material′no-tekhnicheskogo obespecheni͡ia (logistical supply point) and subse
quently the development of infrastructure necessary for the maintenance of ships
and the recreation of ships’ crews.2 Sudan retains equal rights to use the berthing
frontage—if Russian authorities agree. The supply base territory includes the
nearby coastal and water zone. At the tactical level, the Russian chief of the supply
base and the Sudanese commander of the Port Sudan naval base are authorized
by their respective ministries of defense to address questions related to use of
the facility. While Sudanese security forces carry out landward protection of the
base, the Russian armed forces are responsible for its seaside protection and the
provision of air defense. In addition, the Russo-Sudanese contract allows Russia
to carry out all kinds of activities considered necessary for the operation of its
warships, including dredging and setting up floating berths. Russia is allowed
to modify, reconstruct, and demolish real estate it has leased, if the Sudanese
side agrees.3 Sudan retains the option to request Russian assistance on a range of
tasks, including search and rescue, defense against
Lieutenant Tobias Kollakowski, Federal German
swimmer incursions, air defense, and deliveries
Navy Reserve, is a PhD student at King’s College
4
London’s War Studies Department and a research of arms to the respective parties. The term of the
fellow at the German Institute for Defence and Straagreement is twenty-five years, with automatic
tegic Studies.
renewal every decade thereafter if neither country
objects.5
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The agreement immediately gained the attention of the news media, whose
primary interest lay in the intentions behind the Russian plans.6 Russia’s new
military base on the Red Sea, although arguably representing the logical climax
of recent Russian naval involvement on the shores of East Africa and the western
Indian Ocean, is merely one manifestation of Russia’s resurgent interest in the
region since the beginning of the twenty-first century. As extensively covered by
both journalistic and academic writing over the past two decades, examples of
Russia’s (naval) engagement policy in the region have included port visits to Rus
sian partners and regional powers, the participation by the Russian Federation
Navy (RFN) in counterpiracy operations off the Horn of Africa, exploration of
marine-energy resources, Russo-Indian military and defense-industrial coopera
tion, arms exportations, and exportations of nonmilitary nuclear technology to
Indian Ocean littoral states.7
Some media outlets portrayed the Kremlin as being on the road to taking
control over the sea routes accessing significant portions of Africa and the Per
sian Gulf.8 In contrast, this article argues that the Russian naval presence in the
western Indian Ocean and its adjacent marginal seas and the acquisition of a
naval base on the shores of the Red Sea do not reflect an oceanic ambition aimed
at attaining ultimate status as a “power in the sea” in this region of the world. It
also seeks to show that twenty-first-century Russian naval activities in the Indian
Ocean are not a revival of those of the Soviet naval force that formerly operated in
the region—the Soviet Pacific Fleet’s famous 8th Operational Squadron—as there
are significant differences in the natures of the two naval task forces.
First, a quick look at the 8th Squadron will reveal the dimensions and opera
tional capabilities of the once-mighty Soviet naval presence in the region. Next,
a short examination of Russian naval activities in the same region today suggests
that this current naval manifestation does not represent a reestablishment of
the Soviet naval presence, because, although the current force may function as a
“sharp” policy instrument, it does not possess the military capabilities necessary
to achieve relevant operational objectives in a high-intensity conflict. Rather
than blue-water operational objectives, Russia’s military presence at the begin
ning of the third decade of the twenty-first century in the western Indian Ocean
area serves wider political goals, as underlined in the succeeding section of the
article. These political objectives are manifold, concern government and nongov
ernment actors at the northern and western shores of this great basin, and are
essentially terrestrial in character.
In the end, this article argues that the primary motivation driving Russia’s
naval engagement in this region is not oceanic but land-centric and littoral, as
Russia seeks to gain access to the African continent and to maintain close rela
tions with various partners in the region.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/1
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THE SOVIET 8TH SQUADRON DURING THE SECOND HALF OF
THE COLD WAR
In 1968, for the first time, the Soviets publicly announced the deployment of a task
force to the Indian Ocean. It had been detached from the Pacific Fleet and con
sisted of a Sverdlov-class cruiser, two guided-missile destroyers, and a submarine.9
As Mark Carolla points out, the Soviet naval presence initially was quite limited; it
operated a daily average of three ships in the Indian Ocean, lacked regional naval
bases, and suffered from the closure of the Suez Canal as a consequence of the
1967 Arab-Israeli War.10 Over the next decade, however, the Soviet Union (USSR)
significantly strengthened its foothold in the region by securing access to various
ports throughout the Indo-Pacific and establishing a standing naval formation.11
This forward-deployed task force of the Soviet Pacific Fleet was called the
͡
8-ia operativna͡ia ėskadra (8th Operational Squadron).12 At different points in
time, its principal bases in the region included Basra, Iraq; Berbera, Somalia;
Nakura (or Nokra), Ethiopia (at the time, now Eritrea); and Aden, South Yemen
(as the country commonly was called at the time, prior to its 1990 unification
with North Yemen, now Yemen).13 Typically between eight and twenty-five
units were allocated to the 8th Squadron, usually consisting of seven or eight
surface combatants, one or two submarines, one or two intelligence ships, and
up to a dozen auxiliary vessels.14 During certain periods, amphibious units
were present as well.15 In March 1978, the strength of the Indian Ocean squad
ron reached a historic high when there were thirty-two Soviet warships and
auxiliary vessels present in the region. Thus, during most of the second half of
the Cold War, the force level of the 8th Squadron ensured that the Soviet navy
outnumbered its U.S. counterpart in the region during peacetime, although the
United States could deploy overwhelming naval forces to the region quickly
during times of crisis.16 The squadron’s primary area of operations (AO) was
the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, although its warships frequently
operated in adjacent seas. In addition, the 8th Squadron received aerialreconnaissance support from Soviet aircraft that could deploy from airfields at
Uanle Uen, Somalia; Asmara, Ethiopia (now Eritrea); and South Yemen when
operating in the Indian Ocean and Iraq when in the Persian Gulf.17
On a policy level, this naval presence in the Indian Ocean area was just one
component—albeit a significant one—of a regional-engagement policy encom
passing various elements; in addition to arms exports to littoral countries, they
included economic- and diplomatic-policy tools.18 This engagement was part of a
wider competition for regional influence vis-à-vis its superpower rival, the Unit
ed States of America; the declining former colonial power, the United Kingdom;
and its main competitor in the Communist camp, the People’s Republic of China
(PRC).19 Arguably, the Soviet task force’s most notable wartime mission occurred
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during the course of the 1977–78 Ogaden war, when Soviet merchant and naval
vessels carried large amounts of war matériel and supplies to Ethiopian ports.20
Given the remarkable size and composition of this Soviet naval formation, its
access to local military bases, and the geostrategic importance of its AO, the 8th
Squadron also could have been used to achieve military objectives if the Cold
War had turned hot. Soviet adversaries in the first world (NATO) and the third
world (the PRC) assessed that in a high-intensity-conflict scenario the standing
Soviet naval task force would be a major threat to the sea lines of communica
tion (SLOCs) that connected the global West with the oil-supplying countries of
the Middle East, with the capability to interdict shipping routes by choke-point
control (see figure 1).21
Furthermore, as T. B. Millar argues, the Indian Ocean also was of great stra
tegic significance to the USSR itself, as it connected the Soviet Far East with the
European parts of the Soviet empire without relying on the fragile land-based
communications that a hostile China might impair during conflicts.22 This argu
ment was even stronger at the time because global warming had not yet made the
Northern Sea Route as navigable as it is today. Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till also
stress the importance of the USSR’s naval capabilities in the Persian Gulf and the
Arabian Sea against the background of postrevolutionary Iranian policy actions,
including the fact that even Soviet merchant shipping came under attack during
the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War.23
Thus, because of the Soviet navy’s substantial capabilities in the Indian Ocean
and its adjacent marginal seas during the second half of the Cold War, the service
could exercise the full range of military operations other than war and serve as
a powerful political instrument during times of peace. During times of conflict,
the Soviet squadron could undertake regional sea-denial operations when con
fronted with a superior adversary (e.g., NATO) or contribute regionally to secure
Soviet interests and global sea-lanes when in conflict with an adversary fielding
an inferior naval force.
Certainly, the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean also was motivated by many
other, nonpurely naval considerations, such as the USSR’s space program, with
its sea-based tracking-and-recovery components.24 However, as these matters are
not central to the argument presented in this article, they will not be discussed
further.
THE RUSSIAN NAVAL PRESENCE
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION TODAY
The establishment of a Russian supply base on the Red Sea has been discussed
publicly since at least 2017. This move needs to be interpreted within the con
texts equally of current Russian policy interests and Russian naval activities in
the region.25
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FIGURE 1
SOVIET NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE COLD WAR
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The Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean at the beginning of the third
decade of the twenty-first century contrasts with the previous presence of the
Soviet 8th Squadron. In particular, the current incarnation is not permanent and
leaves a wide spectrum of naval capabilities uncovered.
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Since the autumn of 2013, Russia has not maintained a standing naval pres
ence in the Horn of Africa area. As a representative of the European Union (EU)
Naval Force Somalia points out, for the past ten years “Russian warships have
only sporadically conducted counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia
and normally only when in transit through the Gulf of Aden.”26
Nevertheless, while their presence has not been permanent, Russian warships
are regular visitors to the Indian Ocean and its neighboring seas. For example, in
October 2018 the Udaloy I–class destroyer Severomorsk deployed to the Indian
Ocean area to support maritime-security operations in the pirate-infested waters
for more than two months.27 Again, in November 2019, a task group consisting
of the Neustrashimy-class frigate Yaroslav Mudry, the tanker Yelnya, and the
seagoing tug Viktor Konetsky passed through the Suez Canal, crossed the Gulf
of Aden, and participated in the Russo-Indian naval exercise INDRA-2019 off
the coast of Goa from 10 to 19 December 2019.28 Russian naval relations with
India and the annual holding of the INDRA exercises have remained a keystone
of Russia’s policy toward the region since 2014, even when Russia began to ex
pand its regional engagement by making port calls in Pakistan and otherwise
strengthening its relations with Islamabad.29 The same task group, centered on
Yaroslav Mudry, then proceeded to Iran to join the trilateral Russo-Sino-Iranian
maneuver that took place in the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean from 27
to 30 December 2019.30 Afterward, the task group held a joint antipiracy drill
with the Japanese destroyer Harusame in the northern Arabian Sea and stayed
in the AO until March 2020 to aid with the international fight against piracy in
the region.31 Subsequently, Yaroslav Mudry escorted Gazprom’s pipe-layer ship
Akademik Cherskiy, sent to complete the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipe
line, to the Baltic Sea. Both ships arrived in the Baltic in May 2020.32 In the same
month, the Russian Grigorovich-class frigate Admiral Grigorovich, accompanied
by the rescue tug Professor Nikolai Muru, entered the Indian Ocean, visited the
port of Colombo, Sri Lanka, and returned to the Mediterranean in June 2020.33
Moreover, in January 2020, the U.S. Fifth Fleet reported a near collision between
the destroyer USS Farragut (DDG 99) and a Russian intelligence vessel in the
northern Arabian Sea.34
Although open-access information about naval-intelligence activities is very
rare, signals-intelligence vessels generally tend to conduct reconnaissance/
collection operations against a particular set of targets over a long period or on a
frequent basis, to generate the necessary basic data. Therefore, it is safe to assume
that the waters of the western Indian Ocean’s marginal seas are a primary AO for
Russian naval intelligence. The high concentration of naval vessels and military
installations in the conflict-ridden Persian Gulf and in the Horn of Africa area
offers an abundance of high-value reconnaissance targets.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/1
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On the basis of the modus operandi of the RFN in the Indian Ocean area over
the past years, several assessments can be made.
First, Russian task groups deployed to the region generally consist of one
surface combatant, a replenishment vessel, and a seagoing tug. In fact, this has
been the standard composition of Russian task groups operating in this part of
the world for about a decade.35 Given that they feature only one warship, these
deployments offer much less than the complete spectrum of naval capabilities
that a combatant would require in a high-intensity conflict. Additionally, in such
a scenario, the slow-moving sea tugs—whose hydroacoustics must be decades
behind those of modern warship designs—would impair severely the operational
capabilities of these task forces. Ultimately, without sea-based airpower and no
regional Russian air bases from which to deploy fighter, strike, and maritimepatrol aircraft, Russian ships in this part of the world operate with a complete lack
of air support. Therefore, Russian naval deployments in the Indian Ocean area
are not suited to conduct wartime military operations.
The noncombat operational focus of these deployments also is reflected in the
current Russian maritime doctrine, published in 2015. For the Indian Ocean area,
the Kremlin’s strategy paper defines “the development of friendly relations with
India” as “the most important focus of the national maritime policy in the Indian
Ocean regional direction,” and further states that the “National Maritime Policy
is also aimed at building up positive cooperation with other states in the region.”36
While the Russian naval task forces in the Indian Ocean area continue to fulfill
diplomatic and reconnaissance functions by conducting multinational exercises,
calling in ports, and gathering intelligence, the differences in force size, endur
ance, and capabilities make it very problematic to draw any similarities between
the current Russian naval presence and the historical Soviet 8th Squadron.37 Al
ready in 2011, Alexey Muraviev, a specialist on the Russian Pacific Fleet, pointed
out that “[c]ontrary to Soviet times, Russia’s engagement in the IOR [Indian
Ocean region] is neither driven by any grand national agenda, nor by geostrategic
challenges that require a considerable immediate response.”38
In contrast to the claims outlined in the introduction, Russia’s decision to lease
a military base on the Red Sea should not be interpreted as a sign of Russian sea
power returning to the Indian Ocean. Rather, it is driven by motivations that are
born out of the RFN’s transition into a green-water navy.39
In 2011, in light of the closing of Russia’s support facility in Cam Ranh Bay,
Vietnam, and increasing operational demands on the RFN in the Mediterranean
and Indian Ocean theaters owing to considerable Russian antipiracy efforts at the
turn of the decade, academic Muraviev elaborated on Russian needs to expand
overseas basing capabilities, especially in Tartus, Syria, and plans to enhance the
RFN’s oceangoing potential and overseas power-projection capabilities within
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the next ten years.40 While the first forecast did become reality within the last
decade, the second took a course opposite to that predicted.
A quick look at the Russian naval force posture reveals the impact of Russian
naval arms procurement throughout the last decade. Drawing on information
published in Jane’s Fighting Ships, figure 2 shows the makeup of the three Russian
naval formations whose ships are most likely to replenish at Russia’s new naval
base at Port Sudan: the Pacific Fleet, whose ships historically were tasked to form
the 8th Squadron; the Baltic Fleet, whose warships also have deployed to conduct
antipiracy operations in the Indian Ocean; and the Black Sea Fleet, whose AO
encompasses the greater Mediterranean region.41 Warships from the Mediterra
nean easily could be tasked to redeploy to the Indian Ocean, as was the case with
Admiral Grigorovich in 2020.
Already a decade ago, when the RFN still operated a standing antipiracy for
mation in the Horn of Africa AO, the Russian naval posture included only a lim
ited number of major surface warships that were capable of overseas, blue-water
operations.42 All these vessels were legacy (former Soviet) units. The Udaloy-class
destroyers, which displace more than 8,600 tons full load and feature great sea en
durance, frequently provided the surface combatants for Russian antipiracy task
forces at the turn of the first decade of the twenty-first century, as they formed
the backbone of the Russian fleet.43
However, even though Russian naval procurement at the beginning of the
current century has provided the RFN with minor surface vessels in sufficient
numbers—sufficient not merely to replace existing vessels but to enhance the
Russian naval force posture—Russian shipyards effectively could not provide the
FIGURE 2
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navy with major surface units except by modernizing older Soviet vessels. These
acquisitions and changes in Russia’s naval order of battle are in line with a cur
rent fleet design that emphasizes surface vessels that are small but heavily armed,
with great offensive capabilities that rely on advanced missile systems, such as
those of the Kalibr family.44 Discussing the reasons behind this trend, including
strategic considerations and industrial limitations, is beyond the scope of this
article; nevertheless, it has had a strong impact. As shown in figure 2, the number
of blue-water vessels within the RFN has decreased significantly.
Looking beyond pure numbers to the size and condition of some of these ships
further reinforces the argument. Jane’s Fighting Ships classifies Steregushchiy-class
warships—the most numerous of Russia’s newest medium-size surface-warship
designs—as frigates. However, with a full-load displacement of just 2,235 tons,
these vessels—whose primary intended AO is the littoral—rank at the very low
end of frigate dimensions.45 A comparison with their European counterparts,
such as the British Duke class (4,267 tons full load), the German Brandenburg
class (5,487 tons full load), or the French Aquitaine class (6,096 tons full load),
reveals the striking differences in displacement.46 Indeed, many English and Rus
sian sources consider the Steregushchiy-class vessels to be corvettes.47
Furthermore, there is the question of seaworthiness. According to Jane’s, as of
2020 the Sovremenny-class destroyer Nastoychivy was the last destroyer reported
to be in service with the Russian Baltic Fleet.48 Serious doubts exist, however,
regarding the material condition of this 1980s-design ship, which has been in
overhaul for years, and whether it ever will return to active duty.49
Without new capital ships on the production lines at Russian shipyards, the
RFN’s aged cruiser and destroyer forces soon are going to face retirements with
out replacements. Thus, as Russia seeks to continue maintaining a naval pres
ence in the Indian Ocean region, the RFN very likely will have to deploy its new
generations of smaller warships. While the armament of these corvettes and light
frigates might be just as formidable as that of their Soviet predecessors (or even
more so), sea endurance very likely will turn out to be a crucial factor in enabling
or limiting long-range deployments. A 2016 deployment executed by warships of
the RFN Pacific Fleet’s Kamchatka Flotilla demonstrated the Russian naval lead
ership’s determination to commit minor surface combatants, such as corvettes
and minehunters, to long-range, out-of-area deployments.50 Given this issue of
sea endurance, the RFN benefits greatly from access to a network of supply points
stretching from the Black Sea to the Red Sea (see figure 3).
Nevertheless, the potential value of Russia’s new supply base in Sudan for
operational purposes in the wider region should not be overrated. As men
tioned above, given the very limited capabilities of Russian task groups operat
ing periodically in the region, Russian naval deployments to this AO should be
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FIGURE 3
RUSSIAN NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS ALONG THE SOUTHERN MARITIME FLANK,
AROUND 2020
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interpreted not primarily in operational terms—for instance, as efforts to assert
sea control and sea denial—but rather as political instruments. The characteris
tics of Russia’s new naval base support a similar interpretation.
According to the current conditions of the bilateral agreement between the
Russian Federation and the Republic of the Sudan, Russia may not station more
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than three hundred military and civilian personnel at the base, supporting no
more than four units, at any one time.51 Consequently, the new Russian base
at Port Sudan would not be able to support large task forces. As Yuri Lyamin, a
Russian specialist on the Middle East, points out, Russia’s supply point in Port
Sudan very likely will assume a function similar to that which Tartus did before
it received its massive upgrade during the Syrian civil war: as a supply base offer
ing limited infrastructure, merely enabling “our ships to replenish stocks and, if
necessary, carry out minor maintenance.”52
The current berthing limit of four ships also needs to be put in perspective.
As already pointed out, the Russian naval task groups that deploy frequently to
the region generally are composed of one warship, one supply vessel, and one
seagoing tug. Given that even Admiral Grigorovich, one of Russia’s newest war
ships, has to be accompanied by a tug when operating in the Indian Ocean, and
the fact that the average displacement of the ships within Russian warship classes
has decreased, which increases ships’ need for replenishment when operating
far from home ports, it is safe to assume that the makeup of Russian task groups
in the future also will include a tug and a logistics/supply vessel. This makes it
likely that no more than two Russian warships will berth at the supply base at
any time. With a current limitation of three hundred Russian personnel (includ
ing maintenance personnel) at Port Sudan, Russia’s model of potent antiaccess/
area-denial zones—a dominant feature of academic and military debates about
Russian capabilities in the Mediterranean, Baltic, and Black Seas—is unlikely to
be applicable or applied to the Red Sea.53
In light of the absence of primary operational objectives, more explanation is
needed to account for Russia’s establishment of its new logistics/supply base in
Sudan. It is worth noting that while Russia practices naval diplomacy to pursue
political objectives in this region, it does so in other parts of the world as well—
for instance, in the Caribbean Sea and Southeast Asia—yet so far no publicly
available information has revealed that the Russian military has opened any new
naval bases or reopened former Soviet bases in those regions.
RUSSIA’S INTERESTS IN SUDAN AND NORTHEAST AFRICA
Since the strategic importance for Russia of the Indian Ocean by itself hardly
seems sufficient to justify the establishment of a military presence on the shores
of the Red Sea, with all the responsibilities that accompany a long-term commit
ment, understanding the action requires adoption of the traditional perspective
of a continental power. Rather than focusing on what a Russian military presence
on the Sudanese coast of the Red Sea enables Russia to do on the open ocean, it
is better to look at how access to Sudan and the northeast African coast enables
Russia to influence events on land.54
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Russian-African relations have been regaining lost ground steadily since
the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, since 2014 the strengthen
ing of political and economic relations with the African continent has become
particularly striking, simultaneous with the deterioration of Russo-Western
relations.55 In recent years, this intensification of Russo-African relations has
manifested itself, among other ways, in a series of official visits of heads of
state of sub-Saharan African countries to Russia since 2015; a sequence of
diplomatic visits by high-ranking political stakeholders, such as President
Vladimir V. Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov, and Security Council
secretary Nikolay P. Patrushev, to the African continent in 2018; and the con
vening of the first Africa-Russia summit, which was held in Russia in October
2019.56
Russian policy interests in Africa are broad. They include cultivating and
strengthening previously existing and newly formed partnerships, particularly in
light of the Kremlin’s intent to advance a multipolar international order and resist
Western political and economic pressure in the post-2014 era; striving to weaken
the influence of Russia’s adversaries; dealing with such political issues as arise in
accordance with “razumniy [reasonable] pragmatism”; and realizing economic
objectives, such as gaining access to markets and resources.57
In many African locations, these policy objectives have direct implications for
Russia’s defense and security sectors. Since Russian involvement on the African
continent in areas such as trade, development aid, and investment of capital is far
outmatched by that of other important stakeholders, such as the EU, the United
States, China, and Japan, Russia makes ample use of its more-competitive instru
ments: security-related products and services, military diplomacy, and arms
exports.58
With regard to Sudan, various reports elaborate on the involvement of Rus
sian agents associated with private military companies (PMCs) in the country’s
mining sector and the training of government forces.59 According to reports
published by Ukraine’s intelligence service (known as the SSU), Russian PMC
contractors apparently also were involved in the 2018–19 Sudanese revolution
and used Sudan as a regional hub for operations in Libya and the Central African
Republic (CAF).60 The strong bilateral relations between the two countries also
influenced the content of the Russo-Sudanese basing agreement, whose arrange
ments go far beyond questions of logistics and supply. For example, under the
agreement’s terms the Russian military also may deploy temporary mobile posts
outside the territory of the Russian supply base to ensure defense of the Sudanese
military’s naval base. Furthermore, with regard to protection of Russia’s supply
point and Sudan’s infrastructure on the Red Sea, the two countries have agreed
to cooperate when faced with external threats.61
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Russia’s good relations with Sudan also reportedly have given Russian private
and state actors access to the northern regions of the CAF.62 Russia has supported
the CAF government in its struggle against various rebel factions by deliver
ing arms, as well as by sending Russian military personnel to train government
troops under an agreement reached in 2018. Subsequently, reports appeared
about the arrival alongside PMC fighters of Russian soldiers fulfilling training,
security, and support duties in the CAF.63 In early 2019, Russia was the decisive
force in brokering the Khartoum peace agreement.64
Apart from Sudan and the CAF, in addition to intelligence and Spetsnaz (spe
cial forces) units, Russian PMCs also are reported to be active in war-torn Libya
in support of Field Marshal Khalifa B. Haftar of the Libyan National Army, which
controls the country’s eastern part.65 Apparently, Russian PMC contractors are
tasked with training Haftar’s forces, clearing mines, and protecting seaports in
eastern Libya.66 The news agency Reuters quoted Yevgeny Shabayev, head of a
chapter of a paramilitary Cossack organization, as saying that, with regard to Rus
sian security contractors in Africa, “there could be 1,000 in CAR [CAF] and be
tween 5,000 to 10,000 across Africa, including Sudan, South Sudan, and Libya.”67
There are indications that these Russian PMCs often are intertwined closely
with the Russian state, both on the policy level and in their preparation for and
execution of their respective tasks.68 For example, during the battle of Debaltseve—a high-intensity battle during the war in Ukraine—Russian PMC fighters
apparently made use of Russian military personnel carriers.69 During the war in
Syria, Russian PMC fighters who had been wounded in a U.S. air strike apparent
ly were evacuated on Russian military airplanes to Russian military hospitals.70
Thus, Russian PMCs appear not only to be working on behalf of the Russian
state and alongside state representatives; they also appear, under certain condi
tions, to be given access to Russian military assets and to operate with some
degree of liaison with the Russian armed forces. Given this operational history
of Russian PMCs in Ukraine and Syria, Russian military capabilities deployed
to or from Port Sudan could benefit Russian PMC activities in northeast Africa,
whether directly or indirectly.
Moreover, to conduct their operations successfully, these PMCs depend on the
shipment of large quantities of fuel, ammunition, and provisions to the interior
regions of the African continent. According to media reports, private Russian
companies also supply Sudanese clients with matériel such as personal protective
equipment and medicine.71
In the cases of Sudan and the CAF, economic and security interests intermix;
Russian stakeholders provide support in security affairs in part to obtain special
access to economic opportunities such as exploration for natural resources (e.g.,
gold and diamonds).72 The control and exploitation of energy resources also
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drive Russian policy interests in Sudan and South Sudan as Russia seeks to secure
oil-exploration rights in the latter and to establish a refinery in the former.73 All
(South) Sudanese oil runs through two major pipelines that reach the coast of the
Red Sea at Bashayer Terminal, Port Sudan.74
Russian direct and indirect involvement in armed conflicts, training of
government and opposition forces, and other security matters on the African
continent primarily involves the delivery of large amounts of weapons, and arms
exports long have been a key function in Russo-African relations.75 According to
data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia
has become the most important arms exporter to Africa. Figure 4 shows the arms
exports of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to Africa.
Over the last decade, Russian arms exports have grown considerably. Between
2015 and 2019, almost 50 percent of all arms exports to Africa by these five
countries, as measured in million trend indicator values (TIVs), were delivered
by Russia. Furthermore, as figure 5 demonstrates, within the last five years the
African market has become significantly more important as a destination for
Russian weapons.
Within this trend, northeast Africa has been one of the busiest regions for
Russian arms exports in recent years. Other than Egypt, the various countries
included in this region are proximate to Port Sudan. Since 2011, Russia and
Sudan on several occasions have agreed on the delivery of military hardware. At
the beginning of the last decade, Moscow supplied two dozen Mi-24 attack he
licopters and fourteen Mi-8 transport helicopters.76 In August 2020, the Russian
FIGURE 4
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FIGURE 5
SHARE OF RUSSIAN ARMS EXPORTS DELIVERED TO AFRICA
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Source: “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 3 January 2021, armstrade.sipri.org/.

Ministry of Defense confirmed that the two countries had signed further armsexport contracts at the international military-technical forum Army-2020.77 As
recently as October 2020, against the backdrop of strengthening Russo-Sudanese
military cooperation, Russia handed over a training ship to the Sudanese navy.78
In late 2019–early 2020, Eritrea purchased Russian military helicopters.79 In the
same period, Rosoboronexport finished delivering Pantsir-S1 air-defense sys
tems to neighboring Ethiopia.80 In 2016, according to Valeriy Varlamov, head of
a Rosoboronexport delegation, the Russian side was willing to consider exporting
weapons to Somalia and South Sudan if “the situation improves and [subject to]
a corresponding decision of the highest state organs.”81
When all the pieces of the puzzle are put together, they provide strong indica
tions that Port Sudan plays a central role in the Kremlin’s strategic calculus for
the region. Sudan and its neighboring countries seek to acquire the weapons
and military capabilities that Russia is willing to offer. The 2019–20 agreements
give both countries the legal framework to satisfy these demands. Official and
clandestine activities of Russian security forces and PMCs require the movement
of large quantities of goods, particularly weapons. In this regard, as part of the
sealed agreements, the Russian Federation already has secured the right to use
Sudan’s transportation system, including its ports and airports, to transport any
military goods, including weapons and ammunition, needed to operate the Rus
sian military base and its warships and to ensure the safety of its personnel and
Russian contractors.82 As already detailed above, past experience has shown that
Russian PMCs are granted access to official Russian military assets if they are
acting in the Kremlin’s interest, and there is little reason to doubt that the case
of Russia’s military presence in Sudan will be any different. It is true that most of
the reports on Russian arms deliveries available from open sources refer to cargo
flights as the principal means of transportation.83 However, very rarely a report
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does appear that provides details about Russian seaborne arms transportation, as
was the case in 2018 with a Russian-registered cargo ship, Lada, that supposedly
was carrying weapons and other ordnance to Nigeria but was stopped by authori
ties in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, following a security check.84
The way in which military presence and access to a regional transportation
hub’s civilian infrastructure and commercial port facilities can aid in delivering
arms also is demonstrated by the case of the Chinese in Djibouti. In 2018, EXX
Africa, a business-risk-intelligence company, published a special report on Chi
nese arms deliveries to conflict zones in East Africa, including those under UN
embargo. According to the report, arms proliferation is managed by using the
Djibouti hub and involves China’s local People’s Liberation Army support base
and the city’s commercial port facilities.85
In the case of Russia, the example of the harbor of Tartus comes to mind.
There, Russia maintained a military presence and unloaded military equipment
at the same location to support its regional allies years before it decided to in
tervene officially in the Syrian civil war.86 Just as with Tartus and Djibouti, Port
Sudan is an important regional commercial port. It too features very good access
to the regional railway infrastructure, which will grow further once the Ethiopia–
Sudan railway connection linking Addis Ababa to Port Sudan, on which both
countries have agreed, is built.87
Some experts also point toward geopolitical rivalry in North Africa and the
Middle East as one potential driver for establishing a Russian military presence in
Port Sudan.88 Russia’s base is only about sixty kilometers (km) from the Sudanese
island of Suakin, which Turkey leased in December 2017 for ninety-nine years.89
In nearly every historical armed conflict occurring in the area spanning from the
Caucasus through Syria to Libya, Turkey has been Russia’s regional rival. Turkey
also is a NATO member state. The country has been expanding its presence
massively in Muslim northeast Africa in recent years; in 2017, it set up its largest
overseas military base, Camp TURKSOM, in Somalia, as a training facility for
Somali government forces in their fight against al-Shabab.90 Russia’s base in Port
Sudan also is only a little more than 1,000 km from Djibouti, which is another
regional hub; the site of American, Chinese, and French military presences; and
a place where Turkey also seeks to expand its footprint. In 2020, Turkey and Dji
bouti agreed to foster maritime cooperation, set up a special economic zone, and
develop infrastructure.91 Various media sources have reported that Russia has
shown interest in establishing a military base in Djibouti in the past but failed to
secure an agreement.92
In 2018, Turkey and Sudan were in the process of making a series of deals that
would have included the Turkish military and police training Sudanese security
forces and establishment of a vessel-maintenance center in Port Sudan; however,
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it is questionable whether Turkey can execute its plans in Sudan under the Afri
can country’s new leadership, since President Omar al-Bashir’s ouster in 2019.93
The Kremlin’s moves to establish a military presence in the country, in the form
of the 2019 military-cooperation agreement and the subsequent 2020 lease of
Port Sudan, thus seem to fall in line with Russia’s policy interest of countering the
influence of regional rivals such as Turkey.
Taking into account the official and unofficial activities of the Russian mili
tary, the involvement of Russian PMCs in the security and economic affairs of
Sudan and neighboring countries, regional arms deliveries, and the access Port
Sudan provides to the regional infrastructure network, Port Sudan occupies an
ideal geostrategic location (see figure 6). It may become the Russian cornerstone
FIGURE 6
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in the region, supporting and implementing Russian policy interests as the
Kremlin seeks “to position itself in North Africa and beyond as an alternative
to the West.”94 Or, extending former president al-Bashir’s metaphor that “Sudan
may be Russia’s key to Africa,” it may be said that Russia’s military presence in
Port Sudan will be its door.95
As argued throughout this article, Russia’s naval presence in the western Indian
Ocean’s marginal seas is central to pursuing the country’s various national interests,
particularly building partnerships, gathering intelligence, and boosting militaryindustrial cooperation with littoral countries. Located on the western shore of this
great maritime theater, Sudan and its neighboring countries have become a princi
pal area of operations for Russian governmental, private, and hybrid stakeholders.
Safeguarding their activities, strengthening cooperative regional governments,
gaining access to northeast Africa and its markets and resources, countering the
influence of peer and near-peer competitors—all these qualify as primary Rus
sian policy interests in the region, and they drive Russia’s military presence on the
shores of the Red Sea. Reviving the naval presence of the former Soviet 8th Op
erational Squadron; establishing a credible sea-denial capability against the other,
vastly superior navies that operate in the region; and, most unattainably, achieving
sea control and becoming a “Great Sea Power” in the Indian Ocean, do not.
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INNOVATION, INTERRUPTED
Next-Generation Surface-Combatant Design
David H. Lewis

The fact that efficient guns and gun-armed warships remained . . . a
European specialty . . . is a strong indication that technology in itself
was not enough. The society must also have the necessary flexibility and
dynamism to absorb technology and change the institutional framework
in order to make the best possible use of them.

P

JAN GLETE, WARFARE AT SEA, 1500–1650

earl Harbor changed everything” is the dramatic beginning to Douglas Smith’s
magisterial book on American World War II aircraft carrier battles in the
Pacific theater. “During that difficult period, naval aviators sought to reconfigure
the tactics, material, and equipment that had been developed during the prewar
years for actual combat.”1 Contemporaneously, “[w]hen war broke out in Europe
in 1939 it quickly became apparent that the large fleet actions for which the
interwar destroyers had been primarily designed were unlikely to materialize.”2
And “[o]nce it became clear that the war in the Pacific would not be following its
anticipated course . . . modifications became necessary in both the U.S. Navy and
the [Imperial Japanese Navy].”3 On 8 December 1941, the United States declared
unrestricted submarine warfare against imperial Japan—a mode of warfare that
both America and Great Britain long had considered immoral and unethical as
a matter of formal diplomatic and naval policy.4
David H. Lewis is the Acquisition Chair and ProfesAfter fighting a global maritime war in World
sor of Practice at the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, California. A retired USN surface warfare War I, how did the major naval powers in the
officer and senior engineering duty officer, he served
1920s and 1930s get the “next war” so wrong?
as the Aegis shipbuilding program manager, proThose navies engaged in years of intense interwar
gram executive officer for ships, and commander of
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command before operational study and strategic thought and ne
retiring as director of the Defense Contract Management Agency. He has a master’s degree in computer gotiated no fewer than four separate, technically
science and is a graduate of the Naval War College.
prescriptive naval-arms-control treaties and agree
ments. How did they manage nonetheless to build
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new ships that required immediate reconfiguration
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and modification to fight the next maritime war, one they had long expected and
anticipated?
I seek to answer that question with a blended analysis of technology, engineer
ing, and maritime operations. First, I discuss the incremental prewar warshipdesign process that created the need for ships to be reconfigured and modified
to the demands that World War II imposed—a process conceptually unchanged
since the Elizabethan era. Next, I describe the two new and innovative warshipdesign methodologies—multimission and open-architecture approaches—that
emerged just before and during the 1941–45 Pacific campaign that enabled Amer
ican naval aviators and submariners to succeed, spectacularly, in new, unexpected
operational environments. I then discuss the dissonance that the contemporane
ous use of these three ship-design approaches created in the U.S. Navy’s current
ship-design and ship-sustainment processes. I conclude that the U.S. Navy must
transition to a next-generation surface-combatant-design process that I term “Enterprise design,” to accommodate today’s—and the future’s—dynamic and unpre
dictable war-fighting environment.
I illuminate the three warship-design philosophies by profiling three fa
mous ships from the Pacific theater of World War II from both operational
and technical perspectives. Interwar strategic and operational theories drove
real engineering innovation and the development of key shipboard and weapon
technical characteristics, but some of these designs could not then be adapted
to new realities that were exposed by naval combat at the start of World War II.
The sources of that inflexibility reach back to design philosophies that emerged
in England during the years leading up to its face-off with the famous Span
ish Armada of 1588. I then discuss postwar maritime and operational inno
vation through to the present day from a technological perspective, showing
the growing, deleterious effects of those four-hundred-year-old ship-design
principles, even as the merits of new approaches were being realized. Finally,
I highlight Danish surface-ship-design innovation, uniquely grounded in this
new approach, to examine historic and future USN surface-ship-design and
-construction trends, closing with a proposal for an American surface-combatant
“navy for the ages.”
A TALE OF THREE SHIPS
The effects of interwar mission uncertainty and technological innovation are
illustrated best by profiling three ships designed in the 1930s that fought in the
Pacific theater during the dramatic early months of America’s involvement in
World War II. The Japanese battleship Yamato, the U.S. submarine Wahoo (SS
238), and the aircraft carrier Hornet (CV 8) embody, respectively, traditional
warship-design concepts and two new design concepts developed during the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/1
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interwar years from operational experience in World War I. Yamato represents
the iterative warship-design process that emerged during the Elizabethan era.
In contrast, Wahoo demonstrated an innovative, new, multimission approach
to that historic warship-design philosophy, while Hornet’s revolutionary, openarchitecture design marked a complete break with prior practices.5
Yamato: Last Ship of the Elizabethan Way
The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) battleship Yamato would have won every en
gineering and acquisition excellence award available in today’s U.S. Navy. Lethal
and survivable, it was designed to meet a clear, well-founded, well-established,
analytically derived war-fighting requirement.6 Its design incorporated several
new and innovative battleship technologies; a main battery of record-breaking
eighteen-inch guns, massive armor belts, and unprecedented horsepower and
speed made Yamato arguably the most powerful battleship ever built. Yamato and
its sisters were built on schedule and fully met all their combat-performance re
quirements on delivery to the fleet. As a bonus, Yamato was built in total secrecy;
its subsequent appearance in battle was a complete surprise to the U.S. Navy.7
Yamato was delivered in 1941, just before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor; its
sister ship Musashi was delivered six months later; both were nominally on sched
ule. Yamato, alone, accounted for half of Japan’s total new-warship construction
tonnage delivered in 1941, and Musashi represented more than a third of its newwarship tonnage for 1942.8 This one shipbuilding program clearly had the IJN’s
highest priority.
The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922’s 3 : 5 : 5 ratio established an inferior
number of battleships that Japan could maintain relative to the United States
and Great Britain.9 To comply with the treaty’s terms, Japan quickly broke up
or scrapped battleships sitting on shipways. When Japan abrogated both the
Washington Treaty and the follow-on London Naval Treaty in 1936, it began
a naval-rearmament plan from a position of profound relative weakness.10 Ja
pan did not have the industrial capacity to build up to parity in battleships
with the United States; instead, it needed to build fewer but more-powerful new
ships that could leapfrog established American naval strength. Since the United
States had not built a new posttreaty fleet yet, Japan had to postulate what a
future posttreaty American battleship would look like, then design and build
a more powerful new class of ships to defeat that projected American design.
Yamato was the result. The three planned Yamato-class ships were designed to
defeat five of the imagined new U.S. battleships in a classic Mahan-inspired,
mid-Pacific surface duel.11
Despite the excellence of its design, the power of its weapons, the precision of
its war-fighting requirements, and the skill of its builders, Yamato and its sisters
proved useless in the Pacific War that followed.12 They sank no ships and won no
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battles; only Yamato ever even sighted an enemy ship.13 Worse, their prodigious
fuel consumption limited both their own and the rest of the IJN’s fleet operations
after naval-fuel supplies came under stress from U.S. commerce raids.14
At 73,000 tons, each Yamato-class battleship represented the industrial equiva
lent of two aircraft carriers, which, at that time, displaced about 37,000 tons (e.g.,
the Taiho class of 1942). After the Battle of Midway, a planned but unnamed
fourth ship of the class was canceled and the third ship, Shinano, was converted
into an aircraft carrier, although it never engaged in active combat.15
The U.S. Pacific campaign might have gone quite differently if Japan had com
missioned two additional aircraft carriers in October 1941 and two more in June
1942 instead of two giant, operationally useless battleships. Recall that, even af
ter losing four aircraft carriers at Midway in June 1942, Japan still possessed a
three-carrier advantage over the United States in the Pacific.16 Even without our
engaging in a detailed counterfactual exercise, given the ferocity of the operations
that followed, if Japan’s post-Midway margin of superiority in aircraft carriers
had been seven instead of three, it is likely that years more of fighting and tens
of thousands more war dead would have been required to achieve the probably
still-inevitable American victory.
The IJN was neither innocent of nor blind to the new naval technologies that
emerged during the interwar era. It embraced many advanced technologies in its
warship designs and made innovative use of aircraft carriers, fixed-wing naval
aviation, submarines, torpedoes, land-based naval aviation, radio, and amphibi
ous warfare. Neither was its embrace of these technologies a matter of mere the
ory; their application in Japan’s lightning victories in its early Pacific campaigns
serves as clear demonstration of effective conceptualization and implementation
of interwar naval war-fighting technology.
Japan sought to overcome the disadvantages of its smaller battleship fleet by
extending existing warship-design practices to build larger battleships that would
leapfrog ahead of the capabilities of the notional American foes they were expect
ed to face. In that sense, Yamato embodied the culmination of fifty years of suc
cessful Japanese fleet operations and ship-design evolution. The ship’s concept of
operations was well founded in established Japanese naval doctrine, which pro
ceeded from broadly accepted principles of modern naval warfare, as articulated
by Alfred Mahan in the 1880s.17 These core operational principles were devel
oped in combat during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and refined further during
combat operations in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War and against Germany
during World War I.18 Japanese warship-design principles followed proven and
mature engineering principles, extending them as emerging technology per
mitted to meet expected operational war-fighting needs effectively.19 Lastly, Ja
pan’s decision to build Yamato was consistent with the battleship-centric plans
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of all other major navies at the time.20 Yamato’s design and operational require
ments emphasized lethality and survivability within a well-established analytical
warship-design philosophy. Yet not only did those well-founded, analytically
pure decisions fail to enable victory at sea, but they contributed to imperial Ja
pan’s eventual defeat in 1945.
Wahoo: The New Multimission Ship
USS Wahoo was a historically significant submarine of the Gato class (often re
ferred to as “fleet submarines”). Wahoo and its sisters were designed to provide
fleet reconnaissance and distant support for the American battle fleet. That fleet
was built around a core of powerful battleships attended closely by cruisers and
destroyers. Submarines like Wahoo were to be assigned as advance scouts to
find, track, and report on the Japanese battle fleet. If possible, the submarines
were to conduct attrition attacks of opportunity against Japanese warships, but
on a not-to-interfere basis with their primary role of reconnaissance and re
porting.21 To support American fleet operations in the vast Pacific theater, their
design and operational doctrine maximized transit speeds and endurance, while
remaining in compliance with treaty limitations on individual submarine size and
characteristics.22
During the interwar period, both the United States and Great Britain consid
ered unrestricted submarine warfare against unarmed merchant ships to be both
immoral and illegal. Germany’s use of those tactics almost had lost World War
I for Britain and had been the principal basis for a deeply isolationist America’s
entry into that war.23 Both nations pushed hard, but unsuccessfully, to include re
strictive language prohibiting unrestricted submarine warfare against merchant
ships into the naval-arms-limitation treaties of the interwar period. It was official
U.S. policy that American submariners would not plan or train for, nor conduct,
any such attacks.24
But, as with Yamato, these operational concepts did not turn out as expected
in practice. On 8 December 1941, as the core of the American battle fleet lay
smoking in the muddy waters of Pearl Harbor, the United States declared unre
stricted submarine warfare against Japan. Thus, the fundamental premises of the
operational and design principles of American fleet submarines, developed and
inculcated over two decades, were invalidated within hours of the commence
ment of combat operations against Japan.25 Yet Wahoo and the other Gato-class
submarines went on to sweep the seas of Japanese merchant ships, fighting well
above their weight after 1943.
Through sheer happenstance, the ship-design characteristics necessary to exe
cute the fleet-reconnaissance mission in the Pacific Ocean matched almost exact
ly those needed to execute long-range, unrestricted submarine guerre de course
against the Japanese empire. A seventy-five-day patrol duration, prodigious
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torpedo capacity, a modest surface-gunnery capability, nominal self-defense ca
pability against aircraft, rapid dive capability, long submerged duration, high sur
face speed, and advanced torpedo fire-control systems were necessary attributes
for both mission sets, and Wahoo and the other Gato-class submarines possessed
them all. In fact, Wahoo’s ten torpedo tubes and twenty-four-torpedo loadout
were almost double the five tubes and fourteen-torpedo loadout of a Type VII
German U-boat of the same period. Wahoo’s unrefueled 11,000-nautical-mile
(nm) range was far superior to the Type VII’s 8,500-nm range, even though Ger
many had designed its U-boats specifically to conduct unrestricted submarine
warfare against merchant ships.
Despite the more than satisfactory technical characteristics of Wahoo and its
sister ships, America’s implementation of its new policy of unrestricted warfare
against Japan was exceptionally slow.26 Infamously defective torpedoes and lesswell-known engine-performance issues with the submarines that preceded the
Gato-class boats, doctrinal disputes, and the timidity of American submarine
captains limited the combat effectiveness of American submarines until well into
1943. During those early years, USS Wahoo and its famous captain, Lieutenant
Commander Dudley “Mush” Morton, and its even more famous executive officer,
Lieutenant Commander Richard “Dick” O’Kane, along with a few other pioneer
ing officers, led the way in finding, defining, and demonstrating the Gato class’s
inherent but latent combat capabilities.27
Engines and torpedoes could be fixed and new commanding officers trained
and assigned. American submarines in the Pacific eventually waged the most
successful unrestricted-submarine-warfare campaign in history—far more effec
tive than that of their German counterparts in the contemporaneous Battle of
the Atlantic.28 The prewar design of American submarines formed the techni
cal foundation of victory from 1943 to 1945, even though the actual operational
environment was unexpected and ran counter to the expectations embedded in
twenty-five years of explicit American naval war-fighting policy and doctrine.29
Had the United States been required to design new submarines to perform a
completely new, previously undefined mission starting in 1941, the course of the
Pacific campaign would have been profoundly and negatively affected. America
got lucky.
Hornet: A Ship of the Future, a Ship for the Ages
The concept of an aircraft-carrying ship was born and almost fully matured to its
modern form by Britain’s Royal Navy between 1914 and 1918 with the conversion
of the 14,000-ton HMS Argus in 1917–18.30 It had a flight deck stacked on top of
an enclosed hangar deck and vertical elevators to move aircraft between them;
it was missing only an island and catapults. In the United States, the 12,000-ton
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USS Langley (CV 1) was converted from a collier in 1922 as a low-rent version of
Argus. America’s much larger follow-on carriers, the 37,000-ton USS Lexington
(CV 2) and USS Saratoga (CV 3), were converted from incomplete battle-cruiser
hulls in 1927. Both were considered “too big” at the time, with their size having
been dictated by the hulls on which they were built rather than by aviation warfighting requirements.31 Invoking standard ship-design philosophies to build the
first American aircraft carrier designed from the keel up produced the 14,000-ton
USS Ranger (CV 4) in 1934 and the similar USS Wasp (CV 7) in 1940.
But in the four years between Ranger’s design and commissioning something
happened that brought the entire philosophy behind that design into question.
The airplanes it was intended to embark became obsolete and were replaced with
much larger, more-powerful aircraft. Although Ranger incorporated many suc
cessful innovations—most notably, an open hangar bay dedicated to maintenance
and ammunition loading, a starboard above-deck island, flight-deck “galleries,”
and some limited gun armament—USN designers quickly realized that their
warship-design paradigm was flawed.32 Between 1927 and 1940, the U.S. Navy
fielded three generations of frontline fighters whose takeoff weight and engine
horsepower (hp) increased from the 2,750 lb, 450 hp Boeing P-12/F4B in 1927
to the 7,952 lb, 1,200 hp Grumman F4F Wildcat in 1940. Attack aircraft showed
similar generational growth, culminating in 1942 with the 15,905 lb, 1,700 hp
Grumman TBF Avenger. Dive-bombers did not exist in 1927 but joined the
American air wings in the late 1930s. This sustained pace of weapon-system de
velopment was unprecedented in the history of naval-weapons technology; new
airplane models were fielded every eighteen to twenty-four months.33 The Amer
ican naval-aviation community did not follow long-established naval-warshipdesign practices, and the U.S. Navy could not afford to build a new ship every
time a new airplane was invented.34 A different design approach was needed.
The solution was to decouple the weapon (aircraft) from the ship as much as
possible. Rather than having hundreds or thousands of design touch points—
called interfaces—between the weapon and the ship, the Navy’s aircraft carrier
design team sought to minimize and standardize these interfaces. Greater ex
cess margins for weight and power were added to accommodate unknown future
growth in aircraft characteristics. Defining maximum landing weight, takeoff
wind, deck loading, elevator lift capacity, hangar dimensions, aviation-fuel load,
and bomb-storage capacity allowed ship designers to isolate themselves from the
pace of change in the aviation community.35 A new ship would be required only
once one or more of those key interfaces or ship-design margins were going to be
violated by the characteristics of a new air wing.
Ranger’s design flaws were corrected in the three ships of the 25,000-ton
Yorktown class, which comprised its namesake, USS Enterprise (CV 6), and USS
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Hornet (CV 8), commissioned in 1937, 1938, and 1940, respectively. The class
improved on the “too big” Lexington-class hulls and incorporated the hard les
sons of the inadequate Ranger and Wasp—ships that were functionally obsolete
before they were commissioned.36 Like Saratoga and Lexington, Hornet was a big,
roomy ship with large elevators, a fast hull, clearly defined air-wing interfaces,
and generous design margins.
After Japan’s attack against Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, President
Franklin Roosevelt directed an attack on Japan’s home islands. The Navy tried
to demur, because most of the battleships it traditionally would have needed
to enable such an attack would require years of repairs before they were ready
for an offensive campaign. The Army had no bomber with the necessary range.
Roosevelt was undeterred, and within a few weeks a Navy-Army team determined
that a new Army medium bomber, the B-25 Mitchell, theoretically could take off
from a Yorktown-class aircraft carrier deck with enough relative wind over the
deck. Several weeks of testing ashore convinced commanders that it could be
done, and the Doolittle Tokyo raid was conducted successfully on 18 April 1942
from Hornet—just four months after the Pearl Harbor attack.37 Although militar
ily insignificant, the attack was a huge psychological success, crushing Japan’s
self-image of impregnability and boosting American morale at a critically low
point.38 It was brilliant, and brilliantly executed.
Had anyone proposed that Army bombers operate from Navy aircraft carriers
before December 1941, they would have been not only laughed at but probably
removed from their jobs as well. There was no chance of such a suggestion being
written into a ship-requirements document or included in a ship design. No ship
designer envisioned it, and no war plan proposed it—but it surely was needed,
and it happened.
B-25s happened to fit within enough of Hornet’s design interfaces to permit
pierside loading and afloat fueling, arming, and takeoff. To use modern terms,
the pace of aircraft development forced the aircraft carrier designers to invent an
open-architecture design approach, and it decoupled the ship from the embarked
air wing. The designers focused primarily on defining clear interfaces to an em
barked “mission module”—the air wing—rather than the internal technical or
war-fighting details of that mission module—the airplanes. Rather than fully and
inclusively defining all the desired missions of a ship, then designing it to meet
that exact capability—as with Yamato—the new aircraft carrier approach broadly
defined a “capability to have a capability” by not overspecifying current capabili
ties, leaving the operational door open for future, unknown mission-module (i.e.,
air wing, ordnance, and embarked personnel) war-fighting capabilities.39 Lethality
was removed from the ship-design process, ceding that characteristic to the em
barked air wing.
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The result has been profound and revolutionary. Aircraft carriers now rou
tinely serve continuously for up to fifty years as operationally relevant, first-line
warships. That has not happened for surface combatant ships since a forty-yearold HMS Victory fought at Trafalgar in 1805. Aircraft carriers routinely and easily
accommodate major advances in war-fighting technology that were unknown at
commissioning.40 USS Midway (CV 41) was designed in 1943 with Mitsubishi
Zero fighters and Betty bombers in mind, but spent most of its forty-seven-year
service life carrying jet fighters operating against supersonic Backfire bombers
carrying nuclear cruise missiles, interspersed with combat missions to Korea,
Vietnam, and Iraq, among many others. Beyond the Zeros and Bettys, none of
this was, or could have been, anticipated by the ship’s original designers. And
Midway was not unique; quite a few other major World War II–era warships saw
similar extended frontline service lives—all of them aircraft carriers.
THREE SHIPS, THREE DESIGN PHILOSOPHIES
Yamato represented the culmination of four centuries of successful ship-design
practices, incrementally optimizing explicitly defined operational requirements
into pristine, tightly constrained designs that met highly detailed war-fighting
requirements for lethality and survivability. Wahoo and its Gato-class sisters
accidentally discovered the advantages of being capable of conducting multiple
primary war-fighting missions. Gato-class submarines had operational charac
teristics that permitted them to operate effectively in other closely related warfare
missions beyond what had been designated originally. After all, sinking a mer
chant ship at sea is not too much different from sinking a warship; if anything,
it may be easier. Hornet broke the mold, demonstrating the combat value of a
completely new open-architecture, adaptable ship-design approach. Designing
for an interface to an embarked weapon rather than to a specific combat mission
allowed the U.S. Navy to change the ship’s mission easily by changing its mission
module—the embarked air wing. In the decade before the Pearl Harbor attack,
the number of viable warship-design philosophies tripled. In the subsequent
eight decades, there has been a broad failure to appreciate the differences and
trade-offs among them, to the detriment of many shipbuilding programs.
The Foundations of Modern Ship Design
So, how did Yamato’s flawed design happen? Why was Wahoo’s mission so poorly
defined? Why did the naval officers and engineers responsible feel so sure in
their approach to Yamato and most of the other surface combatant ships in their
fleets? The answers lay in the origins of modern fighting-ship design in sixteenthcentury Europe.
Elizabeth Tudor, daughter of King Henry VIII, ascended the throne of Eng
land as queen on 17 November 1558. Elizabeth I’s new domain was bankrupt,
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torn by religious strife, resource poor, and diplomatically isolated. Worse, the
leader of the most powerful nation in the Western world, King Phillip II of Spain,
believed that he was the rightful king of England as a result of his marriage to
Elizabeth’s since-deceased half sister, Queen Mary I, who preceded her on the
throne. Elizabeth had caught a tough assignment, but she was very much up to
the challenge.41 Recognizing that her first priority was to refill the depleted royal
treasury, England’s new “Pirate Queen” invoked the “Willie Sutton rule” 350 years
before it was first articulated; she dispatched her sea captains to steal Spanish
treasure en route to Europe from the New World.42 Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter
Raleigh, Sir John Hawkins, and their fellow English captains were moderately
successful in this effort.
However, they soon reported problems with their ships in battle against their
intended Spanish victims. The “warships” of Elizbeth’s early reign rarely were
purpose-built; instead, most were temporarily converted merchant ships. Super
structures (called “castles”) and small guns were added during the short Atlantic
fighting season. High castles forward (from which the nautical term fo’c’sle de
rives) and aft enabled plunging fire from handheld weapons against galleys and
unmodified merchant ships. Larger, mounted weapons were fired over bulwarks;
the idea of cutting holes in the sides of ships for deck guns was an emerging, risky
technology first tried in 1501.43 When not engaged in naval service, these ships
would be stripped of their war-fighting gear and operate again in merchant ser
vice to offset their annual operating expenses.
These makeshift warships were slow and difficult to maneuver. Clumsy han
dling characteristics were not a significant problem for hauling cargo but were
liabilities in a fight. Spanish ships were armed with guns made for the army that
were unaltered for naval service and were operated by embarked soldiers; the
sailors sailed and the soldiers fought. The Spanish employed shoot-and-board
tactics; they approached directly toward an enemy ship, fired their heavy guns
once, and then grappled and boarded the target vessel to overwhelm the enemy
crew with crossbows, small arms, and sword- and pike-wielding soldiers. As has
been the practice of land powers afloat for centuries, Spain turned sea fights into
land fights. The Spanish also adopted the Mediterranean oared-galley practice of
mounting a few very heavy guns on their bows that could fire only forward, creat
ing the galleon: a ship with the low bows of a galley to accommodate big, forwardfiring guns and the high stern of a converted merchant ship to enable plunging
fire when alongside an enemy.44 Ship’s guns of the day were a century away from
using recoil mechanisms to permit reloading from inside the ship. Instead, guns
were reloaded in place by gun crews hanging over the side of the ship on ropes
and in bosun’s chairs—a time-consuming and difficult task even for experienced
sailors, and not one that soldiers did well. Still, the galleon’s design suited Spanish
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fighting tactics while retaining the ships’ inherently mercantile mission of haul
ing treasure from the New World back to Spain.
King Henry VIII, Elizabeth’s father, had been a gun and ship enthusiast.45 He
liked the flash and bang of guns—the bigger the better—and he liked the power
and pomp of a big ship. Elizabeth inherited a navy with few soldiers and many
guns; sailors fought, manned the guns, and sailed the ship. To defeat the heavily
crewed Spanish ships and their aggressive frontal attacks, English ships needed
to be able to stand off from their targets and fire their guns, trying to kill as many
Spanish soldiers as possible to even the odds before closing to board and seize the
galleon’s cargo of treasure. English ships needed to be faster, more maneuverable,
and more heavily armed than their Spanish opponents.
To achieve greater speed and maneuverability, English ships needed to be
slimmer and carry more sail; to overwhelm the heavier Spanish ships, they
needed to carry as many guns as possible, both broadside-firing and forwardfiring. These characteristics were entirely incompatible with the ones that made
a good merchant ship of the day; lethality and survivability needed to dominate,
while as many other ship characteristics that reduced those qualities as possible
needed expunging. Dedicated warship design was born. The new English war
ships would be designed “from the keel up” to perform a single, clearly articulated
combat mission. These ships enabled English naval tactics that no converted war
ships at the time could replicate. The new warship would sail toward the enemy,
then wheel away at range, firing its guns in sequence as they came to bear. When
safely out of range again, English sailors would clamber over the side to reload.
Then they would repeat the feat, raking their targets again and again. English
ships needed continuous, open internal decks to allow for the free flow of orders,
ammunition, and sailors among guns as they executed these complex attacks and
maneuvers. Elizabeth’s warship designs had to be dedicated to and optimized for
war at sea; the vessels no longer could be converted merchant ships. The result
was the fast English galleon—one of the first true, from-the-keel-up, sailing war
ship designs.46
Standardized ship designs permitted different English shipyards and dock
yards to build similarly performing ships, enhancing their combat performance
when operating together. Elizabeth was the first English monarch to provide
shipbuilders with ship-performance specifications, a prototypical version of
“build to print” contracting.47 She also needed an effective and efficient naval
infrastructure to manage and maintain these ships, since they no longer could
offset their operating costs by hauling cargo in the off-season. She added capac
ity to her father’s pioneering naval depots and dry docks, supplemented their
infrastructure, and built an efficient civil naval administration—the precursor of
the British Admiralty.48 The purpose of all this was to store, manage, care for, and
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protect the ships and their equipment, stores, and armament when they were not
actually fighting—which is to say, most of the time.
Bereft of money but awash in recent combat experience, Elizabeth and her
sea captains defined a lean, tightly coupled design-build process. The naval ad
ministration they established to manage that process consistently delivered lethal
and survivable ships using available technologies that exactly met her immediate
operational maritime needs at minimum cost and with maximum operational
effectiveness.
The result was brilliantly effective, as demonstrated during the many failed
Spanish armadas of the late sixteenth century. The most famous was the doomed
armada of 1588, made up of ponderous, overmanned, poorly led, poor-sailing,
and overloaded ships; Elizabeth’s purpose-built warships sailed circles around
them. Ammunition usage data from the fighting show that the Spanish ships
fired, on average, one shot per gun per day, while English ships fired each gun
one to one and a half times per hour.49 As a result of this extraordinary firing-rate
disparity, the Spanish Armada never ran out of ammunition before its ultimate
destruction, while the English fleet ran out several times. In fact, obtaining more
ammunition for unexpectedly depleted shipboard magazines quickly defined and
constrained English fighting operations after the first day of the weeklong battle.
The fleet- and ship-design approach that produced the successes of Elizabeth’s
Navy Royal matured over the ensuing centuries into the modern warship require
ments definition and design process.50 The iterative process began with a clear
definition of the immediate operational environment, explicitly defining the new
weapons (lethality) and innovative ship characteristics (survivability) that meeting
the defined mission required; then it optimized the warship’s design to remove all
other nominally unnecessary characteristics. The process was repeated for the next
generation of warships, then refined, repeated, and refined again ad nauseam until
it produced the modern steel warships that appeared in the early twentieth century.
That iterative process repeated until 21 May 1934, when the keel of USS Yorktown (CV 5), lead ship of the class that included Hornet, was laid at Newport News
Shipbuilding and Drydock Company in Newport News, Virginia. Yorktown was
the result of an entirely new approach to naval technology and warship design.
As with Queen Elizabeth I’s Navy Royal, this methodological revolution was a re
sponse to new technologies and new war-fighting requirements that existing de
sign processes were inadequate to address. Nearly four hundred years of established
naval-ship-design practice should have come to an end at that point; regrettably,
they did not.
Surface-Ship-Design Practices
Elizabethan design methods were effective as long as naval technology evolved
at a pace roughly in step with contemporaneous ship life cycles of forty to fifty
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years. The method began to unravel when the rate of technical innovation in
naval technology started to accelerate during the Industrial Revolution. Steam
propulsion technology first moved afloat in the early 1800s and was becoming
mainstream by the 1830s.51 Gun, gun-propellant, and ship-armor technological
advances followed quickly through the Crimean War, the American Civil War,
and the emergence of the modern steel navies in the 1890s, culminating with
the all-big-gun battleships of World War I fame.52 The long century between the
Battles of Trafalgar (1805) and Jutland (1916) was the most innovative in the
history of naval technology to that point. A British sailor transported from Sir
Francis Drake’s flagship Revenge in 1588 would not have been uncomfortable
aboard HMS Victory at Trafalgar, both sailing warships; a sailor from Victory
would have been completely lost on board Admiral John Jellicoe’s flagship at Jut
land, the dreadnought HMS Iron Duke.53 The technological differences between
Victory in 1805 and the first all-big-gun battleship, HMS Dreadnought in 1906,
comprise, in my opinion, the greatest degree of change across any one-hundredyear period in naval history. But it did not stop there. By the time of the Battle of
Jutland in 1916, Dreadnought itself—archetype of the modern battleship—was
deemed so obsolete that it was left out of Britain’s Grand Fleet, just ten years after
it was commissioned. Dreadnought was scrapped in 1919, while barely a teenager.
Throughout this century of radical technology innovation, Elizabethan-school
design principles nevertheless held strong despite the limitations that clearly were
emerging. New weapons, new propulsion technology, new armor, and new op
erational requirements all necessitated substantial ship-design changes to imple
ment. Most warships could not be retrofitted to accommodate new technolo
gies. Under the Elizabethan-school design rubric, major maritime innovation
required building new ships. To compensate, design-build cycles were shortened;
new ship classes were designed almost annually, with each year’s more lethal and
survivable designs improving on, and even eclipsing, the previous ones. The pace
of advancement became so fast that ships often became obsolete before they were
launched.54 New ships had to be built whenever a major new war-fighting tech
nology was developed. Elizabethan-school design principles, focused only on
meeting contemporary lethality and survivability requirements, removed future
adaptability and flexibility from baseline class designs. Margins for growth and
adaptation were, and often still are, seen as waste.55 Ships were built to meet the
day’s threat with the day’s technology, and tomorrow’s war-fighting needs were
judged to be a problem for tomorrow’s leaders. As a result, planned ship-service
lives were achieved rarely, if ever. Modernization, if attempted, was invariably a
long, expensive, and often unsatisfactory process.56
A technical note on design margins and interfaces. Margins are excess capaci
ties in key characteristics such as displacement, power, cooling, and stability that
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are designed into ships above what the current systems on that ship require to
allow for future modernization and additional equipment. Margins allow for real
growth in those characteristics up to their defined (and design) maxima. Interfaces are the connections between systems within a ship. Interfaces allow for
changes on either side of the interface without breaking functionality on the
other, so long as both sides comply with the interface standard. Interface stan
dards are why, without affecting the power company’s grid, you can plug your
new lava lamp into the same electrical outlet into which your clock radio used
to be plugged. Likewise, your lava lamp will continue to work when the power
company switches from coal- to solar-power generation. Margins are why you
blow a fuse or trip a breaker if the appliances you plug in draw too much power.
After World War I, maritime technology continued to change rapidly. In a
1936 paper, Britain’s director of naval construction observed that between 1920
and 1935 the weight of antiaircraft armament on warships tripled, deck protec
tion weight quintupled, and the weather-deck area occupied by aircraft and their
associated equipment went from 0 to 20 percent. And “all of these increases had to
be accommodated in a hull limited in size by the [naval arms] treaties.”57 No con
sideration was given to unexpected operational requirements. In fact, had those
treaty restrictions been relaxed, “there is every reason to believe that the major
navies would have simply opted for more main guns and more torpedoes.”58 This
is exactly what happened when Yamato was designed, once freed from those trea
ty restrictions. The Elizabethan-school design philosophy’s ruthless optimization
imperative did not allow for any other path.
By contrast, American aircraft carrier commanders in the Pacific theater dis
covered, in the early months of the war, the crucial operational flexibility that
open-architecture ship design provided. After the Battle of the Coral Sea, in May
1942, American commanders complained that their strike-heavy air wings need
ed more fighters instead. Within three weeks the fighter allocation to air wings
was increased by 69 percent—just in time to make a material contribution to the
U.S. victory at the decisive Battle of Midway, in June 1942.59 Similarly, American
dive-bombers, as noted earlier, were unknown when the first American aircraft
carriers were designed in the 1920s and early 1930s. But they proved to be deci
sive in those early Pacific naval battles—just five years after they were introduced
afloat.60 For comparison, no battleships or cruisers ever doubled their air-defense
capability in three weeks or changed out their principal weapon system in less
than five years.
After World War II, American warship design bifurcated, with a new
Hornet-style process applied to aircraft carriers and an updated Elizabethan-school
process applied to new, multimission surface combatants. Maritime operations in
World War II finally had exposed the fatal limitations of the classic single-mission
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Elizabethan-school approach while illuminating the new, derivative, multimis
sion path discovered in Wahoo and other ship classes during the war. Battleships,
largely unable to perform their primary surface-warfare mission for want of tar
gets, became artillery platforms for shore bombardment in support of amphibious
assaults and air-defense platforms for task groups and fleets. Destroyers became
radar pickets, antisubmarine platforms, and air-defense ships, in addition to per
forming occasionally their prewar designated mission as surface escorts.
The U.S. Marine Corps proved to be as disruptive to American ship design
ers as the naval-aviation community had been, and amphibious ship designers
quickly adopted the same open architecture and flexible ship-design approach
used for aircraft carriers. This left the Marines free to buy new tanks and am
phibious assault vehicles without having to make the U.S. Navy buy new ships, so
long as they complied with defined interface and margin standards.61
In brief, aircraft carriers and amphibious ships demonstrated the design im
plications of “cross-domain” ships. Aircraft development and the Marines did not
follow Elizabethan-school ship-design rules, instead changing and modernizing
at a far faster pace than the ship-design and shipbuilding communities could tol
erate. The solution, logically enough, was to separate, in a controlled way, those
noncompliant domains (aviation and amphibious operations) from the ship do
main in the ship design; interfaces and margins had to become the connection
(and insulator) between the slow-moving world of ship design and shipbuilding
and the high-speed worlds of amphibious operations and naval aviation. By way
of analogy, interfaces and margins are like the gearing that allows a high-speed
automobile engine to be coupled to a low-speed tire or a high-speed marine gas
turbine to be connected to a low-speed ship propeller. Aircraft carriers and am
phibious ship designs are thus “loosely coupled” to their embarked weapon sys
tems through a defined set of interface standards and design margins.
Surface combatants, however, were not subject to the same operational dis
continuities and frequent disruptions of the aviation and amphibious communi
ties, leaving their designers comparatively free to follow the old rules—slight
ly modified by adding Wahoo-like multimission capabilities—in peacetime.
Surface-combatant designs did not have “gearing”; they were “direct drive”—new
weapon systems required new ships. Surface combatants retained the traditional,
Elizabethan-school “tight coupling” between the ship and their installed weapon
system. Embarking versus installing weapon systems became the principal design
differentiator between Hornet-like ships and Yamato- or Wahoo-like ships.62
But advances in surface-ship technology since the 1950s have seen the same
high rate of obsolescence as before World War II, if not greater, challenging the
modified Elizabethan-school approach. Missile, radar, and computer technolo
gies all saw rapid innovation, generating a series of war-fighting capability leaps.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,

127

122

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [], No. 1, Art. 1

The new multimission approach (i.e., Wahoo-like) appeared to offer an easy solu
tion to the problems this pace of innovation posed. It allowed fewer multimission
ships to replace larger numbers of single-mission ships (and, later, multimission
ships capable of fewer missions) while still introducing new technologies exclu
sively through the ship-design and shipbuilding process, exactly as had been
done for centuries; as a result, fleet size collapsed but fleet combat capability mul
tiplied. This technology environment perpetuated the same high rate of design
turnover and abbreviated warship service lives that had plagued advanced navies
since the 1830s; deploying significant new surface-combatant war-fighting tech
nologies still required building new ships.
Facing their own new, internal, accelerating technology drivers and con
strained by the Elizabethan-school ship-design process, shipboard weapon and
system developers (e.g., of radar, sonar, and fire-control systems) began to adopt
the approaches developed by aircraft carrier designers in the 1930s and amphibi
ous ship designers in the 1950s. They established strict interface standards and
clearly defined margins within the confines of the systems they developed for
surface combatants. Formal engineering principles of modularity, adaptabil
ity, and flexibility began to be developed in the 1960s in response to this high
rate of technological change, and they have produced enduring capabilities that
long outlasted the first hulls into which they were installed.63 The computercontrolled, software-based SPY-1 radar, in all its versions and descendants, in
combination with standardized computer designs and software methods, allows
war-fighting-capability improvements to be implemented through computer
software upgrades far more easily and cheaply than modernizations that require
a hardware redesign and installation. Modular vertical launching systems (e.g.,
VLS) permit new missiles to be deployed without having to install new launch
ers unique to each missile. Despite these system successes, surface combatant
ship designs remained products of the time-tested Elizabethan-school processes
and methods; once weapon-system hardware (radars, launchers, computers, etc.)
were installed, major changes and hardware modernization of weapon systems
became difficult, if not impossible.
Warships today are collections of independently developed systems, each with
its own development plan, budget track, and sustainment plan. The genius be
hind the Aegis system was to integrate the entire air-defense detect-to-engage se
quence into a single, unified system with common development, execution, and
sustainment processes.64 But despite Aegis’s four-decade record of success, this
level of integration is only beginning to emerge in other types of systems installed
in modern, multimission warships.
As with Wahoo—whose secondary mission, attrition attacks against enemy
warships, became its primary mission at the start of World War II, just applied to
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merchant ships—modern multimission ships can accommodate new threats so
long as the threat emerges within the explicitly defined capabilities of the ship’s ex
isting weapons; any new threat that emerges within the limits of that extant “mis
sion space” can be addressed with few or no modifications to the ship’s systems.
The addition of a ballistic-missile-defense (BMD) capability to selected Aegisequipped warships after the Cold War demonstrates this sort of mission flex
ibility. Sometimes even these expanded capabilities themselves can be expanded
for new missions, as in 2008 when USS Lake Erie (CG 70) successfully conducted
an antisatellite mission using a space-intercept capability inherent in its existing
BMD capability, which itself was a modification of the ship’s existing Aegis areaair-defense capability.65
Being unable to add unexpected war-fighting capability doomed volume pro
duction of the new Zumwalt class of ships years before the first ship was commis
sioned.66 The first five ships of the Ticonderoga (CG 47) class were decommissioned
after as little as eighteen years of service because they could not accommodate new
missiles and new hardware, just as HMS Dreadnought had been scrapped eightysix years earlier for similar reasons. The technology was new but hampered by the
same old ship-design process. From my time as a junior naval officer, I remember
a Terrier and Tartar missile “New Threat upgrade” being installed on dozens of
ships decades after a Soviet “New Threat” antiship missile was fielded, then those
recently and expensively upgraded ships were decommissioned just as quickly and
en masse after the Cold War ended. The price of inflexibility created by focusing
ship designs principally on contemporary threats continues to be high.67
Today, it is even more difficult to predict what is required from encounter to
encounter, much less from year to year, and, as well articulated in 2011 by former
Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig, it is almost impossible to predict warfighting requirements any more than a decade into the future.68 Paradoxically,
weapons technology is changing even faster today than it did during the Cold
War.69 More importantly, it is changing in unpredicted and unpredictable ways.
Aggressive international sales of sophisticated weapon systems quickly prolifer
ate tough new threats globally.70 In addition, modern computer technology is no
longer dominated by military requirements, as it was in the 1960s and 1970s; the
commercial market is driving even more unplanned change into an already chal
lenged weapon-system and ship-design environment.71
In brief, the situation facing surface-combatant designers today is the same
as that faced by mid-twentieth-century aircraft carrier and amphibious ship de
signers. Substantial technology issues outside the control of surface-combatant
ship designers are creating design dilemmas that materially affect both current
and future war-fighting performance. In the 1930s and 1950s, respectively, crossdomain technology requirements overrode existing aircraft carrier and amphibious
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ship design processes. Today, core surface-combatant war-fighting demands are
less certain and less predictable, but current installed ship weapon systems have
limited capacity to be expanded beyond the explicitly defined war-fighting re
quirements to which they were built.
Surface combatants now have an equivalent “cross-domain” design driver:
technology. To generalize a bit, all warship designs are driven by the expected
technology requirements of some defined time horizon. When they are built to
face an immediate and existential threat, as Queen Elizabeth I’s fast galleons were,
longer-range technology drivers can be ignored. In this special case, ships are
designed and built “today” with today’s technology and today’s threats in mind,
and out of a deliberate choice to “worry about tomorrow, tomorrow.” When tech
nology moves slowly, perhaps at the pace of a ship’s operational life (nominally
thirty to forty years), as it did between 1588 and the early nineteenth century,
new technologies can be implemented in new-construction ships in the normal
course of business. As the pace of technology change quickens, however, that
design rubric becomes less and less palatable, as navies get caught between the
high cost of building new ships and the high cost of modernizing existing, oldtechnology ships.
Separating the ugly details of implementing rapidly changing new war-fighting
technologies (such as airplanes, tanks, radars, missiles, and computers) from the
long-service, stable technology base of the ship’s platform design (hull, engines,
electrical power, passive survivability, etc.) as much as possible is a proven way of
resolving this conundrum (e.g., Hornet). Lethality—to use a term in vogue—is a
measure of the missile being launched, not the ship launching it. Explicitly sepa
rating them by using a clearly defined, stable engineering interface ensures that a
navy can achieve rapid technology insertion, affordable modernization, sustain
able sustainment costs, and full ship-service-life performance.
This argues for the U.S. Navy to abandon all vestiges of the Elizabethanschool ship-design processes for new surface combatants and adopt a Hornet-like
modular and flexible whole-ship design process that better accommodates to
day’s dynamic, technology-driven war-fighting environment. I choose to call the
Hornet-style modular and flexible ship-design process “Enterprise design.” Enterprise design begins in earnest where the ship-design process ends for the Elizabe
than school. Modern war-fighting requirements and surface-combatant designs
must extend in time beyond contemporary, known needs, and they should seek
to support the entire planned service life of the proposed ship.72 Unbeknownst to
them, the engineers who designed USS Midway (CV 41) in 1943 were designing
a ship that would operate supersonic jet fighters in 1983; they had no idea that
was what they were doing, or even that naval jet fighters might soon exist outside
1940s science-fiction stories.
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This is different from improving or enlarging design margins. Midway had
design margin when it was built, and new margin was added throughout its ser
vice life to accommodate new flight-deck structures, elevators, steam catapults,
and arresting gear. The capacities of those devices, in terms of size, weight, point
loading, and so on, are the interface points between the ship and the aircraft, not
margin. Those interfaces can be changed, and they were in Midway, but once in
place they did not need modification to accommodate new airplanes unless the
new airplane exceeded the interface standard. That is why USS Gerald R. Ford
(CVN 78) needed new and different catapults and arresting gear from those of
the Nimitz class it is replacing; the expectation is that the airplanes of the future
(especially uncrewed aerial vehicles) are going to break the interface standards of
the Navy’s existing 1950s-era shipboard-aviation systems.73
Since it is, in practice, impossible to know in detail what war fighting will
require twenty to thirty years into the future, critical surface-combatant design
parameters must focus more on the capability to accept future change than on
delivering a ship that meets today’s defined war-fighting capabilities. A new ship
not only must have sufficient war-fighting capability at commissioning; it also
must have an extended “capability to have a capability” throughout its planned
service life. A ship must be commissioned with a “minimum viable capability”
(e.g., F4U Corsairs on Midway in 1946) but with interfaces and margins that can
accommodate a radically different but operationally necessary capability late in
its service life (e.g., F-18 Hornets on Midway in 1990).74
The U.S. Navy’s thirty-eight (as of fall 2021) operational littoral combat ships,
expeditionary transfer dock, expeditionary mobile base, and expeditionary fast
transport vessels are modular, flexible ship platforms that already embody some
version of the Enterprise ship-design process, absent an explicit life-of-ship warfighting requirement. They are the pioneers of this sea change for the American
surface navy. These ships, together with the service’s eleven aircraft carriers and
forty-three amphibious ships, mean that the U.S. Navy already has the world’s
largest national fleet of modular, flexible, adaptable ships. To expand on the po
tential hinted at by that fleet, the Navy must develop the life-of-ship war-fighting
requirements for future surface combatants and determine how to define those
requirements to meet unknown future threats, enemies, and operational situa
tions successfully.
Return of the Viking Longships
Viking longships revolutionized ship design and shipbuilding in northern Eu
rope in the late Middle Ages. Their unique “clinker-built” iron-nail and clippedframe construction made them strong enough to weather the stormy seas of
northern Europe but also light and flexible enough to sail up rivers, and even to
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be carried across short land portages. Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian Viking
kings sailed their longships throughout Ireland, France, Russia, and England and
even into the Mediterranean Sea. Initially these expeditions were exercises in
pillaging, killing, and looting but later were used to conquer, trade, and colonize
throughout the European continent; the Vikings’ flexible, adaptable longships
could carry colonists and goods as easily as warriors.75
The modern Royal Danish Navy, descendant of those Viking mariners, has
embraced its own version of the Enterprise design philosophy to great effect. The
Danish navy’s combat mission during the Cold War could be defined cynically
as being ready to die bravely, valiantly, and quickly in a presumed-to-fail effort to
prevent a Soviet naval breakout from the Baltic Sea. This produced a Danish fleet
composed largely of conventional torpedo boats, coastal gunboats, and minewarfare ships.
With the end of that Cold War mission, Denmark’s small fleet became largely
obsolete, and the Danish navy began seeking new missions and innovative paths
to meet them.76 Rather than developing an immediate, analytically derived con
ventional maritime mission, as Elizabethan-school design principles would pre
scribe, the Danes focused on building an inherently flexible “capability to have a
capability,” to be realized when, and as, new war-fighting requirements and new
maritime technologies emerged in the future.77
Recognizing that weapon-system obsolescence was the key driver for ship
obsolescence, the Danes developed a new technology interface approach called
Standard Flex, alternatively known as StanFlex or STANFLEX. StanFlex is a
tightly defined, modular-mission payload system for embarking a ship’s weapon,
mission, and communications equipment. Using standard-size containers with
defined interfaces that can be embarked in a short amount of time allows a sur
face combatant to add capability, switch among missions, or modernize installed
weapon systems quickly and as needed to support a short-term mission require
ment or implement a key technology upgrade.78 This surface-combatant innova
tion is exactly like embarking new dive-bombers with aircraft carrier air wings in
1937 or embarking new Abrams tanks with Marine expeditionary units on am
phibious ships without having to build new ships to install them.
The success of the modular-payload system led the Danish navy to design allnew warships with StanFlex slots and to install slots on older vessels during major
refits. The U.S. Navy may have the largest fleet of Enterprise-design ships, but the
Danish navy’s main battle force now is composed solely of StanFlex-configured
Enterprise-school ships, establishing it as the most transformed, modular, flex
ible, and adaptable surface fleet in the world.79
Denmark, in turn, has used these modular, flexible ships to build a position
of worldwide naval visibility and operational excellence.80 Danish StanFlex ships
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have deployed to the Indian Ocean for counterpiracy patrols; to the Persian Gulf,
where they provide valuable escort and other war-fighting services; and to the
eastern Mediterranean to support the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons in
2012.81 In each case, the Enterprise design of the ships paired with the StanFlex
interface system allowed the Danish navy to custom-configure each ship to the
special and unique circumstances of each deployment, making them not just mul
timission but custom-mission surface combatants—exactly like Hornet. Today, the
Danes are seeking to expand their ships’ missions further, well beyond anything
their original designers imagined.82 These are the Danes’ new Viking longships—
long in tenure and utility. The Royal Navy has made the same conceptual choice
for its five new Type 31 frigates—a derivative design of Denmark’s StanFlex frig
ates—with the first scheduled to launch in 2023 and enter service by 2028.83 Den
mark has built a navy for the ages: flexible, adaptable, and perpetually useful.
The key to much of this, as with Hornet, is the ability of Danish surfacecombatant platforms to support the innovative capacity inherent in StanFlex sys
tems. As was the case with Hornet, the ships’ capacity for change, implement
ed through their universal standard interfaces for embarked (versus installed)
weapon systems, forms the foundation for a lifetime of operational relevance.
Elizabethan-school design philosophy prizes eliminating margins—considering
them to be waste—and lifetime margins for weight, power, flotation, and the like
between 5 and 25 percent are common in ships designed this way. Denmark’s
StanFlex ships have design margins between 50 and 300 percent, which, in com
bination with their StanFlex interface system, makes them highly accommoda
tive to major weapon-systems changes, refits, and technology upgrades.84 They
use a modern shipboard data center (a “private cloud”) architecture for host
ing software—something the U.S. Defense Department is still modeling, with its
emerging “software defined, hardware enabled” system-design rubric.85 Weap
ons and control consoles are devices and peripherals to the integrated combat
system.86 Upgrades and customizations mostly involve changing software and
possibly changing a StanFlex module. Upgrading a major combat system on a
Danish StanFlex ship can be completed in several weeks, whereas an American,
Elizabethan-style refit can take months, if not years.87
LCS: A Model for America’s New Surface Navy
The Littoral Combat Ship class (LCS) is the U.S. Navy’s first attempt to implement
Enterprise design principles in a surface combatant. The LCS class is unique in
that it has two variants, a monohull and a trimaran design, that are so different
that they are functionally separate classes, despite their common designation.
They are small, high-speed, low-draft warships with a minimal crew and modu
lar mission capability. Being such a radical departure from prior U.S. surfacecombatant-design experience, the class has had significant issues.88 Danish
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designers took twenty-five years to achieve what the U.S. Navy has attempted
to accomplish with the LCS in a decade. In addition to the modularity and
adaptability requirements, the Navy added challenging high-speed and reducedcrewing requirements to the class, all with minimized weight margins.89 The
LCS challenges many, if not all, of the U.S. surface navy’s deeply entrenched
Elizabethan-school design principles, as well as operations and war-fighting
paradigms derived from that same philosophy.90 New surface combatants are
expected to field as front-line, best-of-class surface combatants whose relative
margin of superiority over potential adversary platforms slowly degrades over
time. But in practice, traditional ships do not obsolesce gradually; they do so
as soon as the next gun or missile is invented and deployed. In contrast, an Enterprise ship such as the LCS is deployed with a minimum viable capability and
then grows and matures its combat capability as new systems and new weapons
are developed; as noted earlier, Midway was commissioned operating F4U Cor
sairs and was decommissioned forty-seven years later operating F-18 Hornets.
The LCS is designed to accommodate a comparable corresponding range of
future capabilities.
Until the LCS, the U.S. Navy had not fielded a surface combatant without 100
percent of its war-fighting capability fully implemented on the lead ship of the
class since USS Spruance (DD 963) was commissioned in 1975. Unlike Spruance, which used space, weight, and power (SWAP) growth and capability mar
gins to support future growth, LCS modules are designed to be added, removed,
changed, or upgraded easily within existing margins and interfaces to provide the
ship’s combat power. Like Hornet and Midway, LCS-class ships are expected to
evolve their capability over time, rapidly responding to emerging threats, emerg
ing missions, and new technologies. For example, when the U.S. Army canceled
its Non–Line of Sight missile program, which the Navy intended to use as the
LCS’s primary antisurface missile, the Navy was able to replace it with another
missile system quickly.91 For nearly any other surface ship, the loss of its primary
missile system would have doomed the entire ship class immediately or neces
sitated a major refit and modernization effort. As noted before, lethality is deter
mined by the missile being launched, not the ship launching it.
Like Langley, Lexington, Saratoga, and Ranger—Hornet’s innovative progeni
tors—the LCS got a lot right, but not everything. In building and operating these
ships, the U.S. Navy has learned much and was poised to move forward with bet
ter, bigger, and more-advanced Enterprise-design surface-combatant ships, incor
porating constructive and progressive lessons learned from the original LCS class.
However, at present the U.S. Navy does not appear to be applying that experience.
The U.S. Navy’s future frigate (FFG[X]) and follow-on to the LCS, the Constellation (FFG 62) class, is a regressive multimission ship design. It was developed
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with iterative Elizabethan-school design methods that focus on immediate lethal
ity and survivability using only current technology and building in only minimal
capacity for incorporating future technologies. Its largely off-the-shelf installed
systems will deliver defined war-fighting capability from day one for each hull,
but at the cost of eliminating all modularity and most features that would permit
future adaptability. The design also halves the Navy’s already-restrictive warship
displacement-growth margins to 5 percent (about 370 tons for each ship in the
class, as derived from the published displacement).92 A nominal additional SWAP
margin was added for an electronic-warfare system.93 This design permits no
adaptability and no modularity, and only some of the installed weapon systems
have any capability to accommodate unplanned growth. This is despite a broad
consensus that future surface-combatant weapon systems will include lasers, rail
guns, and a multitude of uncrewed vehicles, which will create additional electri
cal load and require new launch-and-recovery facilities and storage and repair
capabilities (see the table).
It is unlikely that any such future capability-growth requirements will fit into
a 370-ton margin or the additional defined SWAP margin, assuming that any of
it is still available after the first ship is built, tested, and fielded. As the head of
British ship construction noted in 1936, technology-driven war-fighting require
ments are likely to change in rapid and unexpected ways, even while the first ship
is being built.
One exception to the Constellation class’s rigid design is its use of the Navy’s
new SPY-6 air-defense system. This is a fully modular and adaptable system that
proceeds from the best outcomes from forty years of experience with phasedarray radar technology and the integrated Aegis air-defense system. Over those
four decades, the U.S. Navy fielded five major versions of Aegis hardware (SPY1A; the B, D, and D[V] variants; and SPY-6), along with a dozen incremental
intermediate hardware upgrades—about one major modernization every eight
years. Conceivably then, over the forty years of the FFG-62 class’s expected service
life (ten years to build the class, plus the thirty-year service life of the last ship of
the class), the Navy should expect to field another five major hardware versions

EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ON SHIP REQUIREMENTS

Unmanned systems

Power

Cooling

Personnel

Space

Bandwidth

Little change

No change

Increase

Unclear

Increase

Electromagnetic weapons

Increase

Increase

Little change

Increase

No change

Long-range targeting

Increase

Increase

Little change

Increase

No change

Increasing networking

Increase

Increase

More technical

Unclear

Increase

Source: John F. Schank et al., Designing Adaptable Ships: Modularity and Flexibility in Future Ship Designs (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016).
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or upgrades to the Aegis system. SPY-6’s innovative new design likely will accom
modate most if not all future incremental hardware changes, but not the fielding
of a potential SPY-10 or SPY-12.
The history of the Constellation-class design illuminates the problem that the
Elizabethan school’s design rigidity poses for accommodating unknown future
war-fighting environments and requirements. The contracted FFG-62-class design
is derived from a French-Italian design dating from 2007 that is currently in service
in France, Italy, Egypt, and Morocco. In my assessment, it is a perfectly adequate
design for those navies. The derivative USN FFG(X) war-fighting requirements
themselves were developed between 2016 and 2017 to support a planned delivery
of the first ship in 2028.94 Thus, by the time the twenty-ship class is completed in
the 2030s, it will be a thirty-two-year-old design filling a twenty-two-year-old warfighting requirement, with little capacity to accept 2040s capabilities or be modern
ized to address contemporary war-fighting requirements.
Modern experience shows the sort of modernization challenges a twenty-twoyear-old war-fighting requirement embedded in an inflexible ship design can
raise. Twenty-two years ago, in 1999, the U.S. surface navy’s most pressing mate
rial issue was replacing the never-upgraded SPY-1B-equipped Ticonderoga-class
cruisers and modernizing the first twenty-one ships of the SPY-1D-equipped
Arleigh Burke–class destroyers built before 1999—without bankrupting the Na
vy.95 Going back another twenty-two years to 1977, the previously discussed and
costly New Threat upgrade and the original SPY-1A-equipped Aegis cruisers were
under construction or in design, and all were decommissioned or decommission
ing by 1999. Twenty-two years before those upgrades and designs, in 1955, virtu
ally all the surface combatants then in service would be decommissioned before
1977, save for a few gun cruisers that underwent a costly missile modernization.
Given this history and the current pace of change in maritime technology, it ap
pears unlikely that the ships of the Constellation class will have much relevant
war-fighting capability over much of their planned service life.
That abbreviated combat utility compares poorly with the enduring capabil
ity in the Nimitz-class and Gerald R. Ford–class aircraft carriers and the Navy’s
amphibious ships. Today, forty-year-old ships carry the latest aircraft (F-18E/F
Block III, F-35B/C, and E-2D) as soon as the aircraft are available to their em
barked air wings and Marine aviation elements, with no need to change the ship’s
war-fighting requirements. In 2021, an F-35C squadron embarked in USS Carl
Vinson (CVN 70), a thirty-nine-year-old ship, for the model’s maiden opera
tional shipboard deployment.96 F-35B aircraft deployed for the first time in 2018
aboard USS Essex (LHD 2), which, like Carl Vinson, is one of the oldest ships of
its class.97 These deployments proceeded successfully despite, and Carl Vinson
and Essex were unaffected operationally by, delays in fielding the F-35; since the
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ship designs are decoupled from aircraft-development schedules, they continue
to fly existing aircraft as long as needed without operational impact until the new
designs are ready to deploy.
As a thought experiment, consider what the U.S. Navy’s position could have
been today had the twenty-one Arleigh Burke–class destroyers and twenty-seven
Ticonderoga-class cruisers that required modernization at the turn of the millen
nium been built originally as modular, Enterprise-designed ships. Those fortyeight ships could be receiving SPY-6 radars today—replacing their original SPY1A, B, and D systems—the accompanying combat systems baseline upgrades, and
modern weapon suites during planned three-month, predeployment, pierside
modernization periods. Adding in the two Flight III DDG-51-class ships pres
ently under construction with SPY-6 suites, the U.S. Navy could have had fifty of
the most modern, capable, and sophisticated surface-combatant ships in opera
tional service before 2025, instead of just the two Flight III SPY-6 ships currently
under construction. Under current plans, and including the twenty planned, lesscapable Constellation-class ships, the Navy will field only forty-two SPY-6equipped surface-combatant ships, spread over the next quarter century.98
The Navy can do nothing about the design of those fifty destroyers and cruis
ers today, but the surface-combatant design decisions Navy leaders are making
today will bequeath those same modernization and shipbuilding problems to
their successors in coming decades. Without modularity and Enterprise-design
attributes, new surface combatants will need to be built to accommodate some
future SPY radar or Standard Missile, let alone some entirely new system such
as a swarm of drone weapons, a torpedo-firing underwater uncrewed vehicle, a
6G network, or a zettabyte shipboard quantum data center. Elizabethan-school
designs do not survive well in a fast-paced, changing technology environment,
whereas Enterprise designs thrive. Enterprise design, as implemented already
in the Navy’s aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and LCSs, and at the weaponsystem level within the Aegis program and a few other installed systems, dramati
cally accelerates war-fighting innovation and technology upgrades over classic
Elizabethan-school methods.99
The LCS and Aegis demonstrate that the U.S. surface-navy community is capa
ble of true innovation, in the modern way. However, that community has stepped
away from learning from or capitalizing on this valuable, hard-won, hard-earned
experience—innovation, interrupted.
THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED
The engineers who designed Hornet and its sister ships, while contending with
the unexpected implications of these new cross-domain vessels, were making it up
as they went along—and they did well. Today, the U.S. Navy has a strong body of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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shipbuilding and -design experience, lessons, and rigorous research and analysis
that transcends the innocence of those first aircraft carrier design engineers, creat
ing a capability to make designs that can accommodate unknown future advanc
es.100 As a prominent economics writer cautions, “It would be reassuring to think
of new technology as something we can plan. And sometimes, it’s true, . . . [b]ut
these examples are memorable in part because they are unusual. . . . [T]he idea that
we can actually predict which technologies will flourish flies in the face of all the
evidence. The truth is far messier and more difficult to manage.”101
To escape the costs of either modernizing or replacing rigid warship designs,
the Navy must abandon its Elizabethan-school engineering comfort zone for fu
ture surface-combatant designs and instead embrace the engineering sea change
begun in 1934 by modularizing both ships and shipboard weapon systems. For
mally separating the details of specific war-fighting capabilities (lethality) from
the ship design and focusing instead on defining a robust but minimal set of shipto-weapon engineering interfaces, with appropriate (i.e., generous) margins, is a
proven method for enabling future flexibility and adaptability; the Navy has been
doing just this for nearly eighty years with its aircraft carrier designs. Warships
cannot be “future proofed,” but they can be designed with the inherent resilience
and capability for growth necessary to enable future generations to respond effec
tively to the still-emerging challenges of the twenty-first century using the ships
the Navy is building today.102
Hornet’s designers were unconcerned about B-25 takeoff weight or ordnance
load, because B-25s did not exist when Hornet was being designed in 1934; the
first B-25 flew in August 1940, just four months before Hornet was commis
sioned. But the Army bombers were able to take off from its decks on a radi
cal, “game changing” combat mission just twenty months after the first B-25
flight. That did not happen because the Navy planned for it; it happened because
Hornet’s design did not preclude it from happening.103 Hornet was designed and
built with a “capability to have a capability”—innovation, unbound.
FIGHTING TODAY FOR THE FUTURE
The U.S. Navy has a long history of coming up with the right “stuff ” at the right
time, so that, when wars started, it had the right ships, airplanes, and systems to
accomplish its early war-fighting tasks. Despite the interwar financial strain dur
ing the 1920s and 1930s, when naval disarmament treaties and then the Great
Depression decimated both the service’s budgets and the composition of its fleet,
the Navy designed largely the “right” fleet for fighting the war in the Pacific.104
Wahoo and Hornet were both designed and built during those lean and tumultu
ous decades. All the hard design and conceptual work was done before the first
shots of America’s part in World War II were fired, so that all American industry
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/1
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needed to do was push its war-production capacity “full speed ahead” without
having to wait to design new ships.105
Today the Navy is at a critical juncture; it faces many choices ahead to ensure it
can deploy a strong, diverse, innovative toolbox of technologies against emerging
and future threats. But like Yamato’s designers and builders, who looked solely to
the past to predict the future, the U.S. surface navy also is burdened with unhelp
ful design history. Yet with Hornet and its sisters, the Navy looked forward, not
backward, to design and build ships that proved themselves victorious in a deadly
new combat environment against a formidable foe. The naval-aviation commu
nity has perpetuated that success now for decades in the face of dozens of new
technologies and completely unexpected maritime operational environments.
Against growing, or at least uncertain, future threats, the Navy’s surface com
munity cannot deploy the latest capabilities in sufficient quantity using tradition
al, Elizabethan-school approaches to design. To attain the advantages of flexible,
adaptable operational capabilities that the naval-aviation community has enjoyed
and nurtured for nearly a century, it likely has to make hard choices to sacrifice
some near-term performance and war-fighting requirements to ensure its ships
retain long-term relevance. But as legendary race car driver Mario Andretti is
often quoted as saying, “If everything seems under control, you’re just not going
fast enough.”106 Now is the time for the Navy to “go faster”—to step away from
highly controlled and comfortable Elizabethan-school ship-design practices and
embrace a more fluid, adaptable, flexible, and much, much faster Enterprise shipdesign philosophy.
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REVIEW ESSAY

“NEITHER KNAVES NOR FOOLS”

Thomas C. Hone

The War Lords and the Gallipoli Disaster: How Globalized
Trade Led Britain to Its Worst Defeat of the First World War,
by Nicholas A. Lambert. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press,
2021. 368 pages. $49.95.

This thoroughly researched and very well written book is based on the research
that Nicholas Lambert did for his Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare
and the First World War, published in 2012. In his earlier book, Lambert showed
how the global trade network that Great Britain constructed before World War I
was a decidedly two-edged weapon when Britain went to war with Germany in
the summer of 1914. On the one hand, the ability of the British government to cut
German trade and finance out of the network suddenly might hamper the German
economy so severely that the German government would find it impossible to con
tinue the war; on the other hand, strangling German trade and finance would affect
other nations’ economies, including those of the United States and even of Britain.
The War Lords and the Gallipoli Disaster picks up where Planning Armageddon
left off. Lambert shows how economic and social factors rooted in Britain’s global
trade network shaped the decision by the British War Council (the “War Lords”
of the title) to order British (joining with French) naval and land forces to capture
the Dardanelles in 1915. Lambert has read the military histories of the Gallipoli
campaign, but his research shows that comprehending why that campaign oc
curred—and occurred the way it did—requires an
Thomas C. Hone is a former professor at the Naval
War College and a former principal deputy director understanding of the role of wheat in Britain’s war
of program analysis in the Office of the Secretary of
strategy.
Defense.
Wheat? Why did wheat—specifically, Russian
Naval War College Review, Winter 2022, Vol. 75, No. 1
wheat—play an important role in the decision to
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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attack the Turkish defenses of the Dardanelles? Lambert answers that question
by first noting that the major belligerents assumed that the war would not last
long. “Home by Christmas” may have been a wish that the troops on both sides
voiced in 1914, but the leaders of the warring states hoped for it as well. Great
Britain, for example, did not have a process in place to guarantee that British bak
ers would continue to have flour on hand to make affordable bread for Britain’s
population if the fighting continued into 1915. British political leaders assumed
that the commerce of wheat production and distribution, coupled with the com
merce of open-market bread production and sales, would feed Britain’s millions
adequately. They also assumed that the tsar’s regime could supply the Russian
armies with sufficient ammunition. Both assumptions turned out to be wrong,
and Lambert deftly explains why.
The heart of Britain’s problem was the insistence of Sir John D. P. French, the
commander of the British Expeditionary Force in Flanders, that a stalemate did
not exist on the western front. French argued that, with more troops and artillery,
his force could crack the German trench line in 1915, and Herbert H. Asquith,
the prime minister, “could not and did not take the political risk of ignoring the
professional opinion of the senior field commander” (p. 264). However, if French
had it wrong—as indeed he did—then the war could drag on; and if it did, the
Asquith cabinet—and not just the War Lords—had to do its best both to gain a
victory and to not destroy the British economy in the process.
French’s was not the only military proposal on the table as the War Lords met
at the beginning of 1915 to consider Britain’s next move in the war. Winston
Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, pressed his colleagues to adopt a plan
to seize the Dardanelles. His argument was that doing so would not prevent the
British forces in Flanders from making a major attack on the German lines in
1915. Moreover, opening the Dardanelles would knock the Ottoman Empire out
of the war—thereby allowing Russian wheat to flow into world markets, prevent
ing a price surge that Britain ill could afford.
Lambert makes a strong case that the War Lords went along with Churchill
“primarily for political, not military, reasons.” Britain needed a victory to jus
tify war losses already sustained; Russia needed to export its wheat so it could
buy needed ammunition; British workers needed the wheat to live; and Britain
needed to keep Russia in the war. Lambert observes that “[f]or the most impor
tant decision-maker—the prime minister—the weight of the evidence indicates
clearly that the wheat issue was paramount in his mind” (p. 267). But it did not
retain that position for Asquith. By late March 1915, after initial attempts by
British and French warships to force their way through the straits had failed,
Asquith and his colleagues faced a choice: Back down and call off the attacks on
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the Turkish defenses or press on with a major amphibious assault? They chose
the latter—and lived to regret it.
For Lambert, the failure at Gallipoli—especially the thinking and discussions
that preceded the actual military assault—illustrates the dilemma facing the
builders of any global economic system in wartime. If they create a worldwide
system of free trade in peacetime and then engage in what they think is decisive
economic warfare, they run the risk of robbing their system of the confidence
on which it is based. Free trade is built on the expectations and perceptions of
multiple participants in its system of communications, finance, and shipping. A
government that decides to manipulate those systems drastically runs the risk of
wiping out those expectations and wrecking the very system that is the source of
its great influence. That was the dilemma facing the British cabinet as it explored
the chances of gaining a quick and decisive victory in the Dardanelles.
As Lambert shows, Asquith and his colleagues were aware that they faced a
situation of “damned if you do and damned if you don’t.” Lieutenant Colonel
Maurice P. A. Hankey, who was secretary to the War Council (and therefore to
the War Lords) after November 1914, and whom Lambert quotes, put it well:
“We were neither knaves nor fools. We were dealing, under circumstance of
great pressure and difficulty, with a problem of appalling complexity” (p. 261).
It is not as though no one had warned them previously; in 1903, then–Prime
Minister Arthur J. Balfour had noted that the “difficulties which we have to face
are difficulties which are inherent in our position, and which nothing can wholly
remove” (p. 272).
Even as Lambert illustrates the “difficulties,” he also warns historians to take
heed of the economic, social, and even psychological factors that influence
decision-making in wartime. As he states, “This book is an attempt at intentbased, rather than outcome-based, history” (p. 261). Why did the War Lords
approve military operations in the Dardanelles? Was there one basic reason,
and was that reason the only one that really mattered as the leaders in London
considered the alternatives before them? Lambert’s answer, based on his careful
and thorough research, is no. “The blinding rapidity with which events occurred
and opinions altered makes it difficult to generalize or point to any single set of
reasons” why the Asquith cabinet chose to attack the Dardanelles (p. 262). This
should sound familiar to today’s Americans trying to understand where U.S.
policy in Afghanistan came from.
Related to this rejection of a single cause for the Gallipoli campaign is Lam
bert’s understanding that trying to apportion blame is a misguided effort. What
matters is trying to understand the intentions of the principal actors, how those
intentions were formed and sometimes changed, and how the principal actors
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saw themselves and their tasks. As Lambert asserts, “The contextual breadth,
explanatory precision, and archival research necessary for intent-based history
exceeds the norms of conventional naval and military history” (p. 261). He thus
throws out a challenge to military historians to wrap their minds around all the
major factors that shape decision-making.
As Lambert writes, “Temporarily separating out the various component parts
[military, economic, etc.] may be necessary for analytical purposes but the arti
ficiality of this separation must be constantly borne in mind” (p. 276). And as
far as the issue of personal responsibility is concerned, his last words in the book
never should be forgotten: “All the threads [in making decisions] were knotted
together on [decision makers’] desks every day. The collective weight of all this
complexity was crushing and inhibited decision-making. Historians are obliged
to re-create that narrative tapestry as best as possible. Before we can say whether
their decisions were right or wrong, we must truly understand why they were so
difficult” (p. 280). Wise words from one of our finest naval historians.
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BOOK REVIEWS

CAT-AND-MOUSE GAMES
Indianapolis: The True Story of the Worst Sea Disaster in U.S. Naval History and the Fifty-Year Fight
to Exonerate an Innocent Man, by Lynn Vincent and Sara Vladic. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018.
592 pages. $28.

“Japanese submarine slammed two
torpedoes into our side, Chief. We
was comin’ back from the island of
Tinian . . . just delivered the bomb,
the Hiroshima bomb. Eleven hundred
men went into the water. Vessel went
down in twelve minutes. . . . Very first
light, Chief, the sharks come cruisin’.”
As his dramatic monologue continues
in Steven Spielberg’s 1975 movie Jaws,
Captain Quint reveals the horrors the
real survivors had faced thirty years
earlier following the World War II
sinking of USS Indianapolis (CA 35).
Just after midnight on 30 July 1945, the
Imperial Japanese Navy submarine I-58
torpedoed Indianapolis between Guam
and Leyte. Of the ship’s 1,195-man crew,
879 died. An estimated three hundred
died immediately or soon after; the
remainder were killed by sharks or
drowned owing to exhaustion, delirium,
and injuries. Only 316 hands survived
to be rescued three-plus days later.
In December 1945, a Navy general
court-martial found Captain Charles
B. McVay III, Indy’s skipper, guilty
of hazarding his vessel by failing to
zigzag. In 1968, burdened by the loss
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of his crew, McVay committed suicide.
It would be another thirty-two years
before a congressional inquiry exoner
ated him and cleared his Navy record.
In meticulous detail, Lynn Vincent
and Sara Vladic chronicle the complete
history of Indianapolis, from the keel
laying of the Portland-class heavy cruiser
in 1930 to its discovery at the bottom
of the Philippine Sea in 2017. Using its
wartime service as the flagship of the
Pacific Fleet, the authors build their
story around Indianapolis the ship, but
at its core this book is about people
and accountability. In a military system
under which a ship’s captain has absolute
accountability, the authors expertly
tackle the challenge of convincing read
ers that McVay was convicted unjustly
and his exoneration was appropriate.
The story unfolds in five chronological
books. “The Kamikaze (Spring 1945)”
introduces the ship, key members of
its crew, and its wartime missions,
including coverage of a kamikaze strike
that sent the ship back to California for
repairs. “The Mission (July 1945)” de
scribes the Manhattan Project and Indy’s
secret mission to transport the bomb
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“Little Boy” from California to Tinian
Island. “The Deep (July 30–August 4,
1945)” details events leading up to the
attack, the sinking, and the rescue. “Trial
and Scandal (August 5, 1945–June 30,
1949)” summarizes the legal proceedings
and argues persuasively that the process
was tainted. The last book, “An Innocent
Man (Summer 1999),” ties together the
concerted efforts of a few individuals
that led to McVay’s exoneration.
Short sections covering periods between
1997 and 2005 follow each chronological
book, tracking the efforts of Captain
William J. Toti, the skipper of USS
Indianapolis (SSN 697), Indy’s namesake
submarine, to locate Mochitsura
Hashimoto, submarine commander
who sank Indianapolis and testified at
the 1945 court-martial, and gain his
support to exonerate McVay. These
sections bolster rather than interrupt the
flow of the primary story, particularly
in the last book, and culminate with
coverage of the sixtieth-anniversary
gathering of survivors and their families
in 2005. The story concludes with
a short “Final Log Entry” about the
discovery of the cruiser 18,000 feet
below the surface of the Philippine Sea
seventy-two years after it was sunk.
In dividing their work, Vincent, a USN
veteran and author of numerous nonfic
tion books, focused on the delivery
of the bomb, the court-martial, and
McVay’s subsequent exoneration, while
Vladic, an acclaimed documentary film
maker and the world’s leading expert on
Indianapolis, focused on the survivors
and their families. Their joint passion
to tell the whole story of Indy and its
crew is evident throughout the book.
While the story is well constructed
and captivating, the book is also a
well-documented, scholarly work. The

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/1

authors combine hundreds of hours
of interviews with survivors, rescue
crews, family members, and friends with
primary sources, including official Navy
records, and numerous photographs,
charts, graphs, and maps to produce a
full understanding of what happened
and why. The “Final Sailing List,” crossreferenced from eight sources, is a fitting
tribute to the ship’s 1,195 crewmembers.
The twenty-two-page bibliography
seemingly references every document,
article, interview, film, and book ever
produced on Indianapolis, including
Doug Stanton’s New York Times best
seller In Harm’s Way: The Sinking of
the USS Indianapolis (Holt, 2001).
Supported by years of research and
hundreds of additional interviews,
Vincent and Vladic’s Indianapolis should
be the first choice for new audiences
fascinated with the excerpt from Quint’s
war story. For those familiar with the
sinking and its aftermath, Indianapolis is
worthy of your attention as the definitive
account of this World War II tragedy.
JEFFREY BOVARNICK

Kamikaze: Japan’s Last Bid for Victory, by Adrian
Stewart. Philadelphia: Pen and Sword Aviation,
2020. 209 pages. $29.95.

The very first, and possibly the second,
“suicide dive” that Japanese pilots
made in World War II occurred on
the first day of Japan’s war against the
United States, during the attack on
Pearl Harbor and other sites on Oahu.
Although as the author of Kamikaze:
Japan’s Last Bid for Victory notes, these
pilots’ missions were fundamentally
different from those that came later,
“the motives behind them help to
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explain the Kamikaze creed” (p. 3).
It was the attacks toward the end of
the war conducted by the “Divine
Wind Special Attack Unit,” which the
Imperial Japanese Navy established
officially in October 1944, that were
notorious. Although suicide attacks
were not limited to the kamikaze
aerial attacks, it is the latter intentional
rather than earlier impulsive suicide
attacks that receive the most attention.
The Japanese warrior of World War
II was a fierce opponent, one who
considered suicide charges or other
means of achieving death to be prefer
able to surrendering—death before
dishonor. American and Allied soldiers
and Marines fighting island by island
frequently met with stiff resistance,
including suicidal attempts to kill them,
whether in small or large numbers.
In the Allies’ methodical movement
toward the Japanese home islands,
reclamation of territory occupied by
Japanese ground forces came at a very
high cost in human life. In the waning
months of the war in the Pacific, Japan’s
airpower was diminishing much faster
than its ground forces; so too had its
power at sea largely been destroyed.
Unable to stop the tightening naval
noose around the home islands, Japan
began a new tactic of kamikaze attacks.
Adrian Stewart’s volume—consisting
of eight chapters, a sixteen-page
insert of photographs, and four
maps—provides an informative and
enjoyable study of this aspect of the war
in the Pacific theater. Although moreextensive treatments exist, this book
is worth reading as an introductory
overview of the kamikaze phenomenon.
Ideologically grounded in and inspired
by events of the Mongol invasions of
Japan in 1274 and 1281, the attacks
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drew on Japanese history, religion,
nationalism, and patriotism to attempt
to deter or delay invasion and defeat.
The first chapter, “‘Death Is Lighter than
a Feather,’ ” aptly situates the kamikaze
perspective within historic Japanese be
liefs on death and defeat. Stewart makes
a distinction between suicide attacks
earlier in the war—such as those at Attu
and Guadalcanal and against USS Hornet and Enterprise—and later kamikaze
operations, but he sees in both the legacy
of the Bushido code of the samurai.
Chapter 2 views the beginnings of
kamikaze tactics in 1942, with the later
establishment of the Kamikaze Corps
prior to the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The
third and fourth chapters consider the
effects of the failure of the Japanese
SHO plan for defense of the Philippines
and those islands’ subsequent fall.
Throughout the book, Stewart skillfully
weaves together historical narrative
with presentation of pilots’ final letters
to family members, their other words,
and other evidence of their motivations.
In so doing, the author achieves the
difficult task of showing the human
element of these warriors. As he
observes, “All Kamikaze pilots, without
exception, were devoted patriots” (p.
61). Even so, the toll they exacted
on the Allies was not insignificant,
especially in the Battle of Okinawa, as
the author presents in chapter 7. During
that campaign, of March–June 1945,
1,900 kamikaze sorties sank twenty-six
ships and inflicted damage on 176
more (p. 162). As time went on, the
Kamikaze Corps relied increasingly on
ill-trained pilots and older aircraft.
Stewart’s work balances the experiences
of the attackers and of the attacked,
and in so doing shows the fighting
spirit, resolve, and capabilities of those
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who were targets of the kamikazes as
well. The final chapter, “The Moon
Rose Radiant,” presents the immedi
ate postconflict stand-down and the
responses of surviving kamikaze pilots.
The kamikaze attacks were operational
and strategic failures, but their tactical
effects, at least psychologically, were
enormous. These warriors left a legacy
to be studied and compared with those
of other wars and other suicide warriors.
Readers interested in the personal side
and stories of the pilots will want to
supplement this volume by reading
Kamikaze Diaries: Reflections of Japanese
Student Soldiers by Emiko OhnukiTierney (University of Chicago Press,
2006) and Blossoms in the Wind: Human
Legacies of the Kamikaze by M. G.
Sheftall (NAL Caliber / Penguin, 2005).
Also not to be overlooked is the classic
1958 account by Rikihei Inoguchi and
Tadashi Nakajima, with Roger Pineau,
The Divine Wind: Japan’s Kamikaze Force
in World War II (Naval Institute Press,
repr. 2013). Yet for a first book to read
on the subject, Stewart’s Kamikaze is
very good and insightful. The separate
index of Australian, British, Japanese,
and U.S. ships is very helpful, as is
his discussion of the oft-overlooked
attacks against Australian and British
ships. It is well worth reading.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY

British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth
Century, by Andrew Boyd. Barnsley, U.K.: Sea
forth, 2020. 800 pages. $52.95.

In a most-welcome study of British in
telligence bureaucracies in the modern
age, Andrew Boyd has provided a major
contribution to the historiography of
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maritime strategy. His single-volume
history provides a comprehensive,
chronological analysis of the relevant
administrative trends and key personali
ties and reveals many fresh insights into
the contemporary question of British
intelligence. Responding to the standard
historiographical narratives, Boyd
challenges many myths and provides
corrective observations for his readers
to consider. He examines the secret
history of the British Empire while
simultaneously considering the role of
the Dominions and Commonwealth.
From the late nineteenth century to
the present, British naval strategy has
evolved under the influence of intel
ligence. The bureaucracies involved
largely have remained behind closed
doors, yet intelligence organizations
have helped to define the world
into the twenty-first century.
Boyd draws from original documentary
sources—archival holdings, contem
poraneous firsthand accounts, and
memoirs—to address critical problems
in the official histories and other
historiography of British intelligence,
including addressing the major myths.
Historiographical trends in recent
scholarship have muddied the waters,
and thankfully Boyd has addressed
them. By taking the chronological
approach, he has provided a better
interpretation of the bigger ques
tions, explaining why people in the
past acted as they did at the time.
Among many other examples, Boyd
demonstrates the influence of the First
World War on efforts to renew the
transatlantic relationship between the
British Empire and the United States.
Boyd then uses this history to correct
many popular myths surrounding the
heroic story of British code breakers
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and the role of Bletchley Park in
shaping Allied strategy in the Second
World War. He then applies this history
further to offer additional corrective
historical observations about the
character and organization of British
intelligence in the twenty-first century.
The fictions Boyd corrects frequently
highlighted chosen facts in the histo
riography of British intelligence. The
foreword remarks, provided by historian
Andrew Lambert, serve as a foundation
for Boyd to address those myths by
providing a detailed examination of
the applicable documentary sources.
Placing the myths in question into the
broader context, Boyd also introduces
his readers to the historical personali
ties most responsible for influencing
popular portrayals of his subject.
For example, Boyd examines former
intelligence operative turned popular
fiction writer Hector C. Bywater and his
“strange intelligence” of the First World
War era. Building from this analysis,
Boyd then tackles the actual history of
Commander Ian Fleming, RNVR, to
offer a fresh glimpse behind the curtains
of British intelligence into the Second
World War and through the Cold War
era. Portrayals of British intelligence
as found in the popular fictions of
such authors as Bywater and Fleming
have provided many bread crumbs
for historians to penetrate classified
archival sources. Conversely, Bywater
and Fleming also are responsible for
overstating the capabilities of British
intelligence through such characters as
“Mr. X” and the more familiar Agent
007—Commander James Bond, RNVR.
By focusing on the original sources and
unclassified documentary evidence,
Boyd reassesses the genre of British
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intelligence to retrace the interrelation
ships between history and fiction.
On the other hand, Fleming’s character,
Bond, also worked very frequently with
an American counterpart, Felix Leiter.
Although Boyd avoids the temptation
of getting too bogged down in such
fictions, he restricts his analysis to
the British perspective. As a result,
his analysis sometimes is open to
additional debate concerning the role
of equivalent American intelligence
bureaucracies and the emergence of the
transatlantic “very special relationship”
in the world wars of the twentieth
century. This is understandable, as
British archives generally are better kept
and more accessible than American
collections. Boyd also has pressed the
limits with his more than 680 pages,
which include condensed endnotes
that are not very user-friendly.
On the other hand, Boyd very likely
left much on the cutting-room floor
to conform to the more-recent trends
in the scholarly and commercial
publishing industry of the twentyfirst century. Thankfully, this book
is not written to be read best on an
electronic device; it also is not written
for delivery in a podcast format.
Given some looming questions concern
ing the history of British intelligence,
Boyd has provided many very substan
tial conclusions that historians, policy
makers, and naval-service practitioners
must consider. This book should be
required reading for all contemporary
students of history. Although the future
is yet to be written, Boyd has provided
a very important contribution to the
historiography of British intelligence,
maritime strategy, and naval operations.
DAVID A. KOHNEN
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The Premonition: A Pandemic Story, by Michael
Lewis. New York: W. W. Norton, 2021. 320 pages.
$15.

Upon starting Michael Lewis’s The
Premonition: A Pandemic Story, the
reader anticipates a sobering account
of what occurred in the run-up to the
emergence and spread of COVID-19
across the United States. The book is
that, but much more as well, as told
from the point of view of those who
saw the pandemic coming. The surpris
ing thing about The Premonition is
that it is also at times a feel-good story
about how government can work—even
amid a crisis of epic proportions.
When government does work, it can
be despite bureaucratic organizations
as much as because of them, and
owing, either way, to the people who
hold public office and make decisions,
and those who advise those who do.
Lewis’s book is nonpartisan on this
aspect, identifying troubling dynamics
in modern-day government decisionmaking and organizational behaviors
that, when it comes to dealing with
potential pandemics, date back at least
to the mid-1970s (and, in some ways,
as far back as the 1918 flu outbreak).
When government does work, it is
the integrity, expertise, and ingenuity
of local, state, and federal officials
that ultimately matter. As with heroes
anywhere, during times of crisis some
people will shun responsibility, while
others will rise to meet the challenge,
realizing that in a crisis putting off dif
ficult decisions is simply not an option.
The Premonition details pandemicrelated decision-making dynamics that
hold lessons for other national-security

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/1

concerns as well. Lewis presents these
insights via an intriguing narrative
centered on a motley group of publichealth officials and experts dubbed
“the Wolverines,” after the protagonists
of the late–Cold War flick Red Dawn.
The Wolverines find one another
through their efforts to comprehend
the COVID outbreak and then to aid
the U.S. government in responding to
it. It is their stories—of travails and
occasional successes—that provide a
heartbeat to an otherwise essentially
dire pandemic tale. It is in this way, too,
that The Premonition is a study of what
went right in terms of experts anticipat
ing the magnitude of the pandemic
that COVID would become in the
United States, despite the difficulty
the government at all levels found in
responding, or responding effectively
and in a timely manner, to the crisis.
Lewis’s retelling of the emergence of
COVID and the growing realization
of its ominous implications also well
illustrates how policy makers must
make tough decisions on the basis of
incomplete and uncertain information.
This hard truth is especially pertinent
to public-health policy decisions, where
delays in making decisions can lead to
exponentially higher death tolls. As the
author recounts, “The only clear signal
you get from the virus is death” (p. 227).
The Premonition interestingly also
details how policy makers rely on
outside expertise, whether from former
government officials, think-tank
experts, academics, business executives,
or even foreign experts; this especially
holds true in the midst of an interna
tional crisis of historic proportions.
Lewis’s book highlights some of the
tools and tactics, as well as the means
and channels, by which those on the
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outside—including some with no prior
interaction with or connections to
the White House or other parts of the
Washington bureaucracy—influenced
national-policy decision-making.
The narrative tracks one idea’s origins
from a student science fair to a rejected
academic paper to a White House
briefing, with the concept ultimately
becoming the foundation for a key
component in the nation’s response to
COVID. The point of the story is that,
in a crisis, policy makers are in search
of and often open to good ideas wher
ever they might arise. Yet, as Lewis’s
story also makes clear, good ideas are
likely to be listened to only if they are
framed in a way that addresses the
problem that policy makers are facing
and at the time they are searching for a
solution; in influencing policy decisionmaking, timing can be everything.
Finally, Lewis’s narrative makes clear
that high-stakes policy decision-making
and advising are not for the faint of
heart or play-it-safe-style bureaucrats
and careerists. The personal cost of
having policy influence can be high
at times, particularly when stakes are
elevated and lives are on the line. As
Lewis notes at one point in his retell
ing, “A system was groping toward
a solution, but the solution required
someone in it to be brave, and the
system didn’t reward bravery” (p.
226). Yet when personal ambition is
weighed against the public welfare,
there are some who will act decisively
on behalf of the latter. We all can be
grateful that such people exist.
Anyone wanting to understand
better how and why government
at any level works well—or not at
all—in responding to major crises
will find this account of the run-up
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to the COVID crisis both inspiring
and frustrating. But ultimately the
time will be well spent.
KATHLEEN A. WALSH

The Craft of Wargaming: A Detailed Planning
Guide for Defense Planners and Analysts, by Jeff
Appleget, Robert Burks, and Fred Cameron. An
napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2020. 376
pages. $39.95.

The Craft of Wargaming is a superb book
on how “art” and “science” can interact to
enrich the craft of war gaming. The three
authors detail how a range of disciplines
shape the wargaming profession, process,
and product. Here theory meets applica
tion by exploring how different case
studies, exercises, and varied approaches
inform analytical war gaming and its
applicability to the planning process.
War games alone can neither prevent nor
predict war, but they provide a bloodless
(though not inexpensive) platform to
inform hard choices, confront contempo
rary challenges, and ensure that leaders
at all levels are prepared when competi
tion transitions to conflict and combat.
The authors build on extant literature
with lessons observed to provide the op
portunity for students and practitioners
alike to understand, employ, and exploit
war gaming better. The Craft of Wargaming is informed both by these experiences
of working with students to execute their
own war games and by working with
sponsors considering complex challenges
related to both potential near-future
conflict and far-horizon force design.
The book is designed to help readers
better understand a six-phase approach:
to (1) teach, (2) apply, (3) do, (4) learn,
(5) repeat, and (6) improve. This is
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executed in a fifteen-chapter, 209-page
main text supplemented with 123 pages
of appendix material. Even those who
consider themselves wargaming pros
should resist the temptation to skip
over the first section, covering the
field’s foundations. For example, there
are subtle differences between how the
Naval Postgraduate School and other
organizations approach war games.
The book’s second section covers the
fundamentals of both teaching students
and executing war games for sponsors.
For students, the expected outcome is to
be able to apply wargaming principles
and processes to help senior leaders
define, confront, assess, and understand
complex problem sets. For wargame
sponsors, the expected outcome is that
both the recipient (sponsor) and the
provider (wargame team) understand
what war games can do—and, importantly, cannot do—within extant time
and resource constraints.
The third part of the book is labeled
“Planning and Management.” This is
misleading, because it goes beyond mere
ly providing a checklist-derived overview
and deserves thorough investigation and
careful consideration. The most impor
tant subsets of this section are “Course
of Action Wargaming,” an important ad
dendum on experiential and educational
war games, and a terrific tabulation of
best-versus-worst examples of “do this,
not that.” This section reminds the reader
that war games do not just happen;
rather, they are the result of a deliberate
process of problem framing, research,
design, execution, and analysis. Each of
those steps demands careful construc
tion. For those working in a planning or
operations environment, this “Course
of Action Wargaming” chapter should
be especially useful. Outside of those
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conducted by specialized organizations
that can bring the full weight of wargame
professionals to bear on a specific key
problem, most war games in fact will
take place at geographic combatant
commands and service headquarters.
The Craft of Wargaming also cautions
the reader to ensure that intelligence
functions are part and parcel of the
war game—something that will not
happen if that function is relegated to
playing the “red” (adversary) side. A
far more effective technique is to have
a stand-alone red organization, then
take personnel from the operational
function and assign them the role of
the adversarial commander—who is
incentivized, and permitted, to win.
The book’s fourth section is an extensive
set of appendices, replete with op
portunities for further pursuit of the
art and science of effective war gaming.
Readers more experienced in war games
may wish to read chapters 1 and 2, then
proceed directly to the appendices. These
six appendices, comprising one-third
of the book, contain a war game in the
fictional country of Zefra, complete with
an exercise brief, scenario, and guidance
on how to execute this matrix game.
Matrix games are at once both exquisitely
simple and laden with insights that lead to
further exploration and learning. Through
this example, the authors bring out several
different approaches to matrix gaming
that will be quite useful to planners who
are in a rush to create a “good enough”
war game based on vague or contradic
tory commander’s wargaming guidance.
This, in turn, enables planners to have an
informed discussion with commanders
to help them frame the problem better
while suggesting multiple approaches
to structuring war games for greater
effect. Also included in these appendices
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are useful practical exercise solutions, a
wargaming “gateway exam,” and an in
sightful set of eight wargame case studies.
Overall, this is an excellent primer on the
science and art of war games: what they
are, what they are not, and what they can
provide—when properly designed and
executed. Please read, mark up, refer to
often, and aggressively employ The Craft
of Wargaming, and thereby build better
commanders, leaders, planners, and staffs.
DONALD J. THIEME

How Carriers Fought: Carrier Operations in
World War II, by Lars Celander. Havertown, PA:
Casemate, 2020. 281 pages. $22.95.

Lars Celander is passionate about
aircraft carriers. He loves writing about
aircraft carriers; he loves explaining
how aircraft carriers work; he loves
thinking about aircraft carriers and
posing sometimes esoteric questions
about aircraft carriers. As a result,
reading How Carriers Fought is a bit
like being at a party and bumping
into a guest who cannot wait to share
his most enthusiastic passion. As the
conversation continues, you may be
impressed by the speaker’s passion,
knowledge, and insights, but eventually
the talk turns to arcane debates and
hypotheticals. In the end you may walk
away feeling enlightened, or you may
feel that you now know rather more
about the topic than you ever wanted.
Celander’s book takes a comprehensive
look at most aspects of carrier warfare
in World War II. He does not focus
exclusively on U.S. carriers and their
Japanese counterparts, although not
surprisingly the carrier battles of the
Pacific dominate the discussions.
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However, if a nation put a carrier to
sea, that carrier is at least mentioned.
Part 1 of the book is devoted to car
rier operations. Technical issues and
developments—for example, fighter
direction, arresting gear, and ship-toplane communications—are examined.
There even is a paragraph devoted to
the humble flight-deck tractor, which,
as U.S. aircraft grew heavier, became
more and more important to flight-deck
operations. Operational and tactical
concepts such as defense in depth
using fighter combat air patrol and the
antiaircraft capabilities of escorting
ships are looked at in some detail.
Some of the explanations Celander
provides will be exceptionally useful to
the lay reader. As an example, the vital
question of cycle times is explained in
some depth. This includes a description
of why crash barriers were essential
to allowing some navies to conduct
simultaneous takeoffs and landings.
Operations and battles are the key
ingredients of part 2. The author begins
with the early missions of scouting
and raiding, then looks at the Battles
of the Coral Sea, Midway, the Eastern
Solomons, the Santa Cruz Islands, and
the Philippine Sea; Leyte Gulf is the last
examined. This section also includes a
look at Operation PEDESTAL, in which a
Royal Navy, multicarrier force escorted
a convoy across the Mediterranean
to Malta in August 1942. Although
Celander claims he takes a new look
at these conflicts, it is unlikely that
knowledgeable readers will find
anything that is truly original or new.
This is not to say that the accounts are
not useful or illuminating, for there are
interesting facts, such as the difficul
ties U.S. dive-bombers had with their
bombsights and windshields fogging up.
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It would appear that Celander had the
most fun writing part 3, in which he
looks at the evolution of carrier warfare.
His engineering background shines
forth as he takes the reader through a
series of comparisons. Was concentra
tion or dispersion of carriers more
effective? What was the proper mix of
bombers and fighters? One of Celander’s
more intriguing speculations pairs a
lone battleship against a lone carrier.
The author concludes that, by the later
phases of the war, the odds were with the
battleship; however, he acknowledges
the very great unlikelihood of such
an encounter ever occurring. While
this may seem an esoteric question,
Celander is just getting started.

to handle a spectrum of targets. The
quad 40 mm gun well may have been
the best surface-based aircraft killer
in the inventory, but that was not the
five-inch gun mount’s only job.

Celander spends significant time
examining the effectiveness of seaborne
antiaircraft guns. At several points he
reminds readers that American efforts
to develop reliable proximity fuses were
extraordinarily expensive yet disap
pointing in their results. He also looks
at the effectiveness of large-caliber
guns when deployed against aircraft.
After painstaking analysis, Celander
concludes that the U.S Navy would have
been served far better if every five-inch
gun mount had been removed from
carrier escorts and replaced with quad
40 mm mounts. As the solution to an
interesting thought experiment, the
effort is convincing, but this is, in the
end, an exercise performed on some
thing like the famous frictionless plane
of physics. A battleship’s or cruiser’s
secondary batteries had more to do
than just provide antiaircraft fire; in a
surface action, the five-inch batteries
would engage in direct combat with
enemy ships, in addition to providing
illumination. During shore bombard
ments the same batteries would
provide a wide variety of explosives

With all that said, Celander does the
reader at least one tremendous service.
His meticulous accounting illuminates
the very great risks that naval aviators
took and the extreme losses they
endured, particularly American pilots
during the first two years of the war.
Technological limitations and opera
tional realities all too often resulted in
these young men being expended
like flesh-and-blood ammunition.
Their willingness to accept long odds
and their dedication in performing
their missions represent one aspect of
carrier operations during World War
II that never should be forgotten.
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The book concludes with something
of a hodgepodge of topics. Celander
comes out in favor of armored flight
decks and single hangar decks. He
suggests that carrier air wings of the
future should be composed of drones
and manned aircraft, and those
manned aircraft should be subsonic
turboprops along the lines of the Super
Tucano. He also concludes that in
application John R. Boyd’s “OODA
loop” is more useful than Alfred Thayer
Mahan’s principles of naval warfare.

RICHARD NORTON

In the Claws of the Tomcat: US Navy F-14 Tomcat
in Combat, 1987–2000, by Tom Cooper. War
wick, U.K.: Helion, 2021. 80 pages. $29.95.

As a junior officer in the U.S. Navy’s
F-14 Tomcat community, I routinely
heard three explanations for why the
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Navy’s premier fighter never scored
an air-to-air victory during Operation
DESERT STORM: the U.S. Air Force
refused to assign air-to-air missions
to the Navy; the Tomcat lacked the
necessary hardware to distinguish friend
from foe; and Iraqi aircrews turned
and ran from Tomcat radars, owing
to their experiences against Iranian
Tomcats during the Iran-Iraq War.
Tom Cooper leads off his new opera
tional history, In the Claws of the Tomcat,
by setting up these same old saws.
Thereafter, while he does not outright
“bust” these three “myths”—which he
describes, probably more accurately,
as “contradictions” (p. 2)—he offers up
ample information for readers to make
up their own minds. In addition to
highly readable histories of U.S., Soviet,
Iranian, and Iraqi aircraft development
and acquisition, he provides detailed
descriptions of all major air-to-air
engagements in the Persian Gulf from
1987 to 2000 that pitted the Tomcat
against a host of Iranian and Iraqi
opponents. And he does all this in
a slim volume of eighty pages.
Although a self-taught historian and
researcher, Cooper accessed a great deal
of information, some of it previously
unpublished. While the majority of his
historical and technical background
information relies on secondary sources,
he did interview most Tomcat crews
involved in the engagements highlighted
in his book. More importantly, he had
access to official Iranian and Iraqi
publications as well as interviews with
former senior Iraqi aircrew members.
Citing classification concerns for the
Americans—and safety concerns for
the Iranians and Iraqis—he presents the
information on the engagements as oral
history. Additionally, the book features

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,

B O O K R E V I E WS

155

hundreds of archival photos, some
showing the actual aircraft and engage
ments themselves, as well as beautiful
watercolors of all aircraft involved.
Decidedly, In the Claws of the Tomcat is
pitched at the aviation enthusiast. The
book includes brief overviews of the
Cold War and the Iran-Iraq War—the
latter curiously called the “First”
Persian Gulf War, to distinguish it from
the “Second” Persian Gulf War (i.e.,
Operation DESERT STORM). Abbrevia
tions for aircraft, weapons, and hardware
abound. That said, the descriptions of
the development of the Tomcat and the
aircraft that opposed it are presented in
layman’s terms and nicely describe the
different capabilities, tactics, and mindsets of the United States, Iran, and Iraq.
The second half of the book includes
descriptions of every air-to-air engage
ment featuring the Tomcat from 1987 to
2000—including three huge revelations.
First, Cooper lays out the evidence, which
includes photos of a damaged Iranian F-4,
for a “soft kill” of an Iranian F-4 in 1987
that the U.S. Navy long had discounted.
Second, he establishes, through multiple
eyewitness interviews, that Lieutenant
Commander Scott Speicher, the first
American casualty of the war, was shot
down by an Iraqi MiG-25, not a surfaceto-air missile, as long had been the
Navy’s official position. Third, Cooper
likewise argues that a shootdown long
credited to the dreaded “optical” mode
of the SA-6 surface-to-air missile system
(against which a generation of U.S.
aircrews grew up defending) may have
been instead another Iraqi air-to-air kill.
Although earlier in the book Cooper
draws excellent diagrams of basic
air-to-air maneuvers, unfortunately he
misses the opportunity to do the same
for these engagements. Although his
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research is thorough, the engagements
are somewhat hard to follow, and the
adjacent maps of Iraqi air bases do
not provide much clarity. Dedicated
diagrams would have been invaluable.
While Cooper does an admirable job
of comparing differing accounts of
complicated engagements and suggest
ing the most likely sequence of events,
his reliance on oral history colors his
overall assessments of the performance
of the Tomcat and its aircrews. It is
unclear whether Cooper believes the
performance of the Tomcat is underap
preciated or that it is appreciated
correctly and he merely wants to provide
context. His three “contradictions” never
are dealt with explicitly, but the evidence
suggests that they—especially the latter
two: that the Tomcat lacked the proper
equipment and that Iraqi pilots knew to
avoid its powerful radar—are accurate.
Cooper goes out of his way to commend
the performance of Tomcat aircrews,
attributing their lack of air-to-air
victories to their strict adherence to
the rules of engagement and tactics;
however, two of the incidents described
feature some obvious mistakes
regarding both. Finally, there are
minor editorial quibbles involving the
aforementioned “First” and “Second”
Persian Gulf Wars, the occasional
improper use of military acronyms, and
his use of Soviet instead of the more
familiar NATO designations for some
weapon systems (e.g., referring to the
R-40D instead of the AA-6 Acrid),
but this may be an idiosyncrasy of the
military aviation enthusiast community.
Despite having heard these same stories
for years—some of them from the same
people Cooper interviewed—I definitely
learned something new from In the
Claws of the Tomcat. Cooper describes
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the Iranian and Iraqi pilots that the
U.S. Navy faced from 1987 to 2000 as
experienced combat veterans, and his
book rightly credits their performance.
Naval aviation sometimes overestimates
its future performance and underesti
mates that of its future opponents, but
it does so (and did so) at its own peril.
JOSHUA HAMMOND

Inside the US Navy of 1812–1815, by William S.
Dudley. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press, 2021. 368 pages. $54.95.

In the first chapter of America, Sea
Power, and the World, James Bradford’s
edited textbook on the history of the
American navy, the author explains to
students and readers what he considers
to be the three elements of a modern
Navy: purpose-built warships, a profes
sional force—in particular, a professional
officer corps—and a shore establishment
of supporting structures and bureaucra
cies. In large measure, naval history
across the past several generations
has tended to focus on the first two
elements, the warships and the sailors.
William S. Dudley’s new book, Inside the
US Navy of 1812–1815, is a masterwork
of depth and research that returns the
third element, the shore establishment
and bureaucracy, to the center of the his
tory of early American naval power. In
doing so, Dudley offers not only a great
service to our understanding of the U.S.
Navy’s past but also key reminders of the
breadth of naval topics that require our
attention in the present and the future.
In June 1812, when the United States
declared war on Great Britain, the U.S.
Navy was not ready. Americans were
taking on the most powerful maritime
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force in the world, yet while Congress
began raising armies and activating
militia units it did very little to prepare
the nation’s maritime defenses and its
navy. Despite the fact that the British
had been engulfed in a long conflict
with France, the Royal Navy in North
American waters still outnumbered
and outgunned the U.S. Navy when
the war began. Yet while America was
lacking in number of ships, the qual
ity and professionalism of its officers
offered some high points. The talents of
commanders such as Isaac Hull, Stephen
Decatur, and John Rodgers would result
in surprising single-ship victories and
other successes early in the conflict.
Over the last decade, as Americans
commemorated the bicentennial of
the War of 1812—while the British
largely ignored it—there has been a
refreshing resurgence in scholarship
on the conflict. However, the glory
of the early frigate duels, the smallsquadron combats on the lakes, and the
operational and strategic execution of
the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy have
tended to remain at the center of this
new scholarship. Much of the narrative
of the war overlooks the key foundation
on which the U.S. Navy—as is any navy,
quite frankly—was built: the administra
tive and bureaucratic functions run by
the Secretary of the Navy to design and
build the ships, recruit and promote the
officers and men, supply the combat
units with everything they needed
to fight and survive, and provide the
infrastructure to maintain and repair the
ships. Dudley’s book corrects this over
sight with the depth that historians of all
kinds aspire to achieve in their work.
Dudley served most of his career as
a historian at the Naval History and
Heritage Command (or the Naval

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,

B O O K R E V I E WS

157

Historical Center, as it was called
during most of his career), holding the
position of Director of Naval History
from 1995 to 2004. During his time as
an official historian of the U.S. Navy, he
launched and led the editorial process
that created the multiple volumes of
The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary
History, resulting in a deep understand
ing of the source material for any
examination of the war. It is hard to
imagine that there is another living
historian with as thorough a knowledge
of the sources as Dudley. That mastery
shows throughout the book.
The work of Secretaries of the Navy
Paul Hamilton and William Jones is at
the core of the book. Modern readers
looking back at the nineteenth century
often forget, or are surprised to discover,
that the Secretary of the Navy served as
both the administrative and operational
leader of the Navy and Marine Corps.
The position of Chief of Naval Opera
tions was not created until the threat
of World War I presented itself, and
Hamilton and Jones were left to shoulder
the overwhelming responsibilities of
both jobs, with only a marginal staff
to support them. Dudley shows how
these leaders balanced the competing
needs and resources of the Navy—or, in
some cases, failed to balance them. He
demonstrates that the glorious victories,
particularly of Perry and Macdonough
on the Great Lakes but also of Hull and
Decatur in the Atlantic, were built on the
hard bureaucratic work that the naval
administrators put into supplying, fund
ing, and supporting the combat forces.
As the war develops through the book’s
chapters, readers are left time and again
to realize that it is the often-overlooked
and sometimes boring elements of the
naval past that end up being decisive.
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The chapters are conveniently broken
up with subheadings that help the
reader keep track of the many threads
Dudley weaves throughout the book.
However, with so much detail to
relate, and given the complexity of the
logistical challenges and administrative
burdens the reader must understand,
the author often employs flashbacks
and jumps through the chronology of
the war. For those who are not familiar
with the general narrative of the conflict
or the time line of events, this can
induce confusion, whereas those who
already have a clearer understanding of
the conflict will benefit from Dudley’s
ability to focus on a specific challenge
before jumping to another topic. A
reader who is new to the naval war
of 1812 should pair this book with
another (such as George Daughan’s
1812: The Navy’s War, or Andrew
Lambert’s The Challenge: Britain
against America in the Naval War of
1812 for a British viewpoint) to help
alleviate any chronological confusion.
B. J. ARMSTRONG

Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War,
July 1937–May 1942, by Richard B. Frank. New
York: W. W. Norton, 2020. 751 pages. $40.

Historian and Vietnam veteran Richard
Frank (Downfall, Guadalcanal) is on a
mission. In Tower of Skulls he sets out
to rebrand the Pacific theater of World
War II as a grand “Asia-Pacific War”
spanning from 1937 to 1945, from
imperial Japan’s invasion of China until
Japan capitulated to Allied arms. His
approach runs counter to the standard
understanding of World War II as
ranging from 1939 to 1945 (the dates
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demarcating the European war against
the Axis) or 1941 to 1945 (covering when
America had joined the fight in Europe
and the Pacific). Frank wants to give
the war in China its due, showing that
it was an integral part of a prolonged
global maelstrom. In this he succeeds.
Tower of Skulls is the first in a trilogy
that aspires to tell the full story of the
world conflict. Yet if Frank’s goal is to
fold the Sino-Japanese War into a single
Asia-Pacific War, why not turn back the
clock all the way back to 1931, when
Japan invaded Manchuria and reduced
it to a vassal state? The author rejects (p.
32) “the beguiling interpretation styled
‘The Fifteen Years’ War,’ which argues
that Japan followed a seamless path from
Manchuria in 1931 to the USS Missouri
in 1945.” Why? Because prominent back
ers of the Manchurian adventure in 1931
came to oppose fresh entanglements
in China by 1937. Accordingly Tokyo,
rather than initiating the new enterprise
in an orderly manner, took “staggering,
stumbling steps” into war in China.
This haphazardness, maintains the
author, demonstrates that “contingency
rather than inevitability produced the
Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945.” But
indecision and acrimony commonly
plague debates about whether to open
a new theater—witness the caustic
debate over invading Iraq in 2003. But
a decision is a decision, no matter how
decision makers arrive at it. Few would
allege that the Iraq War stood apart
from the global war on terror because
of America’s far-from-seamless path to
Baghdad. In other words, Frank’s premise
is reasonable but far from incontestable.
But I quibble. Widening our memory
of World War II to encompass what
happened in China is a worthwhile en
terprise, no matter whether you regard
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1931 or 1937 as the war’s inception. That
small controversy aside, Tower of Skulls
is a fount of facts and insights. It also is
compulsively readable, despite being a
doorstop of a book. Several insights in
particular resonated with me. To name
one, the author draws out the worldhistorical significance of the SinoJapanese War. He lays great weight on
the Marco Polo Bridge incident (1937),
contending (pp. 6–7) that the fracas
“immediately initiated a train of events
ending with the dissolution of the Asian
empires of Britain, the Netherlands,
Japan, and France.” Other results
included a divided Korea, the Commu
nist takeover of China, enmity across the
Taiwan Strait, and long-lasting Ameri
can military hegemony in the Pacific.
In short, the Asia-Pacific War upended
the Asian system the way World War
I upended the European system—and
helped give rise to the world we know
today. Frank’s verdict is reminiscent of
Pankaj Mishra’s conclusion (in From
the Ruins of Empire) that the Battle of
Tsushima (1905) delivered an elegy
for Western imperialism by showing
that Asians could defeat Europeans in
triumphant fashion. Tsushima, says
Mishra, roused dispossessed peoples,
setting nationalist and liberationist
movements aflame across the globe.
Such bracing findings stay with readers.
Frank admirably demonstrates how
the Japanese war in China precipitated
U.S. involvement in the Asia-Pacific
War. The “Japanese occupation of vast
Chinese territories since 1937 was the
great divide” between the island empire
and America. By 1941, the author adds,
“China not only served as a critical
ally for the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Netherlands in the
Asian-Pacific region” but “it figured
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functionally as an indispensable ally
of the Soviet Union.” Throughout the pe
riod of mounting tensions, accordingly,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt “re
mained highly alert to the fate of China”
(pp. 224–26) and involved himself
intimately in negotiations with Tokyo
meant to restrain Japanese adventurism.
To me, though, the most striking
revelation in Tower of Skulls is just how
deep Japanese civil-military dysfunction
ran. Military influence over politics,
sometimes to the extent of outright
insubordination, was a recurring
theme throughout the Asia-Pacific
conflict. After the fall of France in
1940, for instance, Imperial Japanese
Army chieftains cast covetous eyes on
French Indochina. After French and
Japanese diplomats reached a satisfac
tory accommodation, officers on the
Army General Staff in Tokyo and the
Twenty-Second Army and 5th Division
in China “launched Japanese troops in
an armed onslaught” into Indochina
that September. Army officers evinced a
“flagrant refusal to obey lawful orders”
(pp. 146–47), and thereby shaped the
conflict to Japan’s eventual detriment.
Such is the fallout when the military,
which should be a tool of policy, sub
verts policy for its own perceived ends.
Read the whole thing. Strongly
recommended.
JAMES R. HOLMES

The Hero Code: Lessons Learned from Lives Well
Lived, by William H. McRaven. New York: Grand
Central, 2021. 157 pages. $22.

Admiral McRaven (USN, Ret.), author
of the New York Times best seller
Make Your Bed, has produced another
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well-written, enjoyable, and insightful
read. As it is a book on the importance of
character, it shares some similarities with
Admiral James Stavridis’s Sailing True
North: Ten Admirals and the Voyage of
Character. The main difference between
the two books is where the authors find
inspiration. Where Stavridis looks to
the admiralty for examples of exemplary
character, McRaven looks to people from
all walks of life with whom he served
in his long and illustrious career as a
Navy SEAL, combatant commander, and
chancellor of the University of Texas.
The author begins by providing the
reader with a windshield tour of his own
development regarding heroic character.
To McRaven as an eight-year-old,
Superman embodied what it meant to
be a hero. McRaven’s epiphany moment
came on a trip to New York City, where
he came to understand that it was not
Superman but policemen who were the
real heroes. As an adolescent, his heroes
became those whom he believed were
in a special class—professionals such as
astronauts, physicians, sports figures,
and military personnel—because they
were smarter, stronger, and braver than
the rest of us. But as he matured and
began his own military journey, he came
to realize that not only are there heroes
everywhere but, most significantly,
there is hero potential in each of us.
The hero code, he argues, is “a learned
experience” that is developed by taking
small steps “that eventually become the
foundation of our character” (p. xv).
Each of the ten chapters provides a story
from the author’s life that illustrates a
particular character trait. He leads us
into the PT [physical training] Circle on
the Grinder in Coronado, California,
on his first day of Navy SEAL training,
where he first learns the military value
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of having a sense of humor. At other
times, we walk with him through the
passageways of the Pentagon, where
he receives life lessons on integrity
and its one-for-one correlation with
trust. He also introduces us to young
military professionals such as Airman
Jackson, who, while standing her post
on the flight line in Afghanistan, and
despite overwhelming pressure from
superiors, demonstrates the importance
of fulfilling one’s duty by carrying
out General Order Number One.
Some of my favorite chapters, though,
depict McRaven’s interactions later in life
with those not in uniform. One of these
is the story of a fascinating man named
Charlie whom the author meets for the
first time at a dinner party. The author
describes how Charlie, although a man
in his eighties with a lifetime of stories to
tell, was reluctant to talk about himself.
“[Charlie] was much more interested in
me and my family. He wanted to know
all about my son in the Air Force and my
other two children.” McRaven continues,
“By the time dessert arrived, I felt like we
were good friends. His quiet confidence,
gentle nature, and genuine interest
in me and my family built an instant
rapport that often takes years to develop.
He smiled often, laughed with ease,
and was so very gracious to everyone
at the table” (p. 20). After the dinner
was over, the author discovered that
Charlie, the man who was reluctant to
talk about himself, actually was General
Charles Duke, whose résumé includes
such extraordinary feats as serving as
the mission commander for Apollo 11
(the first moon landing), working in
the simulator to enable the safe return
of astronauts from the ill-fated Apollo
13, and being the youngest man ever to
walk on the moon. But it is not for these
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successes that the author tells us the story
of Charlie; instead, McRaven is impressed
by the man’s humility and its effect on
those around him. He concludes the
chapter with the observation: “The power
of humility is that it brings us closer
together and the role of every hero is to
unite people, not divide them” (p. 25).
While I enjoyed and appreciated each of
the stories of heroic character told in a
lighthearted and conversational manner,
the great strength of the book is in the
author’s encouragement to activate the
heroic character that is within reach for
every person. He encourages the reader
to do one thing in the right direction
today, and he believes that the confidence
to take the next step will follow. Regard
less of whether you feel yourself to be
courageous, he says, “Take just one step
forward. Just one” (p. 13). If our goal is to
instill hope in others, he says, “Find out
what you’re good at and give it to others”
(p. 115). If we want to lighten the burden
on others around us, he writes, “Find
your comedic voice and use your wit to
save those around you, to free them from
their sorrow, to give them joy, and to help
them see the humor in the darkest of
times” (p. 132). McRaven contends that
self-reflection followed by small, incre
mental steps is the key to the heroic life.
This is an ideal book for leaders of all
ranks. Senior leaders will appreciate
the wisdom and insight the author has
accrued throughout his career, but they
also will be inspired to be on the lookout
for heroic virtues in their subordinates.
Small-unit leaders will find these stories
memorable and easy to share with those
they supervise. The hopeful tone of the
book will encourage leaders who may
spend an inordinate amount of time
dealing with character defects in others
to focus on helping them develop heroic
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character. Finally, all will be challenged
to reflect on their own strengths and
weaknesses and seek out others whose
lives are marked by the hero code.
SCOTT CAUBLE

The Cambridge History of Warfare, ed. Geoffrey
Parker. 2nd ed. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2020. 608 pages. $99.99.

Shortly before the outbreak of World
War I, the Prusso-German general
Friedrich von Bernhardi (1849–1930)
published his best-selling Deutschland
und der nächste Krieg (1911). Bernhardi,
the long-serving military historian of the
German General Staff, understood war
to be something far more elemental than
Clausewitz’s famous “continuation of
politics by other means.” Drawing on fin
de siècle social Darwinist and ethnonationalist thought, Bernhardi argued
that war facilitated human develop
ment. War provided an opportunity to
rejuvenate the nation, the society, and
the race. This was an ancient notion, as
Bernhardi acknowledged by drawing on
the writings of Heraclitus of Ephesus:
“[W]ar is the father of all things.
The sages of antiquity long before
Darwin recognized this” (Bernhardi,
Deutschland und der nächste Krieg,
pp. 11–12). In Bernhardi’s view, the
development of a society occurred
within the forge of war—it created the
necessity to evolve or go extinct. The
manner in which a society prosecutes
war is, likewise, a representation of
that society. War, like politics, is both a
reflection of and a response to the form
and function of its governing society.
It is this dynamic that the contributors
to the second edition of The Cambridge
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History of Warfare explore fully in their
development of the concept of the
“Western way of war” (p. vii). The nine
contributors (among them Williamson
A. Murray and Peter Monsoor) of
the book’s eighteen chapters clearly
demonstrate that the Western way of war
consists of five principal elements that
reflect broader Western society: disci
pline, finance, technology, eclecticism,
and an aggressive military tradition. The
most important of these are discipline
and finance—elements that allowed for
the nearly perpetual prosecution of war
through the massed mobilization of so
ciety. It is this “natural state” of Western
civilization, from the Early Bronze Age
onward, that facilitated the primacy
of the Western way of war today (p. vii).
This perpetual struggle militarized the
Western state, while simultaneously the Western state bureaucratized
and centralized Western warfare.

lords, wealthy merchant cities, or
mercenary bands. This led to a “startling
continuity” of military organization,
strategy, and tactics in the West until
the advent of gunpowder (p. 63). The
decentralized nature of the state
further made the pursuance of “total
victory” impossible, so warfare likewise
returned to its “positional” version,
like that prosecuted during the Bronze
Age: harvest-dependent campaigns of
sieges and countersieges against fortified
population centers. Even when the
central state gained an overwhelming
share of internal political and economic
power under Europe’s divine-right
monarchies epitomized by Louis XIV
(1638–1715), the nature of positional
warfare changed little. Limited, position
al war—albeit dynastic and enhanced
with gunpowder—continued to dictate
the military organization, strategy, and
tactics of the early modern period.

Gradually, as ancient Western society
shifted toward oligarchic political
structures and the centralized socioeco
nomic power relations of the latifundia,
so too did the “limited wars” of the
hoplite yeomanry of the Greek polis
give way to the “wars of annihilation”
of Rome’s imperial legions—what
Victor Davis Hanson describes as the
“the perfect culmination of existing
Western military prowess” (pp. 5, 46).
Yet this development simultaneously
laid the seeds of feudal decentralization,
as the ability to mobilize society for
war increasingly detached from the
central state and coalesced around
ambitious individuals on the periphery.

This dynamic shifted dramatically with
the revolutionary ethno-nationalism
of post-Revolution France. Under
Napoléon, the nation became the army
and the army the nation. The superiority
of the “nation in arms,” of the massed
mobilization of an entire society against
the old dynastic form, was confirmed
(p. 147). The Western state and its
corresponding way of war now broke
out from its late antiquity bounds,
creating a perfect storm of technological
innovation, ethno-nationalist discipline,
and national mobilization of resources.
Correspondingly, between 1815 and
1914 the Western way of war subjugated
the near entirety of the globe to Western
political hegemony. Despite subsequent
evolutions from positional to maneuver
to nuclear warfare over the twentieth
century, the primacy of the Western way
of war—uniting discipline, finance, tech
nology, eclecticism, and an aggressive

From late antiquity to the early modern
period, the ability of the central state
to marshal its domain for war relied
on negotiating power relationships
with regional political elites—feudal
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military tradition—continued. Even as
the West’s global political and economic
hegemony erodes, the Western way
of war will continue to inform the
military organization, strategy, and
tactics of any would-be hegemon.
Ultimately, The Cambridge History of
Warfare is the most comprehensive
textbook treatment of Western
military history extant, and it serves
as the quintessential companion to
the Cambridge History of War series.
While it may be “open to the charge of
Eurocentrism,” there is no doubt that
the “Western way of war has become
dominant all over the world” (p. vii).
The volume includes twenty maps, a
helpful glossary, a detailed chronol
ogy, and an extensive bibliography.
No work on this subject can be truly
comprehensive, but readers will find this
edition to be a good resource providing
an overview of the Western way of war.
VIKTOR M. STOLL

Information Hunters: When Librarians, Soldiers,
and Spies Banded Together in World War II Europe, by Kathy Peiss. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2020. 296 pages. $36.95.

The ultrasuccessful businessman Mark
Cuban stated in an interview that
“[i]nformation is power. Particularly
when the competition ignores the oppor
tunity to do the same” (“Interview with
Scott McKenzie,” slushpile.net, 9 March
2006). This axiom is especially true dur
ing times of war, when information—no
matter the subject matter or level of
importance—can be made part of the
intelligence-gathering process. On today’s
battlefield, information warfare is one of
the many domains in which our military
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prepares to fight, and intelligence agen
cies use much open-source intelligence.
Kathy Peiss, in her book Information
Hunters: When Librarians, Soldiers,
and Spies Banded Together in World
War II Europe, examines the efforts of
U.S. librarians and archivists during
World War II. First they gathered
open-source intelligence, then gathered
and preserved books, manuscripts,
and other sources during the war and
postwar periods to enhance the holdings
of the Library of Congress and other
research collections across the nation.
This is not the typical subject matter for
Peiss, who usually studies the history of
gender and sexuality. The book started
when she began exploring the life of her
uncle Reuben Peiss, who was part of the
Library of Congress European Mission
(LCM), which started with the mission
of acquiring books and periodicals
for the library but shifted to one of
intelligence gathering. Peiss’s curiosity
regarding her family has resulted in
an exciting exploration of a mission
that was important during World War
II but still holds meaning today.
Peiss divides the book chronologically,
with chapters that correspond to differ
ent periods and relate the missions of
the various units and their masters who
collected the information. Peiss illus
trates that, unlike the “Monuments Men”
who worked within the U.S. Army to
protect art and historic buildings, many
groups contributed to the protection and
gathering of books and other materials.
These ranged from the Library of Con
gress, the Interdepartmental Committee
for the Acquisition of Foreign Publica
tions within the Office of Strategic
Services (the forerunner of the Central
Intelligence Agency), and military units
such as T-forces, to the Monuments Men
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themselves. While the number and vari
ety of the groups can be confusing, Peiss
focuses on the individuals—scholars
and librarians, male and female—who
had to make critical decisions about
books and collections out in the field.
Just as warfare sometimes is the
catalyst for great leaps in technology
and science, such as the development
of the rocket and jet engines during
World War II, Peiss contends that, in
addition to preserving physical books,
the LCM and other groups brought
about innovations in library science. The
sections on the use of microfilm and
the development of organizations that
would develop into ProQuest and OLIC
also were interesting to this scholar, who
uses those services on a daily basis.
Peiss also delves into parts of the
mission that were less than ethical. She
shows the shadowy actions of some
black-market dealers, as well as bringing
up the ethical dilemma of obtaining
a portion of a nation’s intellectual
heritage during a time of war. Finally,
I was taken by the discussion of saving
Nazi records and propaganda, first
for the war trials, then to preserve
them for future historical studies.
Peiss’s book is a joy to read; her recount
ing of this aspect of World War II is
interesting in itself. It also provides the
perfect companion piece to Robert Edsel’s
The Monuments Men: Allied Heroes, Nazi
Thieves, and the Greatest Treasure Hunt
in History (2009) or Joshua Hammer’s
The Bad-Ass Librarians of Timbuktu:
And Their Race to Save the World’s Most
Precious Manuscripts (2016); the latter
deals with efforts to save important
manuscripts during a more recent war.
Peiss’s book deserves a place on the book
shelf of anyone interested in intelligence
gathering, library science, the protection
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of cultural artifacts, or the power of
information warfare. I also would advo
cate that it be included in the training
of civil-affairs personnel in the military.
Peiss provides the history of efforts to
gather and preserve books, manuscripts,
and other sources, but she also provides
lessons on how to conduct similar opera
tions during future military operations.
EDWARD SALO

Strategy Shelved: The Collapse of Cold War Naval
Strategic Planning, by Steven T. Wills. Annapo
lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021. 292 pages.
$44.95.

In Strategy Shelved, Center for Naval
Analyses analyst and retired surface war
fare officer Steve Wills examines the U.S.
Navy’s struggle to reestablish its purpose
and recapture its identity following the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end
of the Cold War. The “strategy shelved”
motif refers to both the late-1980s Maritime Strategy—perhaps the most success
ful employment and force-structure plan
in the Navy’s history—and the apparent
disinterest of the Navy’s leadership in
drafting a unifying strategic vision of
its future during the later 1990s and
the early part of the following decade.
In Wills’s depiction, the cadre of
uniformed naval strategists that the
naval services carefully developed
during the Cold War was shelved.
Instead, the Navy’s full attention turned
toward preserving its force structure and
its share of the dramatically shrinking
defense budget by grasping at stray
concepts and shoehorning itself into
land-centric joint plans. Under the latter
conditions, having creative strategic
experts did not seem particularly
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important, and many of the best bluesuited thinkers drifted to the Joint Staff,
where the “real strategy” was being
done in an “every service gets its equal
share” fashion. This trend obviously was
reinforced by the career requirements
imposed for joint qualification.
Wills’s book is primarily a history of
the drafting of a unifying naval service
strategy, from the late 1970s forerunners
to The Maritime Strategy through the
. . . From the Sea series of documents in
the 1991–97 period to the Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
(first version) of 2007. However, these
three eras hardly are treated equally;
the majority of pages are devoted to the
development of The Maritime Strategy,
a smaller but respectful number to . . .
From the Sea, and barely a handful to
the 2000s. But this is logical given Wills’s
construct, since much of his effort goes
toward explaining the effects of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, the land-centric
1991 Gulf War, and other currents af
fecting the transition from The Maritime
Strategy to . . . From the Sea, particularly
during the tenure of Admiral Frank
Kelso as Chief of Naval Operations.
The originality of Wills’s work is in
challenging the blue-water Navy’s
post-9/11 strategic-planning stupor,
which only recently is being dispelled
by the “shock” of the growing maritime
might of China’s People’s Liberation
Army Navy. He does this by illustrating
the tremendous effort that the naval
leadership (including the Marine Corps)
and the most creative naval thinkers
poured into crafting, assessing, articulat
ing, disseminating, and defending The
Maritime Strategy, in contrast to the
relative indifference displayed by their
successors. As Wills points out, the
Cold War–era Navy had a system for
developing very experienced strategic
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planners through sequential (repeated)
shore-duty tours in the strategy divisions
of the Navy Staff (OPNAV). Few were
the O-6 branch heads or the O-7 (and
above) division directors who had
not been previously a strategy-action
officer as an O-3/O-4/O-5 in those
same branches (or their equivalent
on the Joint Staff or fleet planning
staffs). Many had been sent to the most
challenging civilian graduate schools of
international relations or public policy
for their master’s degrees (and a handful
of PhDs). The Navy may still do that,
but not with the same intensity. These
officers were expected to be capable of
outreasoning the Navy’s academic and
think-tank critics. In contrast, a Navy
strategic-planning billet largely is seen
today as an isolated ticket punch.
Wills names names of almost all those
involved in drafting The Maritime
Strategy and the . . . From the Sea series.
Most circulated around OPNAV’s
Strategic Concepts Branch, then the hive
of strategy document production but
now no longer existent. Yet throughout
the book Wills stresses that it was always
the level of the CNO’s and SECNAV’s
personal commitment and routine
attention that determined whether a
dynamic and public naval strategic
vision would be created and would drive
programming, budgeting, and acquisi
tion decisions, as well as the necessary
congressional and public support. Those
who might challenge the effect of strat
egy documents—with their “soaring,
elegant words”—on “deck plate” budgets
need to recall that The Maritime Strategy
originally was a classified document
to which all programming and Navy
war planning were directed to adhere;
the public version is but a fragment.
In addition to his pointing to the need
for direct, personal CNO and SECNAV
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involvement in the crafting of naval
strategy (whether classified or public),
Wills’s secondary and more subtle theme
is that the Navy cannot rely merely on
the homogenizing Joint Staff to “staff
and process” the Navy’s mission. Wills
does not go so far as to assert (as I
would) that—for all its discussion of the
future and support for unattainable pro
grams—the Joint Staff is unable to shake
its (natural) fixation on the “wars (and
budget) we are in.” However, he makes it
obvious that naval control of the global
commons (which is the primary purpose
of navies) aroused no joint interest until
the People’s Republic of China demon
strated its growing antiaccess capabilities
and started pouring sand on reefs.
Overall, the history offered is ac
curate and the writing excellent. As
noted, Wills details the effects that the
Goldwater-Nichols Act and Gulf War
had on the Navy’s strategic planning,

self-confidence, and sense of purpose.
These effects, plus the American
experience in Afghanistan and Iraq,
continue to ripple. Who needs a strong
Navy for wars of choice and attempted
nation building? And if you do not really
need a Navy—it having fallen victim
to its own Cold War success—why
would you need a naval strategy?
However, a new Cold War—and the
need to deter wars of necessity—is
coming upon us (or is already here). We
can approach our potential opponents
effectively only from a maritime axis
(which includes the air and the space
over the oceans). Perhaps this is the
time for national-security professionals
to determine whether there are lessons
to be learned from The Maritime
Strategy and its era. To do this, Strategy
Shelved is an essential reference.
SAM TANGREDI
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IN MY VIEW

THE SPACE CONVERSATION

Sir:
In the coming months and years, the American people will need to have an ef
fective conversation about our nation’s ability to use outer space freely. This can
be a complicated and technical discussion, but the subject is one that will have
an increasing impact on our lives in the coming years. Such conversations need
to be conducted respectfully, but we also need to deliver a consistent and coher
ent message that will drive cohesive action—a message that the American people
and their elected representatives readily can understand and appreciate, and with
which they, by and large, can agree.
Our narrative to Congress about the importance of space must be the same
one we make to our local parent-teacher association. If we cannot speak in clear,
simple English, without acronyms, then we do not know our subject, and the
people and their elected representatives will doubt the validity of our message. If
we cannot balance explanations of why we may not be able to use space freely (i.e.,
the threats we face) with suggestions (presented in broad terms) for how to coun
ter those threats, we will lose public support, we may educate our adversaries by
providing too much detail, or in some other way we may defeat our own strategy.
To avoid that result, I offer below a structure for conducting those conversations.
When our grandparents were children, the ideas of satellites orbiting in space
and a man walking on the moon were pure science fiction. Today we take for
granted both our access to and our ability to operate in space, because space has
become integral to our daily lives. For example, space satellites provide images
that allow a farmer to determine which parts of her fields need water and fertilizer,
while other images help us forecast the weather. The Global Positioning System
(GPS) enables the farmer to apply fertilizer precisely, and thereby to maximize
the productivity of her fields. GPS also enables the tracking of the trucks, trains,
and ships that bring those crops to market, both here and overseas, while space
communications link those vehicles and vessels to their headquarters during
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their voyages. Finally, GPS provides the timing signals that keep our cell phone
networks and our banking apps on those phones synchronized. That ensures that
the farmer’s payment check is deposited promptly—not four days after she tries
to pay her bills. Thus, space capabilities and our use of space permeate every part
of our lives.
The use of space for communications, timing, navigation, and imagery began
in the form of military and intelligence systems developed and deployed in the
early years of the Cold War. Over the past seventy years, these space capabilities
have migrated from the military and intelligence arenas to become central to our
nation’s economy, diplomacy, and national security. But both the commercial and
national-security capabilities depend on a space architecture composed of the
same three parts: first, our satellites that orbit the Earth; second, the ground sta
tions that monitor, control, and communicate with those satellites; and third, the
communication links that connect our satellites and ground stations.
Unfortunately, all three parts are fragile. In large part, they all were conceived,
built, and deployed during the Cold War, when space conflict was tied to nuclear
conflict, and there was a high threshold for conflict in space. So, while a fight in
space was something that people feared and wrote about, the connection between
the use of nuclear weapons and the satellites that would detect the launch of such
weapons and communicate that information made it unlikely that our enemies
would start conflict in space.
However, since the end of the Cold War, our nation’s enemies, led by China and
Russia, have observed how we have used space to our advantage in conventional
conflicts, such as during the Gulf War and in Afghanistan. Those enemies intend
to counter our advantage on the ground, in space, and in between, and they are
taking active steps to deny both our access to and our ability to operate in space,
for both military and economic advantage.
How do we move forward? We start by looking at the space architecture we
have. Our nation has been blessed with remarkably talented people—men and
women who have built a constellation of satellites that are works of handmade
engineering art. Because of that, these satellites are very capable—and also very
expensive, and thus very limited in number. They were not developed quickly and
cannot be replaced quickly. Therefore, we will be relying on the satellites we have
today for the foreseeable future. We simply cannot afford to abandon the massive
investment we have made to date.
Given that reality, in the future we will do two things. First, we will defend our
current space architecture—the ground stations, the satellites, and the communi
cations paths that link them. Second, as we make investments in our future space
architecture, we must increase its ability to withstand and recover from an attack. In
other words, we will improve the architecture’s resiliency, across all three segments.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/1
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As we construct our narrative for the American people, first we must ensure
that all of us understand the importance of space to our daily lives. Second, we
must explain how our enemies threaten our access to space and our ability to
operate freely there. Third, we must discuss our plan to defend the space archi
tecture we have today and to increase the resiliency of that architecture mov
ing forward. Our narrative needs to be both coherent and consistent, whether
in front of a Rotary Club or in a classified hearing in Congress. This is a vital
conversation about the importance of space, conducted with both the Ameri
can people and their elected representatives—addressing what it means to the
people of a particular congressional district or state—and what we intend to do
going forward.
Our enemies are not waiting; we cannot get this wrong. Failing in this matter
not only will impact America economically; it also will influence our nation po
litically and diplomatically, and will have a bearing on our national security and
military readiness.

CATHAL O’CONNOR
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
© 2022 by Cathal O’Connor

RESPONSE TO “THE LIMITS OF SEA POWER,” BY JAKUB J. GRYGIEL,
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 74, NO. 4 (AUTUMN 2021), PP. 95–110.

Sir:
It is very appropriate for Professor Grygiel to remind navalists that the “conversion
of sea power into strategic effects on the [Eurasian] continent is neither guaran
teed nor easy.” Likewise, it is quite true that “[s]ailing undisturbed on the oceans
does not mean that a sea power, such as the United States, has political influence
on land; control of the sea does not yield power automatically over the land.” It
may be that if current trends in U.S. defense policy and global politics continue,
the United States will not be “sailing undisturbed on the oceans” at the end of this
decade. One must acknowledge that sea power indeed “has serious limits.”
However, in his article Professor Grygiel looks at sea power almost exclu
sively from a political-military point of view and does not acknowledge fully
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its ultimate necessity as a geoeconomic instrument for those nations that are
separated by seas from the markets and materials that fuel their economies, such
as—to use his historical examples—Great Britain, Venice, and, to some extent,
the United States. It is the case for the majority of “island nations” that sea power
is the prerequisite for maintaining any power at all (and perhaps survival) in
a perpetually conflictual world. Without a strong economy, it is difficult for a
nation to sustain land military power (as the Sino-Japanese saying goes, “rich
nation, strong army”). Sea power may not guarantee strong economies for island
nations, given all the factors involved, but it can ensure that their vital connection
to the world cannot be cut off by another global power.
This is also true for the projection of (land) military power, which Professor
Grygiel identifies as necessary for political influence on land. For these states, sea
power is a prerequisite for land power. In fact, sea power can magnify the impact
of a relatively small amphibious-capable army into a highly potent force, which
is why British decision makers could refer to the (relatively small) British army as
a bullet fired by the Royal Navy. It also ensures that such a power’s own territory
cannot be conquered by those states that do not have comparable naval power.
In his effort to argue that a reliance on sea power instills a lack of confidence
in allies—an argument he stretches beyond the breaking point—the author nega
tively portrays Francis Bacon’s quote that “he that commands the sea . . . may take
as much or as little of the war as he will” as indicating a casual approach to sup
porting allies (thereby making them reluctant or suspicious of the alliance). But
in its context, the Bacon quote has nothing to do with alliances. Rather, Bacon is
arguing that sea powers can avoid wars directed against themselves, while even
the strongest continental states more often are forced to fight.
Contrary to Professor Grygiel’s depiction, the phrase “Perfidious Albion” used
by the French bishop and others is not an indictment of Britain’s reputation as
a fickle ally but rather a lament that the English Channel prevented any French
invasion, while British sea power frequently swept away French pretensions to
overseas empire. France’s near-absolute focus on continental warfare in the Seven
Years’ War (1756–63) resulted in the loss of its most valuable overseas posses
sions (Canada and French India), and Britain, not France, became destined to
be the economic power that controlled much of the world. Certainly this might
constitute perfidy from the French point of view, but that was all because of the
relative imbalance in effective sea power. Regarding the result of further rounds
of conflict between the two nations, Napoléon was quoted as saying: “Had I been
master of the sea, I should have been lord of the Orient.” In short, the author does
not provide convincing evidence that sea power makes for tenuous alliances.
Meanwhile, sea power has the reassuring quality of being able actually to move
land power into a far region to support an ally.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/1
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My impression throughout my reading of Professor Grygiel’s essay was that
he was creating an extreme straw man of what he presumes American strategists
think sea power can achieve—a conception that even the most ardent navalists
would not necessarily support. Humans live on the land, not the sea—which can
be either highway or barrier. Did sea power help nation building in Afghanistan?
Of course not. But neither, apparently, could military land power. Can sea power,
in the form of a threatened amphibious assault on Kaliningrad, force Vladimir
Putin to redeploy troops away from the Ukraine border? Perhaps this is a gamble
no one would want to take—but logically it could.
It is interesting that the author concludes with Joseph Conrad’s illustration of
a French man-of-war fruitlessly (and pointlessly) lobbing shells into the interior
of Africa. France built a brave navy, but it did not create and maintain sea power,
which many French governments, as previously noted, viewed as a luxury, not
a necessity. Britain would not have had to lob shells into the interior, because it
could control the coast and all connection with the rest of the world, effectively
isolating the problem.
Of course, all the discussion above can be dismissed as an esoteric debate
between professors. In contrast, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) has its way
of making significant points very simply. Over twenty years ago, I saw a slide
used in several USMC presentations that captured much of this influence of sea
power–versus–land power debate. I could not retrieve it, so the graphic below is
re-created to place the debate in true and simple context.

SAM J. TANGREDI
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program
Manager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading

T

Program.

he Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP)
motto is “Read well to lead well.” The program encourages sailors at all levels
to read books of consequence. It is a professional reading program, which sets it
apart from a simple list of books intended to be read for relaxation and enter
tainment. The techniques a reader should use with books in the CNO-PRP differ
from those for the casual reader. Mortimer Adler and Charles Van Doren’s highly
regarded How to Read a Book: The Classic Guide to Intelligent Reading provides
some suggestions on how readers can get the most out of their time.
Television, radio, and all the sources of amusement and information that surround
us in our daily lives are also artificial props. They can give us the impression that our
minds are active, because we are required to react to stimuli from outside. But the
power of those external stimuli to keep us going is limited. They are like drugs. We
grow used to them, and we continuously need more and more of them. Eventually, they
have little or no effect. Then, if we lack resources within ourselves, we cease to grow
intellectually, morally, and spiritually. And when we cease to grow, we begin to die.
Reading well, which means reading actively, is thus not only a good in itself, nor is
it merely a means to advancement in our work or career. It also serves to keep our
minds alive and growing. (p. 346)

The authors further write the following:
A good book does reward you for trying to read it. The best books reward you most of
all. The reward, of course, is of two kinds. First, there is the improvement in your read
ing skill that occurs when you successfully tackle a good, difficult work. Second—and
this in the long run is much more important—a good book can teach you about the
world and about yourself. You learn more than how to read better; you also learn more
about life. You become wiser. Not just more knowledgeable—books that provide noth
ing but information can produce that result. But wiser, in the sense that you are more
deeply aware of the great and enduring truths of human life. (pp. 340–41)
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The authors advocate the technique they identify as analytical reading.
The analytical reader must ask many, and organized, questions of what he is
reading. . . . We do want to emphasize here that analytical reading is always intensely
active. On this level of reading, the reader grasps a book—the metaphor is apt—and
works at it until the book becomes his own. Francis Bacon once remarked that “some
books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and di
gested.” Reading a book analytically is chewing and digesting it. (p. 19)

Adler and Van Doren recommend that readers ask themselves the following
four primary questions as they read:
1.	 What is the book about as a whole? You must try to discover the leading theme of
the book, and how the author develops this theme in an orderly way by subdivid
ing it into its essential subordinate themes or topics.
2.	 What is being said in detail, and how? You must try to discover the main ideas,
assertions, and arguments that constitute the author’s particular message.
3.	 Is the book true, in whole or part? . . . When you understand a book, however, you
are obligated, if you are reading seriously, to make up your own mind. Knowing
the author’s mind is not enough.
4.	 What of it? If the book has given you information, you must ask about its sig
nificance. Why does the author think it is important to know these things? Is it
important to you to know them? And if the book has not only informed you, but
also enlightened you, it is necessary to seek further enlightenment by asking what
else follows, what is further implied or suggested. (pp. 46–47)

The authors go to the heart of what I believe it means to “Read well to lead
well” when they note, “We must be more than a nation of functional literates. We
must become a nation of truly competent readers, recognizing all that the word
competent implies. Nothing less will satisfy the needs of the world that is coming”
(p. 31).

JOHN E. JACKSON

(All quotations are from Mortimer J. Adler and Charles Van Doren, How to Read
a Book: The Classic Guide to Intelligent Reading [New York: Touchstone Books /
Simon & Schuster, 1972].)
(Note: This is a revised version of a column originally published in the Naval War
College Review 67, no. 1 [Winter 2014].)
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